Kim’s tough four years with Trump

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Kim’s tough four years with Trump

 
Park Won-gon
The author is a professor of North Korea studies at Ewha Womans University.

The world is nervous ahead of the inauguration of Donald Trump on Jan. 20. Although only a month has passed since his re-election as the 47th U.S. president, the world is paying close attention to his words, gestures, expressions and messages on social media. His maverick ways, manifested during his first term, portend all the chaos to come in the next four years. Trump already nominated candidates for key positions in his second term and even threatened to impose a 25 percent tariff on all imports from Canada — a key ally who always sided with the United States on global affairs — on his first day in office.

On Nov. 24, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un made a “pre-emptive strike” against Trump, saying, “The evil ambitions of U.S. imperialists and their followers haven’t changed at all.” Meanwhile, a stunning six-hour-long martial law drama unfolded in South Korea on the evening of Dec. 3. How will Trump-triggered uncertainties affect South and North Korea?

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, many international political scientists don’t regard Trump as an isolationist. The United States took a uniquely isolationist path for two decades between the end of World War I in 1919 and the start of World War II in 1939. President Woodrow Wilson wanted to prevent war by creating the League of Nations (1920-46), but failed due to opposition from the Senate. Until Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, America only cared about its own economy and security.

Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during his first term. In his second term, he will certainly take a more entrenched isolationist path on economic issues, as implied by his relentless protectionism through tougher tariffs. If Trump chooses that path, he can withdraw from the United Nations and NATO — and even break treaties with U.S. allies — even though he wouldn’t go that far.

What Trump really wants is to shun U.S. intervention in foreign affairs and prioritize national interests. This is how he gives back to the U.S. voters who gave him another term in office. He persistently criticized liberal internationalists like Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, who championed the United States’ role as world police and “ignored problems at home” like the plight of the working class.

A majority of residents in the Rust Belt, a core support group for Trump in the Nov. 5 presidential election, are still struggling with their low incomes as in the 1970s. The United States is certainly the richest country in the world largely thanks to its high-tech industries in Silicon Valley and its mighty financial industry on Wall Street. But a strong sense of relative deprivation among Rust Belt workers has reached its limits. Trump gained support from them by attacking the vested interests in Washington and demanding answers to illegal immigrants, more defense cost sharing by “wealthy countries,” including South Korea, and China’s growing security risk.

Trump is not alone in mitigating U.S. intervention in global affairs. It was Obama that abandoned the United States’ role as the world’s police. He defined it with flowery rhetoric like “leading from behind,” which is oxymoronic. To put it simply, he won’t let the United States get involved in global affairs. His “strategic patience” toward North Korea actually meant “neglect, not patience” with the recalcitrant state.

In his UN speech during his first term, Trump stressed that loving America helps make the world a better place. It was a declaration that the role of the United States in maintaining global security and co-prosperity was over. After taking office, President Biden denied the Trump era by upholding the values of liberal democracy and cherishing alliances, but in many ways, it overlaps with Trump’s policies. Biden didn’t rejoin the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership that Trump withdrew from. Biden didn’t restore the nuclear agreement with Iran, either. Instead, he concluded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, which Trump had started, in a dramatic way. This shows that the consistency of U.S. foreign policy doesn’t change depending on the administration. This isolationist path will worsen under Trump 2.0 due to the weakening will and ability of the United States to play the role of “the light on the hill” for world peace and prosperity.

In his opening speech at a National Defense Development 2024 exhibition in November, Kim Jong-un revealed his true feelings toward the United States. Simply out, he tried to negotiate with Trump, but only affirmed America’s “hostile North Korea policy” of using its might to pressure him. This can explain why the North Korean leader declared he would never give up nuclear weapons. Of course, it could be a strategy to gain an advantageous position against Trump in advance. But Kim’s remarks starkly suggest the effectiveness of the “frontal breakthrough” he announced after the failure in the North-U.S. summit in Hanoi in 2019 and his meeting with Trump at Panmunjom four months later.

At the time, Pyongyang claimed that it wouldn’t have any meaningful dialogue with Washington unless its “right to development” and its “right to survival” through the permanent suspension of the South-U.S. joint drills and complete withdrawal of U.S. strategic assets from the Korean Peninsula were ensured. If Kim meets Trump once again, he will present even harsher preconditions for dialogue than before.

At the same time, Kim harbors a fear of Trump. Liberal democracies deal with their hostile counterparts with an agreed set of principles and norms. But Trump ignores them and puts all options on the table for America’s own interests. If necessary, he could mobilize three carrier strike groups to pressure North Korea just like he did in 2017, or he may abruptly bring up the North Korea issue while denouncing China and demand China to pressure North Korea. Or Trump could suddenly boast his “bromance” with the North Korean leader or demand Putin sever his ties with Kim through direct deals with Putin. For Pyongyang, Trump’s aberrant style may be overwhelming.

The abrupt declaration of martial law in South Korea must have embarrassed not only the United States — which must now weather all the fog from a change in government — but also North Korea. The Biden administration must have judged that the declaration of martial law by an ally could undermine the liberal democratic order, while the president-elect must have worried about the possibility of instability in its ally prompting North Korea’s miscalculation. If instability in the South destabilizes the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the United States will have to consider whether to intervene or not. North Korea also must have been busy devising effective ways to respond to South Korea when the military was at the forefront during the short-lived emergency martial law. Fortunately, the unexpected drama ended in just six hours.

But Trump will be there from Jan. 20. The next four years are a critical period for both South and North Korea. Kim Jong-un’s agony over weathering the fog down the road has just begun. It will be best for South Korea to quickly address the ongoing chaos at home caused by the declaration of martial law and its aftermath to avert a national crisis.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
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