Waves of Russia's war ripple toward South with North's troop dispatch
Published: 31 Oct. 2024, 16:55
Updated: 31 Oct. 2024, 19:28
- SEO JI-EUN
- seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
[NEWS ANALYSIS]
The waves of Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine, now nearing its third year, are rippling toward South Korea.
South Korean intelligence reported on Wednesday of a “possibility” that an advance party of North Korean troops is engaged on the front lines in Russia’s Kursk region, an area that borders Ukraine and has seen ongoing military operations. South Korea’s presidential office believes “over 3,000 North Korean soldiers” have arrived near the conflict zone. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that a nation joining with Russia "is the first step to a world war."
Some experts believe North Korea’s involvement will have a minimal impact on Russia’s combat capabilities, while it could pose significant risks within North Korea itself. Language differences, a lack of compatible training and battlefield experience are expected to limit the effectiveness of the North's troops alongside Russian forces. Additionally, as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sends young soldiers to fight abroad despite his focus on "love for the people," experts warn that disillusionment and resentment among both North Korea’s youth and their parents could grow.
For South Korea, North Korea’s military involvement in Ukraine could present a potential intelligence opportunity. This is the first time North Korean forces have been deployed in a foreign war, making it an opportunity for Seoul to evaluate Pyongyang’s military capabilities as well as key insights into the North's military structure and readiness.
Yet the most concerning potential outcome remains a Cold War-like standoff or, worse, an escalation toward a potential third World War, experts say. Should direct engagement between North Korean and Ukrainian forces be confirmed, it could cross what NATO and South Korean officials have referred to as the last “red line.”
Young, elite special forces
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) estimates that up to 12,000 North Korean troops could be dispatched to Russia to join the fight in Ukraine by December. This includes elite forces from North Korea’s 11th Corps, often called the “Storm Corps."
The soldiers sent to Russia are largely in their early twenties, with some even in their late teens. These soldiers have undergone rigorous basic training as part of the Storm Corps, with the NIS warning that their combat readiness “should not be underestimated.”
Analysts have raised doubts about North Korea’s operational impact on the war, pointing out the challenges of integrating with Russian forces.
“Kim Jong-un has done everything he can to prevent outside information from getting into North Korea, which means that the North Korean military likely has had very little exposure to the evolution of the battlefield that has been occurring in Ukraine,” said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense researcher at U.S.-based think tank RAND Corporation.
Evans Revere, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state and now a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, added that differences in training, tactics, language and culture between North Korean and Russian forces “will hamper their ability to integrate their operations."
Intercepted communication by Ukrainian intelligence captured the frustration of Russian troops with the North Korean soldiers. The Russians reportedly complained about the logistical difficulties posed by the need for one interpreter and three senior officers assigned for every 30 North Korean soldiers.
Bennett suggests that Kim Jong-un likely limited the deployment to soldiers from the “top category” of his country's political caste system in a bid to minimize defection risks.
“Those defectors could provide South Korea with major information on the conditions in North Korea and especially in the North Korean military because some of those personnel were advisers who were likely officers and more experienced with the status of the North Korean military forces,” he explained. “Since life is so miserable in North Korea, and since some North Korean officers have apparently previously defected, Ukrainians may be able to get dozens of North Korean defectors if not much more.”
Ukrainian forces have reportedly begun broadcasting in the areas where North Korean forces are deployed to induce them to surrender. There are also reports that 18 North Korean troops deserted their unit near Kursk. Andrew Yeo, a senior researcher at Brookings Institution, emphasized that such defections would represent an “embarrassing blow” for the Kim regime.
Some experts believe North Korea’s intervention may provoke internal dissent among families in the country, particularly if young elite soldiers lose their lives, potentially aiding Seoul’s unification policy.
“Because elite North Korean families tend to have at most one son, the death of their son as a soldier in Ukraine means extinguishing their posterity,” Bennett said. “And because North Korea is very much a family-oriented society, those families will be furious with Kim once they find out that their sons have been sacrificed.”
Money, combat experience, closer Russia ties
North Korea’s decision to send troops to Russia, experts suggest, reflects Pyongyang’s bid to gain advanced military technology, resources and cash amid economic hardship exacerbated by UN sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic. By supporting Russia — a country now largely isolated due to its invasion of Ukraine — North Korea likely sees an opportunity to demand repayment down the line for its assistance.
Revere noted that this deployment signals Pyongyang's significant "investment" in its Comprehensive Partnership with Moscow, essentially expanding the relationship to a “de facto military alliance.” The investment not only includes combat forces but also ammunition, tactical rockets and midrange missiles, as well as political and diplomatic support. In return, the North is likely seeking critical military technology from Russia, such as assistance with aircraft, ballistic missile guidance, satellite launch capabilities, nuclear warhead shielding and re-entry technology.
Financial incentives also play a major role, as Kim reportedly agreed to send troops to Russia in exchange for monthly payments. Russia is said to be paying $2,000 per soldier each month, meaning a deployment of 10,000 North Korean troops could generate around $20 million monthly, giving the regime essential funds for weapons development and food supplies.
“Russia was probably fairly careful with what technologies it gave North Korea, realizing that North Korea really isn't a true ally and could at some point in the future use or sell whatever technologies Russia provided in ways that would see those used against Russia,” Bennett said. “Ultimately, Kim apparently decided that the alternative available to him was to ‘sell’ his soldiers to Russia.”
In addition to material benefits, the deployment could provide “valuable combat experience” for North Korea and allow its forces to evaluate their military capabilities against Western technology and tactics firsthand, according to Yeo.
From Russia’s perspective, deploying North Korean troops — whether as front-line reinforcements or “cannon fodder” for the “meat grinder” of the war — could fill critical manpower shortages. Russia’s ongoing mass assaults have already resulted in high casualty rates, with reports indicating around 1,200 losses daily. Yeo suggests that by incorporating North Korean forces, Russia temporarily relieves pressure on its own recruitment efforts.
"Trump and Harris present starkly different approaches to resolving the Ukraine conflict,” said Hong.
“Trump may prioritize negotiations presenting peace talks, while a Harris administration could strengthen military support for Ukraine, potentially intensifying pressure on Russia […] possibly approving the use of long-range missiles against Russian targets before the transition of power,” Hong added. “For Russia and North Korea, there is an aim to amplify the impact of troop deployment and demonstrate substantial wartime contributions [respectively] before a shift toward negotiations.”
Can it spark World War III?
Experts are sounding alarms about the escalating “internationalization” of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as Pyongyang’s deployment might tip the military balance in Northeast Asia.
Ukraine has called for increased support from the United States and NATO as well as South Korea, which is considering providing lethal aid to Ukraine, a step that Seoul says could evolve based on North Korea’s role in the conflict. Support might escalate from “defensive” systems, such as interceptors, to “offensive” capabilities, including artillery and missile systems — and potentially draw the conflict closer to home.
“In light of the major effort that South Korea has made to strengthen ties with NATO and the EU, Seoul cannot stand by and do nothing in response to Pyongyang's expansion and escalation of the war against Ukraine and its supporters,” said Revere. “It will test whether and to what degree Seoul is prepared to contribute to the security of the NATO and European partners it seeks.”
In a worst-case scenario, a blood alliance between North Korean and Russian forces could prompt NATO members to intensify military support for Ukraine and send troops to aid Ukrainian forces, as well as the provision of lethal aid by South Korea. Such escalations might drive Russia toward nuclear options, which could not only broaden the Russia-Ukraine war but make the Korean Peninsula a future hotbed in a new Cold War structure.
“Russia will be seriously offended by anything that South Korea does to help Ukraine, and so there could be long-term economic consequences for South Korea, which, for example, had hoped someday to get Russian oil supplies,” Bennett said. “If Russia feels that the impact of South Korean actions is too serious, Russia could even take military action against South Korea [by firing] one or more ballistic missiles carrying conventional explosives at South Korea.
“But because Russian forces are largely occupied with combat in Ukraine, there is not a lot more that it could do militarily against South Korea besides military technology transfers to the North,” he added.
“South Korea needs to be smart about dealing with [lethal weapons for] Ukraine,” said Bennett. “It needs to turn to Russia in the step-by-step approach that President Yoon's office has described and tell Russia that if it transfers Russian military technology to North Korea, thereby jeopardizing South Korean security, then South Korea will be warranted in sending lethal aid to Ukraine that will jeopardize Russian security. And the South Korean government needs to make such announcements very publicly and have them recognized internationally so that when Putin lies about what is happening, the world will treat his comments with skepticism.”
BY SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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