A step closer to the nuclear triad
Published: 23 Nov. 2023, 20:06
Updated: 28 Nov. 2023, 16:41
Kim Hong-cheol
The author, a former Air Force brigadier general, is a researcher at the Korea Aerospace Research Institute.
There is a saying that an ominous premonition is never wrong. That’s how I felt when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny cosmodrome in the Russian Far East in September. At the time, many experts predicted that North Korea would receive Russia’s satellite and space launch technology after two failed launches of the “Chollima-1” rocket equipped with the “Mallikyong-1” satellite. In fact, North Korea went ahead with the third launch on Nov. 21.
However, I thought that North Korea would not stop at the technology transfer and successful satellite launch, and ultimately aim to establish a nuclear triad like the United States and Russia. The triad system means the capability of launching nuclear weapons with the ground, sea and air weapons system, like ICBMs, SLBMs and dual-use fighter jets.
North Korea has been obsessed with securing second strike capabilities through mid- and long-range Hwasong missiles from land and submarine-launched Pukguksong-1 missiles from sea. It has also considered using old yet operational aircraft, such as IL-28, through the miniaturization of nuclear weapons. Therefore, I assess that North Korea has a limited nuclear triad capability.
But North Korea may have been worried that it may not be able to guarantee success in using nuclear missiles against the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which has relatively solid missile defense capabilities and an air defense system. Therefore, North Korea would have demanded that Russia — which is pressed due to the prolonged war with Ukraine — to transfer space technology to offset the relatively superior surveillance and reconnaissance capability of the alliance. Moreover, the North must have been eager to establish the ability to drop nuclear bombs using a stealth fighter, which has been a challenge due to international sanctions.
When I was working as the head of the nuclear and WMD strategy team at the Joint Chiefs of Staffs in 2017, North Korea repeatedly made new missile provocations. I thought that a dictator like Kim Jong-un would set an ideal goal for his political survival and mislead his supporters, the military and the people. I argued that Kim will constantly engage in missile provocations to develop solid-fuel missiles, multiple-warhead ICBMs, and space launch vehicles, with a goal to be on par with Russia’s missile system eventually.
However, not many experts supported my view at the time. Since then, the trajectory of the North’s missile development has not been far off my expectations. In the end, the North’s weapons system — which could be affirmed by the “five national defense tasks” presented by the North Korean leader at the 8th Workers’ Party Congress in 2021 and the recent large-scale military parade — proved that my ominous foreboding did not miss the mark.
The current situation is not much different. As the North Korean people’s dissatisfaction grows due to poverty, the leadership needs a plausible target to divert the anxiety to the outside world. Just like any other dictator, Kim Jong-un may be on the delusion of subduing the U.S. and surprising the rest of the world rather than listening to the voices of the people.
Securing stealth capabilities such as Russia’s Su-57S, which can be modified to drop nuclear weapons, will be a grand goal the leader can never give up. These things were impossible until two years ago. But since Putin’s political survival is threatened by the Ukraine war, Kim must have thought that there was room for a secret deal with Putin through the supply of conventional weapons. If North Korea succeeds in establishing a space force-based nuclear triad system, the asymmetric advantage and deterrence through the edge in aviation and space power the two allies have maintained will be greatly offset. In the worst-case scenario, it could lead to a situation where deterrence is impossible.
North Korea’s launch of military reconnaissance satellites should not simply be regarded as a South Korea’s national security issue. Considering Pyongyang’s belligerency and willingness to supply weapons to other countries, the Korea-U.S. alliance and the international community must not offer another window of opportunity to the recalcitrant state. From now on, we must respond thoroughly to get out of the inauspicious cycle of failed nuclear deterrence. This should be the angle to look at Pyongyang’s claim of a successful military reconnaissance satellite launch.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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