Uncertainty looms for South Korea, U.S. under second Trump presidency

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Uncertainty looms for South Korea, U.S. under second Trump presidency

Published: 07 Nov. 2024, 18:53 Updated: 08 Nov. 2024, 09:55

MICHAEL LEE
[email protected]

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes the stage following early results from the 2024 presidential election in Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, Florida, on Wednesday. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

The victory of former U.S. President Donald Trump in his third White House race on Wednesday has opened up new risks for South Korea, which spent the past four years strengthening cooperation with the outgoing Joe Biden administration.

The turbulence of Trump’s first presidency from 2017 to 2021 weighs heavily upon Seoul, which regards its alliance with Washington as a cornerstone of its own foreign and security policies and the key to maintaining deterrence against Pyongyang.

On the campaign trail, Trump reminisced fondly about his interactions with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018 and at the 2019 Hanoi summit, which ultimately failed to produce lasting agreements. The two also shook hands briefly at Panmunjom in June 2019 and exchanged a series of letters.

“I got along very well with North Korea, Kim Jong-un […] It’s nice to get along with someone that has a lot of nuclear weapons, isn’t it?” Trump said in a speech on July 18 this year. He hinted at the possibility of meeting Kim again if he wins the 2024 election, adding, “He’d like to see me back, too.”

Besides Kim, the president-elect has also touted his rapport with other authoritarians such as Russian President Vladimir Putin as proof of his ability to strike peace deals that could end global turmoil.

By contrast, he has expressed less goodwill toward South Korea, which he characterized as a freeloader on U.S. defense spending and as a “money machine” in his comments on the campaign trail.

Such remarks, as well as his previous threat while in office to withdraw troops from South Korea if it did not agree to a five-fold increase in contributions to the cost of stationing U.S. troops on the peninsula, have reopened concerns that he still views the two countries’ longstanding alliance through a primarily transactional lens.

However, some experts in South Korea and the United States believe Seoul could adapt to Trump’s approach to allies by emphasizing the strategic importance of the South Korea-U.S. partnership in countering China and promoting the mutual benefits of the partnership.

By doing so, South Korea could ensure its security interests are not entirely jettisoned during Trump’s second presidency.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, right, meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018, during Trump's first term. [AP/YONHAP]

More pain, little gain expected from the North

While Trump arguably went further than any other U.S. president in his pursuit of a deal with North Korea by agreeing to meet with Kim, the collapse of their second summit in Hanoi will likely color Pyongyang’s interactions with his second administration.

Advances in the North’s weapons programs over the past four years and its budding relationship with Russia, as evidenced by its decision to deploy troops to fight under Moscow’s command, are also likely to dampen Kim’s interest in reaching an agreement with Trump regarding his growing stockpile of missiles and nuclear weapons.

The North’s shift in focus from dealing with the United States to pursuing other relationships was partially reflected in a July report by Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), which responded to Trump’s nomination acceptance speech by saying the regime would not only be “indifferent” to whichever candidate takes office in Washington, but also prepared for “all-out fighting.”

However, experts say the North’s launch last week of a new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is still likely intended to convey to the incoming administration that the regime will not abandon its weapons programs.

“For North Korea, tests like these have both a technical component and a political messaging aspect to them,” says Naoko Aoki, a political scientist at the Virginia-based think tank RAND. “I think it is safe to assume that this was meant to try to convince whoever takes office as the next U.S. president that North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles are here to stay, meaning that North Korea is not interested in denuclearization negotiations.”

When he takes office in January, Trump will also face a vastly different international geopolitical landscape than the one he confronted during his last presidency, when he first threatened the North with “fire and fury” before trying face-to-face diplomacy to convince Kim to abandon his illicit weapons.

Aoki notes that even if the North’s recent deployment of troops to Russia to fight in Ukraine is not directly aimed at the United States, it is “certainly aimed at challenging the international rules-based order that the United States is trying to defend.”

Prof. George Lopez, an international relations professor at the University of Notre Dame, says the North’s priorities are now focused on “pleasing Putin by muscle flexing, as well as sparking more fear in regional neighbors.”

His sentiments are shared by Prof. Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, who notes that Kim “is now so clearly invested in missiles, nuclear weapons and relations with Russia that personal letters and even summits are unlikely to be enough to change direction.”

According to Lopez, Trump also “suffers from insufficient appreciation for Kim’s fury, embarrassment, and then resolve to never speak to Trump again after they walked away from their last meeting.”

He adds, “Now that he has a new patron in Putin, why would Kim have any interest in dialogue with Trump?”

A passerby watches a broadcast about South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's national address at an electronics store in Yongsan District, central Seoul, on Thursday. On the television in front, a report about U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is being broadcast. [YONHAP]

For South Korea, risks and opportunities abound

Observers believe that South Korea and the United States finalized their 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for 2026 early to avoid the possibility that a re-elected Trump might demand increased contributions from Seoul.

However, the risk remains that Trump might rip up the agreement when he takes office.

In an Oct. 16 interview, Trump criticized South Korea’s defense payments, saying, “We have 42,000 soldiers there. They don’t pay,” a likely reference to the 28,500 U.S. service members stationed in South Korea that he once threatened to withdraw if Seoul didn’t agree to pay more for their presence.

In another interview the previous day, he claimed that if he were still in office, Seoul would pay $10 billion a year, about nine times more than Korea had agreed to pay under the latest SMA by 2026.

However, experts say that Trump’s comments are more likely a part of his election strategy and may not reflect actual policy.

Reducing or withdrawing U.S. troops, particularly from strategic locations like Camp Humphreys — the largest overseas U.S. base and just 520 kilometers (323 miles) from the Chinese city of Dalian — is seen as highly unlikely due to the base’s importance in countering China.

“U.S. troops in South Korea are necessary for both countries,” says Prof. Choi Jong-kun at Yonsei University’s Political Science and International Department, who previously served as a first vice foreign minister. “With ongoing issues involving China and Russia, it’s hard to imagine where else the United States could relocate its forces.”

Experts suggest Seoul prepare to renegotiate the SMA after Trump takes office.

“We should identify areas where the United States finds less value and propose alternatives that benefit both sides, which fits Trump’s transactional approach,” says Yang Uk, a researcher at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

According to Yang, one counteroffer South Korea could make is contributing to the U.S. nuclear modernization program while demanding certain assets be positioned for quick deployment to the peninsula.

Potential crises of faith

Although the United States and South Korea have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization, doubts persist about the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence — particularly under a second Trump presidency.

“Trump’s position is to reduce or manage the North Korean threat,” says Kim Hyun-wook, president of the Sejong Institute.

He warns that with a focus on threat management rather than elimination, Trump may pursue a freeze-for-sanctions relief deal, which could cause significant friction with Seoul, which wants to see Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons dismantled.

Advances in the North’s development of illicit weapons have been accompanied by a surge in public support for the development of an independent nuclear deterrent in South Korea, with polls indicating 60 to 70 percent approval.

Experts also say there are limitations to how much Seoul can be expected to rely solely on declarative nuclear deterrence.

“If the United States does not clearly state its extended deterrence policy, South Korea should leave open the possibility of independent nuclear armament,” says Prof. Yoon Seong-won from Hanyang University’s Political Science and International Studies Department.

Evans Revere, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, warns that “if the Trump administration were to fail to maintain this commitment, it would undermine the alliance and shake the confidence of [South Korea] and other U.S. allies in America’s word and its reliability.”

The Trump administration’s policy preferences for resolving conflicts in other parts of the world could also impact South Korean confidence in the U.S. commitment to its security.

Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has previously expressed support for a peace plan that closely resembles Putin’s proposal from February, which would see Russia keep the territory it has taken from Ukraine, the creation of demilitarized zone between the two countries and a promise by Kyiv to stay out the European Union and NATO.

While Lopez acknowledges that “such an action by Trump would go nowhere because neither Ukraine nor Russia have any interest in a ceasefire,” he also predicts it could exacerbate allies’ fears and negative reactions regarding a second Trump administration.

“Whether you are South Korea or Germany or Ukraine, you know that no alliance is irreversible in Trump's calculations,” he notes.

BY MICHAEL LEE, LIM JEONG-WON AND SEO JI-EUN [[email protected]]