Division was an injustice

The division of Korea into two parts was an unjust, unplanned and supposedly “temporary” act whose long-term consequences could hardly have been imagined in 1945. Even if both halves had turned out to be robust and successful states ― which is not the case ― I never believed the division would be permanent. Therefore I start from the proposition that Koreans are one people and that they are destined to be reunified sometime in the future, in a manner and at a time that is now beyond our grasp. As we know from the example of East and West Germany, unification in official and governmental terms will leave a host of problems. Despite enormous efforts in the country with the biggest economy in Europe, including the expenditure of $1.5 trillion in aid, a panel of experts commissioned by the German government reported this June that the East is still economically depressed and highly dependent on subsidies. Politically the two sides are formally joined but in fact still have far to go 14 years after unification. Korea’s problems of reintegration are likely to be much greater because of the far bigger gap between South and North and the more disparate political, social and economic experiences than in the case of Germany. Therefore Korea is likely to be forced to concentrate to a great degree on its own internal problems for decades after unification, even if it takes place gradually and peacefully as I hope (but am not confident) it will. The challenge will be to tend to the enormous reintegration process while engaging energetically with the world outside. To turn away from the world would bring ruin to Korea’s externally-oriented economy and would be socially unacceptable to the increasingly cosmopolitan people of the South. One thing that can never change in Korea is its geography. Relations with its big neighbors will always be important, and those relations will depend to a great degree on what happens in the neighbor states. The greatest question mark is China, which will either continue on the reformist path set by Deng Xiaoping or implode with dangerous consequences for Northeast Asia and beyond. Perhaps because I am impressed with how far and how fast China has changed since I first visited there 30 years ago, I am optimistic that it will manage to deal with its enormous challenges, and that (Taiwan aside) it will not be a physical threat to its neighbors. As for Japan, unless there is a worldwide depression (which would affect everyone, including Koreans), I do not foresee a dramatic change in its general orientation. It is an evolutionary country, not a revolutionary country. Russia, the other major neighbor, will for a long time be seeking ways to recover from three-quarters of a century of Soviet communism and to find a new place in the world for itself. I doubt it will be a major problem for Korea. Whatever the future directions in American foreign policy, I believe it is unlikely that U.S. forces will remain on the Korean Peninsula in any large numbers after unification. They arrived because of the Korean War and remained because of the continuing security threat from North Korea. When that threat is removed, I believe most U.S. troops should and will go home. I doubt the American people will sign up to a serious “balancing role” in Northeast Asia, for which there is no U.S. precedent or tradition. The policies, directions and associations of the new Korea will be established by Koreans working through whatever government exists. I have confidence in the will and national pride of Koreans to deal successfully with the problems at home and relationships abroad. * The writer was a reporter for The Washington Post between 1968 and 1993, serving as the paper’s diplomatic correspondent for 17 years. He is the author of several books, including “The Two Koreas,” published in 1997. by Don Oberdorfer