How to set aside security issues

Ra Jong-yil
The author, a former ambassador to the United Kingdom and Japan, is a chair professor at Dongguk University.

In a country struggling with so many domestic and international challenges, the recent meeting between the president and the leader of the main opposition was, oddly, the first ever since the administration started two years ago. Does it mean that there was no issue requiring a consultation between the two leaders over the past two years?

Also strange is that the meeting was initiated by the opposition leader, not to mention no announcements on the details of their talks. Then, suddenly two professors publicly claimed that they were the secret messengers who arranged the meeting. They even held a press conference to publicize the supposed content of the meeting.

More surprisingly, in their first face-to-face meeting after the 2022 presidential election, neither leader discussed the most important and urgent security issue facing the Korean Peninsula amid the deepening U.S.-China rivalry. Of course, the most important topic in Korean politics these days could be the ever-worsening livelihoods of the people. But such talks are only possible when the country’s security is ensured.

Due to the unique geopolitical condition of Korea, its security challenges always came from outside. Major turbulences in Korean history — such as Japanese invasions of the Joseon Dynasty in the late 1590s and the Qing invasion of Joseon in 1636 — were all linked to developments outside the peninsula. The Japanese invasions were triggered by the establishment of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s hegemony in Japan. The case of the Qing invasion resulted from the rise of Qing in place of the Ming Dynasty. Those external circumstances led to the colossal devastation on the peninsula.

After the Chinese Civil War ended, the British Foreign Office predicted in 1949 a looming danger on the Korean Peninsula. In January 1950, then-British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin warned of the danger of war and even suggested how to respond to the situation. He made several attempts to alert the U.S. State Department but was ignored.

All the major hardships Korea suffered had one thing in common. Political leaders had been satisfied with the current peace, preoccupied with domestic politics, and failed to pay attention to ominous signs abroad.

Following the end of the Cold War, and especially over the past generation, humanity has experienced an unprecedentedly long period of peace. The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc have collapsed or underwent a significant transformation, and world peace, guaranteed by the only superpower, has been maintained. It was this situation that made possible the Sunshine Policy, which aimed for eventual reunification through inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, although they were limited.

But the situation has changed. Crises are brewing far away in Europe, the Middle East, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and even in the Taiwan Strait. Under such volatile circumstances, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has vowed to reunify the two Koreas by force, claiming that they are no longer one people but two hostile states at war.

For the past 70 years, the South- U.S. alliance has prevented a large-scale armed conflict and guaranteed basic security on the Korean Peninsula to establish an environment conducive to industrialization and democratization. Will this guarantee continue in the future? What will the free world do when faced with difficult choices, and what preparations should we make to avoid such a situation?

What counts most is our politicians’ ability to reach consensus. But the lead-up to the first meeting between the two leaders and what happened afterwards point in a different direction.

In a divided world after World War II, Austria’s miraculous foreign policy led to neutralization, self-government, unification and independence in a short time. As Chancellor Leopold Figl, the man behind such great accomplishments, said, the best condition for a great foreign policy is national consensus. This is why the rarity of the meeting between the president and the opposition leader is extremely regrettable.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.