Essence of the Beijing risk

Yeh Young-june

The author is an editorial writer for the JoongAng Ilbo.

As with records in sports, all practices in human society can be challenged. Through various forms of preparations over the past years, it was expected that Chinese President Xi Jinping was going to break the unwritten rule — a leader steps down after 10 years of service — at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The surprise is that Xi actually filled the entire seven-member Politburo Standing Committee with his loyalists, known as the New Zhijiang Army. The expectation that Xi would include at least one or two politicians outside his faction was proven wrong. When the seven members of the Standing Committee were announced on Oct. 23, the exclamation of surprise that burst out from the press booths could be heard even on a live TV broadcast.

It is noteworthy that Vice Premier Hu Chunhua was excluded from the seven-member committee. Hu, who graduated from the prestigious Peking University with top marks and served as the first secretary of the Communist Youth League of China (CYLC), entered the Politburo when he was in his 40s, clinching a reputation as a future leader. And yet, he was demoted at the latest congress, and his political life was practically ended.

What caused Hu’s downfall? According to editorials in the state-run media, including the People’s Daily, the key principle of the reshuffle at the 20th Party Congress was “maintaining a high degree of unity within the party’s center with Xi as its core.” In other words, loyalty to Xi was the key to top appointments.

I was reminded of the open press day of the National People’s Congress when I was a correspondent in Beijing. Of the several conferences of provinces and cities, at least one session was open to the press and participants took questions from reporters. In 2017, provincial secretaries were engaged in a competition to use the title “core” in relation to Xi. And the frontrunner of the competition was Li Xi, who was the CPC secretary of Liaoning Province at the time.

During his 10-minute speech, he used the term ”core” as many as 20 times. “It is the greatest fortune of the party and the people that Xi became the core of the party,” Li said. “Of the Marxist politicians, Xi has outstanding intelligence and tactics.”

After serving as the secretary of Guangdong Province, Li was named the seventh-ranking member of the Standing Committee.

The only exception in the competition was Hu Chunhua. Known for his smartness as he often freely quoted detailed statistics without a prepared text, it was unlikely that he had omitted the word “core” out of mere carelessness. Come to think of it, the fates of Li and Hu were decided at that time.

Another key to the 20th Party Congress was the sudden fall of the CYLC faction. If the demotion of Hu represented the final phase of a purge, the sad expulsion of former Chinese President Hu Jintao from the closing ceremony symbolized the fall of his faction whether it was a mere coincidence or a meticulously planned act. The Hu faction was an elite group led by former first secretaries of the CYLC such as Hu Yaobang, Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua, and they have faithfully implemented Deng Xiaoping’s policy of reform and opening. While they were active leaders in the Deng era, no major conflicts with the West occurred.

But Xi cannot coexist with the CYLC faction for various reasons, including his background and philosophy. Xi and other members of the Princelings, also known as the party’s Crown Princes, think their parents were the founders of the Communist regime whereas the CYLC elites were professionals hired to manage the party. Furthermore, the pro-market perspective of economic experts produced by the CYLC are incompatible with Xi’s direction of returning to socialism, common prosperity, and a state-led economic policy.

There is no meaning anymore to analyze Chinese politics with factions such the Princelings and CYLC. The upper leadership is comprised of Xi and his loyalists. The world’s second largest economy and military power is now controlled by one man. Depending on how Xi uses that power, the world may maintain stability and harmony or the world may be marred with insecurity and tensions. That is the essence of the China risk.

A bigger risk is that there is no guarantee that the risk will end after five years. None of the newly formed leadership can be seen as a successor to Xi. The leader in the post-Xi era will likely be Xi Jinping all over again.