Pitching the troop transfer

When it comes to the ROK-U.S. alliance, troop movement in and out of the Korean Peninsula is the most sensitive topic. It rocks the boat.

That is why the transfer of wartime operational control of South Korean troops to Seoul, despite having been decided upon in 2006, is a lingering issue that still won’t go away.

The main argument of the naysayers here is: Why would you want to abolish a system that works perfectly? These people argue that the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command is the most efficient way to control the troops on the Korean Peninsula. They point out that this will allow the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces commander, who is also in charge of the U.S. troops stationed here, to give orders under a single command system. Point taken.

The other argument is that with the South Korean military playing a larger role, the financial burden pressed upon the country will only get bigger.

Take signal intelligence, for example. It is the area that is by far the most dependent on the contributions of the United States. When you go to the Blue House there is this bunker that looks a lot like a Hollywood facility. Flat-screen monitors decorate a whole wall, and there is a map displaying the Korean Peninsula where you can actually see planes taking off and landing - including North Korean ones. You push a button and the president can speak directly to the pilot. All in real time, I was told. The hitch: It comes courtesy of the U.S. military.

To plug that particular gap, South Korea would have to go shopping for some very expensive equipment and start training personnel, because even with continued assistance from Washington, the expectation would be that Seoul would start shouldering more of the financial burden as it gradually moves toward obtaining some of the capability that the United States has.

The military’s ambitious 2020 reform plan that envisions a leaner but more technologically advanced force has already had to be changed because of budget problems. It’s no surprise that pessimists are painting a dark picture as there is no assurance the South Korean military could secure a defense budget large enough to upgrade its hardware and software.

Talking to former defense ministers and generals, it’s also very clear that the transfer issue has become political.

Said a former defense minister who opposes the transfer: “The current officer corps know we’re right but don’t want to admit it, because it would mean that they were wrong in the first place!”

Some of the members of the old guard are sitting on the Grand National Party’s advisory board on military affairs and have also met with U.S. officials, including current U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, to make their case. They don’t want a transfer, or they at least want to delay it for the aforementioned reasons.

According to them, the adage “if ain’t broke, don’t fix it” applies to other areas of operation as well.

“If you have a new Korea Command it means that U.S. troops and South Korean troops will be assigned to separate sectors. Right now you can attach a U.S. regiment to a Korean corps very easily,” said a retired general. “What took one phone call to order will take two and that hampers the whole decision-making process in a game where speed is everything. That is extremely dangerous.”

On a side note, experts believe that the North’s strategy for the peninsula is to strike fast and reach Seoul within days or weeks. If the objective of taking the whole of the South cannot be accomplished, it is predicted that the North will try to settle for a deal with Seoul to use as a bargaining chip.

Thus, the whole military doctrine is centered on the blitzkrieg approach, which would create multiple fronts as well as prevent logistical support and reinforcement of the South’s frontline troops. That is why the North employs such a large Special Forces contingent, amounting to 180,000 troops. I’m no military expert, but the argument that a unified command is more efficient than a split one sounds logical, especially under these circumstances.

U.S. military commanders have always said that Washington will provide “bridging capabilities” to Seoul until the South has obtained the necessary capacity to take wartime control of its troops. Assurances have been given on both sides that the ensuing command structure and cooperation will not suffer from the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Several military training exercises have already been scheduled in order to test the new command structure and ensure it functions smoothly.

What cannot be tested is the psychological effect of knowing that the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command could somehow delay a swift response from Washington if war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula. A good majority of the South Korean military brass (old and new) and experts believe that the U.S. response won’t be as swift with the Korea Command as with the Combined Forces Command, under which Washington’s involvement is thought to be guaranteed. There was a similar train of thought in effect when the decision to relocate the U.S. forces was made several years ago. The concern then was that the U.S. military’s “trip wire” function would be weakened.

I’m sure that the North Korean military will be watching all of this with keen interest, but nobody will really know what the effect of having to go through several layers of command will be on combat readiness or efficiency unless it goes down to the wire.

What I do know is that both sides have recently reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the deal, and I’d be surprised to see either side backpedals from that.

Unless North Korea shows increasing signs of collapse or the security situation changes drastically in the time leading up to the scheduled transfer in 2012, it will proceed as planned.

The real problem is that the government has failed in explaining clearly to the public what all of this means. The previous administration, true to its political roots, pitched the transfer as a measure that would end control of the country’s military by a foreign power, which played perfectly to Washington because the United States was looking for a way to shift its troops around in line with its new military doctrine.

President Roh Moo-hyun argued at the time that the South Korean military wanted to become more independent and said the government would provide the military with the necessary funds to do it. Easier said than done. When the 2020 reform plan was made, it called for an annual defense budget increase of roughly 9 percent. Then it was revised to accommodate an increase of roughly 7 percent until 2020. With half a decade of relative peace on the Korean Peninsula hypnotizing a public that cares more about health care and other social benefits than two North Korean nuclear tests and whatnot, the Defense Ministry will have a hard time justifying its budget.

With the diplomatic wheels already in motion it is now up to the government to make sure that there are no holes in its security structure. Laying it all out to the public would be a good first step.

By Brian Lee [africanu@joongang.co.kr]