Two anchors for security in the Pacific
Published: 04 Jun. 2023, 20:18
Shin Kak-soo
The author, a former deputy foreign minister, is a senior advisor at the law firm Shin & Kim and a member of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.
President Yoon Suk Yeol had a hectic diplomatic schedule in the past two months — a trip to Japan in mid-March, a visit to the United States late April, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s return visit to Seoul early May, and attending the G7 summit in Hiroshima late May. The tight itinerary represents the shifting of the Yoon administration’s diplomatic axis from North Korea and China to the United States and Japan in a remarkable contrast with the liberal Moon Jae-in administration.
Above all, the Korea-Japan relationship which suffered multiple fractures over past issues for nearly a decade has started to recover thanks to the conservative administration’s ambitious step to resolve the wartime forced labor issue through “third-party” compensation.
Over the Mar. 6 government-proposed solution to the forced labor issue, nearly 60 percent of Koreans showed opposition, probably due to the government’s rush to announce the solution based on a third-party fund even without statements of regret and apology from the Japanese companies or their voluntary participation in the fund. President Yoon most likely reached a political decision prioritizing the strategic interests expected from weathering complex uncertainties in the global transitional period by restoring frozen bilateral relations over tactical interest from drawing concessions from Japan through protracted diplomatic overtures.
President Yoon’s decision also reflects his administration’s determination to cut the Gordian knot originating from the conflict between the 2018 Korean Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of compensation for the wartime forced labor and the Japanese government’s claim that the issue was already addressed by the claims settlement in 1965 between Seoul and Tokyo. After Japan attacked Korea for violating the agreement and international laws, Korea was suddenly pushed to take a defensive position and lost the moral high ground. President Yoon’s decision is likely aimed at turning the tide through the a third-party solution.
Such a bold diplomatic initiative seems to be reaping the strategic gains the government sought from the beginning. First of all, the Japanese prime minister paid a return visit to Seoul in just 52 days — much earlier than expected — and helped pave the way for normalized relations. Besides, Tokyo stopped its one-track policy firmly based on “no cooperation without first addressing the forced labor issue” and started to move toward improving bilateral ties for further cooperation on broader issues.
Following welcome remarks from U.S. President Joe Biden and State Secretary Tony Blinken, Biden appreciated Yoon’s aggressive step aimed at improving Seoul-Tokyo relations in a joint statement released after his summit with Yoon in Washington in April. The developments have helped the joint statement from Yoon, Biden and Kishida at the trilateral summit on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to take a more concrete form for the tripartite cooperation. The restoration of Korea-Japan relations and the reestablishment of trilateral relations will certainly help the countries to respond to North Korea’s unfettered sophistication of its nuclear weapons capability and China’s wolf warrior diplomacy for national security.
However, Kishida’s lukewarm regret about the past — as manifested by his rhetoric in Seoul to succeed the historical recognition of the past Cabinets — and the uncertainty over Japanese companies’ voluntary participation in the third-party fund have left diplomatic challenges for Yoon. In his return trip to Seoul, Kishida consoled the battered souls of the forced labor victims, and showed his sincerity by jointly paying tribute to the Korean victims of the atomic bombing at a peace park in Hiroshima with Yoon. But such moves still stopped short of meeting Koreans’ expectations. As the forced labor issue is not completely addressed yet, the government needs to fix possible loopholes as soon as possible.
The bilateral relations have entered the phase of acceleration at last after getting out of a long, dark tunnel. The government must change the paradigm of bilateral relations from a past-oriented, bilateral, emotional and existing generation-based one to a future-oriented, glocal, rational and young-generation-based one. The following is my advice for the transition.
First, the Yoon administration must end the forced labor dispute fast. The March 6 solution aims to resolve it through a third-party compensation to avert the liquidation of assets of Japanese companies in Korea. However, considering the need to create a fund to compensate more than 1,080 plaintiffs awaiting court rulings and the need to avoid a clash with the top court ruling, special legislation is the best option. The government must hurry to set up a civilian-government committee, including the opposition Democratic Party, to prepare for the enactment. At the same time, the government must make diplomatic effort to encourage Japanese companies to apologize — just as Kajima Corp., Nishimatsu Construction and Mitsubishi Materials did to Chinese forced labor victims in 2000, 2009 and 2016, respectively — and volunteer to contribute to the fund, while persuading victims and seeking public support for the move.
The Yoon administration also must pursue historical reconciliation in the mid-to-long term. As the job can better be done by historians, the government needs to reestablish the Korea-Japan joint committee on historical issues and find various ways for Japan’s young generation to correctly recognize the past through history education and cultural exchanges.
Second, the government needs to start from areas where the fruits of bilateral cooperation can be reaped as early as possible. The two countries should create an environment for their companies to actively exchange and cooperate on macroscopic levels. Both countries also must kick-start economic dialogue to strike an FTA, cooperate on such diverse areas as standardization, patents, information, space, cyber, science and technology for the fourth-industrial revolution, support for their joint advance to other countries, supply chains, financial help, and sharing information on economic security.
Third, the Yoon administration must hurry to recover the trust asset. To dispel mutual ignorance, misunderstanding and prejudice and raise the level of mutual understanding and trust, what’s important is an endeavor to expand — and systematize — the suspended human exchanges, including the young. The two countries can get a clue from the 1963 Elysée Treaty signed in the spirit of reconciliation and exchange to put the seal on the friendship between Germany and France.
Fourth, the Yoon administration must reactivate the shut-down communication channels and open new ones if needed. Since the significance of strategic dialogue grew, both countries should have communications on high levels. Establishing a joint civilian-public committee to help stabilize their relations by presenting future visions for the two countries also could be a good idea.
Last, they must cooperate in implementing their Indo-Pacific strategy, maintaining the liberal international order and jointly responding to international issues on the global stage. Cooperation in such fields can maximize the synergy effect of cooperation between Korea and Japan.
The arrow has left the bow. The time has come for the government to take the momentum to better bilateral ties as quickly as possible and develop them into a mechanism that helps ensure peace and prosperity in East Asia. The two neighbors sharing the same democratic values and alliance with the U.S. must not forget their obligations as reliable anchors in the Pacific.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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