[IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW] Working with uncertainty

Hans Blix

With the North Korean nuclear talks entering a crucial stage, the JoongAng Daily spoke recently to Hans Blix, a Swedish diplomat and former foreign minister. Blix headed the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) from 2000 to 2003 and was director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 to 1997, during which the first North Korean nuclear crisis erupted and was defused with the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.

Q. In light of your experience with the first North Korean nuclear crisis, would you say there has been progress on the current one?
A. I was in favor of the 1994 agreement because we had demonstrated that there was more plutonium than [the North] had declared. We could not tell how much. But it stopped at that through all of the ’90s and the spent fuel remained in storage. Then in 2002, the United States somehow got information that North Korea had bought some centrifuges, which presumably came from A.Q. Kahn in Pakistan. I am not an expert on the details, but the U.S. termination of the deliveries of oil led the North Koreans to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to throw out our inspectors.

Was the evidence weak?
Yes. It was also the Bush administration’s attitude at the time. They always considered the 1994 agreement immoral, seeing it as a bad deal. But actually their own actions led to something worse. It led the North Koreans to restart reprocessing in 2002 ― that’s five years, until they recently closed down the reprocessing plant. You can calculate how much they have reprocessed. It’s not an enormous quantity, but is still much more than we think they had in 1994. I don’t defend the North Koreans’ action, but I think it was precipitated by U.S. political action.
On the other hand, I am positive about the six-party talks. I think the United States and the others are on a wise track with the talks. It is better to use carrots than to use sticks.
There is one element in North Korea’s calculation about their security: They can choose their security through a bomb of their own, or they can choose security guaranteed by the outside. But if you have a stick at the same time, it is more likely they will say, “Well, we cannot depend upon any guarantees; we are better off with a bomb.”

You went to the North and also coordinated inspections, but the IAEA inspectors were not allowed to roam freely at the time.
Verification is one of the crucial issues in the nuclear talks because there is not much confidence in North Korea’s behavior. We know from Iraq and Iran that transparency is very important.
The IAEA inspectors are in Yongbyon. It will require a separate agreement to go anywhere in the North. We had such a political agreement, allowing us to go anywhere anytime, and we used it. The disablement itself is a technical issue. Once started, it would probably be a matter of months.

What would be the most efficient way to disable the nuclear facilities in the North?
One of important things is that the spent fuel must be gone, taken out of Korea. You can send it to Russia or the United States. In the case of Iraq, the nuclear fuel was loaded onto Russian planes and taken to Russia for storage. This would be important in the North Korean case. Since 1994, we’ve had nuclear fuel in dry storage. That is going to be another tough nut to crack in the negotiations.

Do you think there are any more facilities in the North besides those exposed in 1994?
It’s hard to tell. They are great at digging tunnels, but satellites see quite a lot. When it comes to construction work, satellites see a lot, but still you need inspectors on the ground.
You will never have 100 percent certainty. In the case of Iraq, by 1997 we were able to say to the UN Security Council that we have a “full understanding of the nuclear program.” Our conclusion was that there was no infrastructure left so they could not make nuclear weapons. Washington recognized that conclusion. It was only after 9/11 that Washington looked upon the evidence differently. There is a residue of uncertainty. It’s a political judgment whether that residue is one that you are willing to live with or not.

What do you think are the most key facilities in the North?
I think those are the reprocessing facilities that they call the radiochemistry laboratory.

What is your judgment of the North’s highly enriched uranium program?
I would suspect that if intelligence knew more about it, they would have come out with it ― but they have not. From talking to some people, my impression is that they have some evidence such as the existence of some centrifuges; whether it goes beyond that, I don’t know.
I am not 100 percent confident on American intelligence.

What should be done about the nuclear waste?
The spent fuel is the most valuable thing in Yongbyon, but there is also some waste. It could be used as a dirty bomb and that would have to be taken out of the country as well. But it’s not a strategic weapon. It has limitations and it’s a psychological weapon. It’s a weapon of terror.

How about a light-water reactor for the North?
The U.S. has said no for now and that is an issue further down the line. They are not adamantly opposed to it, after all, but they are adamantly opposed to anything happening right now. In this field there is some elasticity that can be used in the negotiations.

Do you think the inter-Korean summit is a good place to discuss the nuclear issue?
I don’t know. I think there can be value in direct contact.

If the nuclear issue is discussed at the summit, South Korea can play an independent role in solving the nuclear issue. Is this role feasible?
No. I see an advantage in the six-party talks because all the interested parties are there. Whatever guarantees to be given to the North will also be given to the others. It is a security issue that is relevant for all these countries. There it is a good format. It is also clear that at the sidelines of the talks they can have direct talks.

by Brian Lee Staff Writer africanu@joongang.co.kr