Upgrading public diplomacy to the next level

Kim Young-jun

The author is a professor at the Korea National Defense University.

Koreans may have felt proud by the elevation of the country’s rank through the recent Korea-U.S. summits and others. But the perspective of Americans is different from Koreans’. Most Americans are immersed with domestic issues related to global powers like Russia and China.

Korea is nearly non-existent on the public diplomacy front directly linked to national interests. Many in the global community may like Korean companies, culture and food. But considering Korea as a key partner for their national interests is a different matter. Korea’s public diplomacy policy in the U.S. is still centered around Korean residents and students in the U.S., former expats, diplomats and soldiers in Korea who have Korean spouses, a restricted group of experts on Korean issues, and Korean correspondents in the U.S. Apart from the limited sources, Korea is short in its networking and communicative strategy.

In Washington D.C., the Korea Foundation, the Korea Economic Institute, and the Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University and other think tanks have been running programs with restricted budget and staff to play their role as a platform for Korea’s public diplomacy in America. But the time has come for the country to raise its public diplomacy level to the ranks of Japan, Israel and European countries to share geopolitical, economic and other key issues with the U.S. and contribute to the global order. For such an upgrade, Korea needs to make several steps.

First of all, public diplomacy must go beyond ethnic Koreans and pro-Korea think tanks. To influential Republican and Democratic Senators and multi-term Congressmen, big donators and leaders of the two U.S. political parties, South Korea poses attractive, but not enough to be a core economic and political partner, as heavy-weight American politicians only look for supporters to their key interests who can bring jobs or economic benefits to their constituencies to help their political career. They won’t side with Korea just because they enjoy Korean dramas or singers like BTS. They would smile and take pictures and dine with Korean officials, but wouldn’t care to keep up connections.

Instead of lobbying, relationships should be developed to the level where areas for close cooperation are shared and discussed in order to solve various problems. While working with the Korean and U.S. legislatures, I campaigned for the creation of a federation of Korean and U.S. lawmakers and tried hard to build a bridge between the two.

Second, public diplomacy should deepen beyond the level of self-complacent exhibitions like seminars and addresses or events mostly for think tanks and universities where Korean students, Korean Americans, and correspondents from Korea form a majority of the audience. Seminars and international conferences are meaningful and cost-worthy. But most of the trips by Korean officials and politicians merely end with a couple of pictures with U.S. lawmakers and experts — and with dull reports except for a precious few. Seminars and business trips are important, but they must serve to draw real effects by raising awareness on certain themes among Americans.

Third, public diplomacy should not aim to please the Korean public and media. It must persuade American public, media, and opinion leaders on issues related to Korean interests to draw win-win results. Officials must appear on influential news outlets like the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, The New Yorker, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, CBS and ABC to present common interests of the two countries to influence public opinion in the U.S. Israeli prime minister, minister or ambassador, European envoys or ministers, or expert groups supported by Japan often appear on Sunday morning news shows to speak for their national interests and play a role for their public diplomacy.

Last, there must be a command center on policy on public diplomacy to effectively coordinate various foundations advocating for Korean interests. The effect could be maximized through interaction with Korean American groups. Since the government should not be directly behind public diplomacy, the role must be carried out by former government officials or experts. The command center must elaborately mediate — not control — and support the diverse public policy institutions like the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, the Korea Foundation, and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

Coordination of interests of conflict and trust building can hardly be enhanced through inter-government meetings that mostly waste time on formalities. Continuous and delicate interactions among politicians, government offices, companies, civic organizations, and media outlets can help build the international order and policy direction. We must upgrade public diplomacy to the standard of developed countries. Public policy is not about lobbying, but about serving as a battleground to fight for our national interests.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.