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Israeli ambassador urges Korea to continue support for elimination of Hamas

Published: 30 Nov. 2023, 19:37 Updated: 01 Dec. 2023, 19:41

MICHAEL LEE
[email protected]

Israeli Ambassador to Korea Akiva Tor speaks to the Korea JoongAng Daily during an interview held at the Israeli Embassy on Thursday afternoon. [PARK SANG MOON]

Israeli Ambassador Akiva Tor called on Korea to continue being a “a good world citizen” with its support for the elimination of the militant group Hamas in Gaza in an interview with the Korea JoongAng Daily held at the Israeli Embassy on Thursday afternoon.

In his remarks, Tor said that the Israeli government has explained its war aims to the Korean government and has received support from both of Korea's major political parties.

He also acknowledged diminishing international support for Israel’s war against Hamas amid high casualties, but emphasized that the Israeli government had been left with “no choice” but to eliminate the armed group after it launched an attack on southern Israel on Oct. 7, killing approximately 1,200 people and taking over 240 hostages, according to Israeli authorities.

Israel’s bombardment of Gaza, which it says is aimed at toppling Hamas, has since has killed over 15,000 people, according to the Hamas-run Ministry of Health in Gaza.

An uneasy cease-fire that came into effect on Nov. 24 resulted in the release of over 100 Israelis and foreign nationals captured by Hamas on Oct. 7 in exchange for 180 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons before expiring on Friday morning.

The following is a transcript of the Korea JoongAng Daily's interview with Ambassador Tor. Comments have been edited for clarity and brevity.

A pianist rehearses at Seoul National University's concert hall in Seoul during a recital on Nov. 1 in front of seats filled with pictures of the 240 people believed to have been taken hostage during an attack by the militant group Hamas on Israel on Oct. 7. The Israel Embassy in Seoul hosted the “Concert of the Missing” to stand in solidarity with the hostages and their families and to demand the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. [YONHAP]

Q. What message have you been delivering to the Korean government and the Korean people at large during this conflict, and what has been their response?

A. I’ve explained to the Korean government more or less the facts and Israel’s war aims, which are to end the rule and military capabilities of Hamas in Gaza and the return of hostages who have been taken there in captivity.

We’ve also been very clear to the Korean government that Israel intends to pursue the war according to the laws of war and standards of Western armies and also that of the Republic of Korea Army. We take all possible action to avoid civilian casualties. Still, we’ve also warned the Korean government that we’re fighting an enemy who is deeply enmeshed in civilian institutions and infrastructure and behind civilians.

The response of the Korean government has been largely positive. Korea quickly condemned the actions by Hamas and underlined Israel’s right to self-defense. We’ve received this message from the main political parties, the People Power Party and the Democratic Party.

Our message to the Korean public is largely the same, but we face a structural challenge because seven weeks of fighting have taken place since the Oct. 7 attack. There’s been a lot of collateral damage, and significant numbers of Palestinian non-combatants have been killed, including young people and children. The visceral images are all from the Palestinian side and on television all the time, whereas the events of Oct. 7 are in the past and the Israeli hostages were hidden underground until recently. That creates a public diplomacy challenge, but we deal with it.

Children's shoes representing Palestinian children killed by Israeli bombardment of Gaza are laid out during a protest against the war that was held in front of the Bosin Pavilion in Jongno District, central Seoul, on Nov. 17. [NEWS1]

What role would you like to see Korea playing in this conflict?

Korea’s job is to be a good world citizen, which means supporting the eradication of Hamas as a political and military force in Gaza.

The Israeli military, officially known as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), said it discovered North Korean-made weapons left behind by Hamas after its Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Have South Korean, Israeli and U.S. intelligence held consultations on the provenance of these weapons, and what findings can you share?

What’s been found are primarily North Korean-manufactured rocket-propelled grenades called F-7s and also 122-millimeter rockets, as well as other systems. What we don’t know is when they entered the Hamas armory. It’s possible that they’ve been in Gaza for a long time — maybe when Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, but that’s not known for certain.

North Korea is selling weapons all over the world. It’s possible these weapons entered Gaza by way of a third party, such as Iran, which is a very strong supporter of Hamas and has good relations with North Korea. We don’t assume the weapons entered Gaza before 2007. While the presence of North Korean weapons is a topic of great interest here in South Korea, but it’s not a fundamental strategic element of the current conflict.

It’s worth noting that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has officially expressed his government’s support for Hamas, which is no surprise because anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism are part of the official propaganda and ideology of the North.

The IDF has come under considerable criticism for attacks on hospitals, schools, refugee camps and homes in Gaza. Could you explain these attacks?

We didn’t attack hospitals or schools. When we say refugee camps, we’re talking about Jabalia refugee camp, which is actually a small town of approximately 110,000 people. Jabalia is also adjacent to the northern border and is a hotbed of Hamas activity. We struck it and we killed a Hamas commander. To say Israel attacks refugee camps is a misstatement. Israel attacked military targets in a refugee camp the size of a small city.

A good part of the fighting, before the current truce came into effect, was centered around Al-Shifa Hospital. Israel and the IDF claimed that there was a command center under the hospital.

We proved it.

There are tunnels and caches of arms, but the claims that a command center was hidden under the hospital appear questionable from the evidence that’s been presented.

We showed the tunnels, the rooms, the installations and the weapons. We’ve shared the video debriefs of Hamas prisoners who spoke clearly about Hamas activity underneath Shifa. We also showed videos showing hostages being taken to Shifa on Oct. 7 and the presence of Hamas fighters within the hospital on Oct. 7 and afterward.

So while it’s true that we can’t show or even necessarily claim that the entire battle was directed from Shifa, but we have demonstrated clearly that Shifa was a major, important Hamas installation that could have well been evacuated ahead of time. After all, Yahya Sinwar is believed now to be in the south of Gaza. We also demonstrated that a similar situation was taking place at Al-Rantisi Hospital, and we’ve shared our findings with the international press.

The important thing is that we’ve shown that Hamas cannot be believed. They said there were no hostages taken to Shifa and they said they have no activity in the hospital. We’ve shown those claims to be clearly untrue.

The Israeli government has stated that its goal is the elimination of Hamas. Hamas and many others argue that its elimination is difficult, if not impossible. What criteria would Israel use to judge that it has adequately suppressed or eliminated Hamas?

I agree with the premise of your question in that we can’t wipe out the Hamas ideology or erase support for Hamas from some elements of the Palestinian population. What we can do is bring about a situation where a rocket will not be fired from Gaza into Israel and Hamas leaders cannot come out of hiding from tunnels and rule Gaza.

But none of that is achievable if we accept a permanent cease-fire, in which Hamas would remain in power, and no doubt rebuild their capacities with the support of Iran. I believe that it’s fully within the capabilities of the Israeli military to end Hamas’s rule and ability to attack from within Gaza. It won’t be easy because they’ve moved south, and we don’t have a large amount of international support, but it can be done.

An Israeli soldier takes part in military operations in the Gaza Strip after a temporary truce between Israel and the Palestinian armed group Hamas expired on Friday. [ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES]

If these criteria are met, does Israel have a plan for Gaza’s post-Hamas governance?

We will not reoccupy Gaza, build settlements in Gaza or seek to rule Gaza on a permanent basis. But we also won’t allow a security vacuum, and we’ll likely maintain a presence in Gaza until the emergence of a stable regime there. Ultimately, it would be some form of Arab or Palestinian governance.

Some 40 percent of Gaza City’s housing stock is destroyed. Does Israel have plans to participate in the physical reconstruction of Gaza?

I don’t know. Perhaps if we’re invited, but I’m not sure. I think the question will depend on what arises. I hope there will be a government that is friendly towards Israel, and that we can go back to a situation of cooperation.

Israel can do many different things for Gaza, such as providing employment. Before Oct. 7, 40,000 Gazan laborers were working in Israel every day. Many Gazans were being treated in Israeli hospitals, particularly for cancer. We were supplying significant amounts of Gaza’s electricity and water. Above all, we envision a Palestinian government in Gaza and the West Bank that is a good neighbor. A good neighbor is one who is as prosperous as you are.

Is the Palestinian Authority (PA) a suitable candidate to govern Gaza if Hamas is defeated?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the U.S. government have both offered opinions about this, and I don’t think they contradict each other. According to the agreements signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the PA is the legal government of the Palestinian people. We’ve never retracted from that. But the problem is that the PA remains very weak.

In 1993, we signed the Oslo Accords, whereby Israel recognized the principle of Palestinian self-determination and national rights, and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and to live in security. In 1994, we had the Gaza-Jericho agreement, which established the PA, Yasser Arafat’s election as president, and Palestinian governance in Gaza from 1994, which was realized in its full entirety with the withdrawal of Israeli settlements and military from Gaza in 2005, at which point Palestinians became entirely sovereign in Gaza. During this period, they enjoyed a huge amount of goodwill and support from the international community. But by 2007, the PA lost power in Gaza to Hamas, forcing Israel and Egypt to place border and sea controls on Gaza.

The PA has to be willing to take control in Gaza, but they haven’t said they are. They also have to be capable. I don’t know what a future government in Gaza will look like, but from the Israeli perspective, it has to take the form of a government that is capable of delivering reasonably good governance to Gaza and is not hostile towards us.

Surrounded by Hamas flags, a Palestinian celebrates after being released as part of a cease-fire exchange between Israel and the armed group in Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank on Friday. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Some, if not many, Palestinians express support for Hamas, a group that is classified as a terrorist group by the United States, Israel, Britain and the European Union. How can you reach a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without engaging with a group that represents the views of at least some part of the Palestinian population?

It’s a fair and good question. We don’t know to what extent the Palestinian people support Hamas. I don’t want to postulate on it because it can only lead us to negative places. There was a survey released on Oct. 6 that showed the majority of Gazans do not support Hamas, but now there are new polls that show the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank do support Hamas.

What should we do when a people support a government that is committed to your destruction and happily carries out atrocities? I don’t want to sound bombastic, but that’s what happened in Germany in 1933 when Germans voted the Nazi Party into power. Does that mean Jews should have found ways to get along with the Nazi Party? I think that’s the situation we face. I also think we have to work hard to change the views of Palestinians.

Do you think Israel is effectively accomplishing its goals in Gaza? Is the death count worth the expected goals? How do you think the deaths toll will affect prospects for peace with Palestinians?

Israel has two goals that don’t fully align. One of them is to defeat Hamas and the other is to release the hostages. Engaging with Hamas to obtain the release of hostages is harming our capacity to unseat Hamas tactically and politically. The moment we stop fighting, it becomes very hard to garner support to resume. But there’s complexity in the world, and we have to live with it.

Regarding the casualties, we don’t know the exact numbers, but let me grant you that it’s significant. We had 1,200 Israeli casualties on Oct. 7, and also military casualties in the fight against Hamas. What should we do? Do we leave them in place? We have a quarter million Israelis who are displaced from the regions adjacent to Gaza and along the northern border with Lebanon. How are we going to get people to live in these regions if we leave Hamas in power? If we don’t remove Hamas, I have no doubt there will be an attack by Hezbollah from Lebanon.

Also, until what point should the Palestinian people bear with this? Shouldn’t they act with agency and remove Hamas? People are always talking about freedom, statehood, and rights for Palestinians. I don’t want to deny them any of that. But the rights of statehood also require that the Palestinian people have agency and take destiny into their hands. They can’t simply be victims all the time. They also have to do something to achieve governance that will better their plight. Our problem is that the experiment in Palestinian self-determination in Gaza has delivered a Hamas government, and frankly, that’s unacceptable. It’s led to this current impasse.

Palestinians walk through destruction in Gaza City on Friday, Nov. 24, 2023, as the temporary cease-fire between Israel and Hamas took effect. [AP/YONHAP]

That philosophically answers my question, but the question was more about how the war is affecting Palestinian perceptions of Israel. How can Israel convince Palestinians it wants peace while also carrying out a war?

What is our option, really, when 3,000 people cross your border, kill 1,200 people, abduct 240 people and hide them under hospitals, in their homes and beneath their mosques? Is the expectation that we should not hunt them down and destroy them? The war harms our image among Palestinians and in the world, but at the end of the day, a government that won’t defend its people has no right to be a government. Providing security is the first duty of government, above providing democratic rights.

Also, what future does Gaza have if Hamas is not removed? Who would ever invest a single euro or dollar or won in Gaza if Hamas remains in power? In your interview with the Palestinian representative, he said the international community would disarm Gaza. Does he really believe that? Is there anyone aside from Israel that will remove Hamas from power in Gaza?

You have to remember that we refrained from trying to remove Hamas from power for 16 years. We had major exchanges of fire with Gaza every two, three years, but we held back from trying to unseat Hamas because we looked at the casualties we would incur to ourselves and the collateral damage to the Palestinians and decided it wasn’t worth it. So we got mediators like Egypt to restore calm and just returned to our same, miserable and unhappy life of coexistence.

But with Oct. 7, that was no longer feasible, as much as people, especially on the global left, would like to minimize or deny the scale of the Hamas atrocities. Now, we have to get rid of Hamas. We have to do it for ourselves. Ultimately, I think it will serve the greater good of the Palestinian people, even if they may not see it that way now.

'We want a cease-fire, not a pause,' Palestinian envoy tells Korea

A criticism that has been raised against the Israeli government is that it facilitated Hamas’s continued existence through payments from Qatar to Gaza. In hindsight, was this a mistake or a failure of foresight by Israel?

A common argument is that Israeli governments found Hamas’s presence in Gaza convenient because it divided the Palestinian national movement. I don’t think that’s a fair criticism because leaving Hamas to rule Gaza has been the policy of both the Israeli left and right, and the Israeli left is more in favor of a two-state solution. Hamas’s presence was just a reality we had to deal with because Hamas is both the civilian and military government of Gaza. We collect taxes according to the interim agreement on behalf of the Palestinian government in Ramallah, which then transfers funds to schools in Gaza. Should we prevent that, because the schools are run by Hamas?

Your question is a fair question, but it sounds like you’re asking me, on the one hand, if the cost of removing Hamas is worth the damage being caused, but on the other hand, you’re also asking me why we didn’t do it earlier. We left Hamas in power because we didn’t have another choice.

What actions does the Israeli government plan to take if Hamas releases all of the hostages, both military and civilian?

I don’t have instructions from my government on this issue, but perhaps Hamas could surrender. Maybe Hamas will leave and go to Qatar. But we won’t allow them to remain in power in Gaza.

Raz Ben Ami, center front, reunites with her daughters at Sourasky Medical Center in Tel Aviv, Israel, following her release from captivity by the Palestinian militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip on Thurday. [ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE]

Many of the Palestinian prisoners released by Israel in the recent hostage exchange have never been convicted and were held in long-term administrative detention. Palestinians in the West Bank are also tried in military courts, as opposed to civil courts for Israeli settlers. Why do Palestinians accused of crimes face different treatment instead of normal criminal prosecution?

Administrative detention is not extrajudicial. It goes through a judge and it’s still approved by a court. It’s true that it’s not a normal criminal proceeding. It was also the long-term practice of the British government in its struggle against the Irish Republican Army. In fighting a terror organization, it’s not always easy to produce a civil standard of evidence, especially when you’re fighting a very bitter foe that carries out suicide bombings and you have strong restrictions on means of interrogation. That gives rise to a situation where even a democratic regime needs to be able to use administrative detention.

But we only use it against people who are not our citizens. By contrast, an Israeli Arab cannot be held in administrative detention. Every citizen of Israel, whether they be Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Arab, Ashkenazi, or Mizhrahi, is under one law. Those who are not Israeli citizens are not under Israeli civil law.

But not all of the people who have been detained who were released in exchange for hostages have committed very violent crimes. Some of them are accused of throwing rocks. Should they be held in long-term detention for that?

Let’s put it this way. Administrative detention is not an ideal situation. But there are rocks, and then there’s Molotov cocktails and stabbings, and unfortunately, the people carrying out these acts can be 14, 15, 16 years old. It’s very unfortunate, but we can’t deal with it like juvenile delinquency, because it’s happening in an environment that supports and encourages violence. So am I happy about it? No, I’m not. Do I think it has legitimacy? Yes, I do.

This is also exactly the reason why people should rule themselves. When I reported for reserve duty, I had training periods and patrols in the West Bank. Every time I came back from patrols, I would wonder why we couldn’t solve this problem and ask myself what it means for us to rule another people. But then I’d go back to work, and there’d be a bus bombing in Jerusalem, where 35 men, women and children were killed and their families destroyed. At that point I’d think, “Yes, this is unpleasant, but what choice do we have?”

If the Palestinian people and their governance were of a sort where we could really, really make peace, the great majority of the Israeli public would be in favor of a far-reaching settlement. Israelis in the past elected governments that were willing to go very far to make peace. Ehud Barak offered 92 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza. Ehud Olmert offered 95 percent and power-sharing in Jerusalem. That was the position of the Israeli public until the 2000-2005 Second Intifada and the failure of our disengagement from Gaza.

Is the Israeli public ready for a far-reaching settlement now? No, it is not. The Israeli public would not support an Israeli government that enables a state that could easily come under Hamas domination and rule.

You’ve spoken about wanting a Palestinian partner for peace. The PLO renounced violence in 1993. Critics of Israel have said that despite this, the occupation has gone on. Why have Palestinians have not seen changes in the occupation? Is that just on Palestinians? Is it their fault?

In human relations, it’s never one side’s fault, but I believe a fair-minded person would conclude that it’s primarily a problem on the Palestinian side. Hillary Clinton recently went on air — in front of an unsympathetic audience — and said her husband was present at the Camp David talks, where the Palestinians were offered a state with almost the entirety of what they asked for. They said no. By now, I could be attending the reception of the Palestinian Embassy in Korea on the 23rd anniversary of their independence. Is it Israel’s fault? I’m sure we made errors, but I don’t think it’s primarily our fault. There are Israelis and Israeli politicians who value the divine promise of the land more than they value peace, but they are marginal voices. They do not represent the majority of the Israeli political thinking.

So you say marginal voices, but Prime Minister Netanyahu was quoted in the Times of Israel that he has continued to lead the Likud party because he is “the only one who will prevent a Palestinian state in Gaza and [the West Bank].”

I’m not counting the prime minister as an extreme voice. He gave a historic speech in 2009 at Bar-Ilan University where he supported the establishment of a Palestinian state. But that was a while back, and things have taken a wrong turn.

But is the Israeli government still committed to a two-state solution?

At this moment, it’s hard to say. The Labor Party is looking for a two-state solution. Parties in the center are more in favor of strong Palestinian autonomy rather than full statehood. The difference between full statehood and autonomy is that Israel still has the ability to maintain strong security control in the latter situation.

I’m not saying Israel will never go back to supporting full Palestinian statehood. But if you look at the Israeli mainstream and moderate Palestinian voices, the minimum that the PA is willing to accept exceeds the maximum that the mainstream Israeli consensus believes it can safely offer. When we refer to a two-state solution, we’re usually talking about a Palestinian state on all territories captured by Israel in 1967, and I don’t think the Israeli public is quite there. We were there in the past, but not now. Israelis believe that there’s too great a likelihood that such a state would be a failed, radicalized state very similar to Gaza on the eve of Oct. 7.

As Koreans know, the lack of a perfect solution doesn’t mean there aren’t imperfect possibilities. The PA rules all six major cities in the West Bank. Those areas can grow. They can be flourishing places, but they require reasonable governance.

Israelis argue that Palestinians are a security risk and should be treated as such, but Palestinians say that security risk is only present because of the way Israel was created and expanded and the current conditions in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. What can Israel do on its side to end this cycle?

It’s very difficult for us to do it on our own, but neither are we free to not do it. There’s a statement in the Ethics of the Fathers in the Talmud: “Not upon you is all the work to accomplish, but neither are you free from trying to accomplish it.”

I always thought Israel made an error in the Oslo process by dropping people-to-people exchanges with Palestinians, which would have fostered greater levels of contact between Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. Arafat didn’t like that because he saw people-to-people normalization as a concession to Israel, and Israel should not have conceded to that. When problems broke out on the senior level, we didn’t have societal ties and relationships to hold the peace process together. I very much hope we’ll get to a place where these contacts can happen again. The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement undermines such exchanges. But unfortunately, progressive dialogue right now is against compromise and focuses instead of demonization. That doesn’t take us very far.

I remember that during my interview with Palestinian Ambassador to Japan Waleed Siam, he said that part of the reason why the PLO turned down the Israeli proposals for a two-state solution was because Palestinians did not want to concede land where Israeli settlements are currently located in the territories captured by Israel in 1967. Are the settlements something the Israeli government should have conceded on?

Ehud Barak’s proposal at the 2000 Camp David talks entailed the removal of large numbers of settlements. Yasser Arafat could have offered a counter-proposal if he thought the Israeli proposal wasn’t good enough. Mahmoud Abbas should have done the same at Annapolis in 2007 if he thought Ehud Olmert’s proposal wasn’t good enough. I think that at the moment of truth, the Palestinian national movement hit a wall with the issue of final claims. Once a Palestinian state is established next to Israel, it means Palestinian refugees from Acre and Tel Aviv are not going home — their home will be in Palestine. My guess is that that was a big problem for them.

Multiple United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the International Court of Justice have ruled that Israeli settlements in the West Bank contravene international law. Why do settlements continue expanding despite this, and why is violence committed by settlers continuing unabated?

It’s our responsibility as a government that there be no vigilante violence and that we act to enforce the law against Israelis living in the West Bank who commit violations. The majority of Israelis who live in the West Bank, also known as Judea and Samaria are law-abiding citizens. But there are a number of criminals, and we have to do a better job to stop and arrest them from committing violence. There’s no question about that.

That being said, we don’t believe that the territories in question are occupied. We believe that they’re disputed. We’re aware that the international legal opinion is not in agreement with Israel, but that’s one of the issues of sovereignty, which is that we have our internal law enforcement. We believe that there’s rule of law in the West Bank, and that private Palestinian land belongs to Palestinians, but that there’s also state land which is not owned by any state at the moment, and that there is a possibility for Israelis to live in the West Bank.

There have been different policies by different Israeli governments at different times. The general policy of Israeli governments in recent times, and even that of the current Israeli government, is to restrict the establishment of new settlements. We’ve primarily allowed natural population growth in settlements that already exist, and the great majority of Israeli settlements are not far from the Green Line, which was the border between Israel and the Jordanian-held West Bank before 1967. Of course, there are settlements that are deeper within the territory, but they’re small.

There were Israeli governments that believed that Israel has a right to settle everywhere, but in general, Israel has been restrictive on this issue. But we have said that without a final agreement, we should not restrict the ability of existing settlements to thrive and grow within their municipal boundaries.

Many Israeli politicians have used language that appears to go beyond the Israeli government’s stated goal of eliminating Hamas and seems to call for the total destruction of Gaza and its residents. For example, IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari said on record the focus of the war is “on destruction and not accuracy,” while Likud politician Ariel Kallner said “nakba” is the “only goal.” How can these statements be reconciled with other official public Israeli statements that insist Israelis want peace?

I have to check Hagari’s statement. I think he meant we can’t fight this war with tweezers, which is how he should have phrased it. That being said, there are outrageous statements by Israeli politicians that I can’t defend, and I won’t even try to defend. It happens in Korea, too, every day. We have a democratic system with 120 members in the Knesset and a coalition government with a number of parties that are not mainstream. Some things are said that I think are wrong and can’t be justified. But they’re not the policy of the Israeli government. We are not trying to achieve a Nakba in Gaza.

How would you define Zionism, and it is incompatible with Palestinian state sovereignty?

There’s no contradiction. Zionism is the movement of the Jewish people for self-determination in their ancient homeland. It’s derived from 19th-century nationalism, but it’s also rooted in deeper traditions. In the Jewish prayer book, we ask God three times a day to gather the exiles and return us to Jerusalem. There’s a very deep wish among many Jews to achieve normality within a nation-state over their own.

But Zionism never defined the exact contours of the Jewish state, and in the end, the Zionist movement accepted the United Nations partition plan of 1948. The 1948 partition resolution was the first two-state solution, and it offered very unfavorable terms for the Jewish state, which was given mostly the Negev Desert and the coastal plain. Jerusalem wasn’t included in the Jewish state under the plan. But David Ben-Gurion felt it was sufficient for establishing a state. The partition plan also included a wide expression for Arab nationalism and aspirations for self-determination in what was still the British Mandate for Palestine.

So Zionism is capable of making room for Palestinian self-determination, and this has been proven time and again with prime ministers like Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert all being Zionists. They all strongly supported a two-state solution until we arrived at a point where it didn’t seem tenable. By the way, I don’t want you to misinterpret the position of the Israeli government regarding a two-state solution. We believe that we have to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, but we’re not committed to establishing a Palestinian state. We’re committed to achieving as much Palestinian self-determination that Israel can safely live with.

How should Israel answer the claims of Palestinian refugees created by its establishment?

If you read Benny Morris’s “The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” which I think is the best account of this issue, he argues that the refugee crisis was not the result of an organized campaign by the Israeli high command while acknowledging some were the result of expulsions. But ultimately that skirts the issue, because the United Nations has called for the return of refugees.

The Israeli perspective is that the 1948-49 Israeli War of Independence also caused a mass expulsion of Jews from historic communities in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt and North Africa. If you look at the numbers of Jews from Arab lands who lost their property and citizenship, you’ll see it’s a greater number than the Palestinian refugees. They came to an impoverished country that was dedicated to their rehabilitation and helping them build their lives. Approximately 45 percent of the Israeli population today are descendants of Jews from Arab lands. Our view is that what happened here is an exchange of populations.

We understand why the Palestinians don’t see it that way. They’ll ask “That’s the Arab countries, what’s that got to do with us.” But in 1948, it was the new Jewish state of Israel against the entire Arab world. Similar processes happened in India and Pakistan, as well as in Europe, where Germans and Poles were expelled from lands where they lived for centuries. Greece and Turkey underwent a similar process before World War II. The Palestinians should understand that Jews also suffered a mass expulsion, and it’s time for everyone to make lives for themselves 75 years after the fact.

BY MICHAEL LEE [[email protected]]