Silence from the North despite the turmoil
Published: 02 Jan. 2025, 20:14
The author is an adjunct professor of Security and North Korean Studies at Dongguk University.
Kim Jong-un, chairman of North Korea’s State Affairs Commission, has remained conspicuously silent during Korea’s political upheaval following the Dec. 3 martial law declaration and the impeachment crisis. For the sixth consecutive year, Kim has refrained from delivering a New Year’s address. Moreover, his speech at the five-day plenary session of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s 8th Central Committee last December made no mention of the South’s political developments.
Kim Yo-jong, deputy director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, who has often issued fiery rhetoric regarding inter-Korean issues, has also been unusually quiet. North Korea’s state media offered its first response to the martial law declaration more than a week after it was enacted and has since maintained a subdued tone.
Despite President Yoon Suk Yeol’s explicit attribution of the martial law to threats posed by “North Korea’s communist forces,” Pyongyang’s response has been almost negligible, appearing passive compared to past behavior.
This uncharacteristic silence has prompted some to speculate whether it represents a “new normal” for North Korea. Historically, Pyongyang has reacted swiftly and strongly to South Korean political crises. For example, after President Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment was overturned in May 2004, North Korea condemned the decision within two days, labeling it “the people’s judgment against conservative forces.” During the impeachment proceedings of President Park Geun-hye in December 2016, North Korea launched an intense propaganda campaign, reporting on the Constitutional Court’s decision to uphold the impeachment within hours of its announcement in March 2017.
In contrast, North Korea has not issued an official response nearly a month into the South’s current impeachment crisis. This atypical behavior warrants a closer examination of Pyongyang’s motives. One possible explanation is that North Korea is preferring to wait until the situation stabilizes, calculating that premature involvement could backfire.
North Korea’s previous attempts to influence South Korean domestic politics have often had unintended consequences. For instance, the announcement of an inter-Korean summit with Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il just three days before the 16th general election in April 2000 was criticized as an electoral ploy, ultimately benefiting the conservative opposition. Similarly, during the 19th general election and 18th presidential election in 2012, Kim Jong-un’s “Directive No. 1 on South Korea” urged voters to deal “a decisive blow to the traitorous regime,” but the results defied Pyongyang’s expectations. These failures may have taught Kim Jong-un the risks of direct interference, prompting him to adopt a cautious, wait-and-see approach to the current political turmoil.
Another plausible explanation is North Korea’s deliberate effort to distance itself from South Korean domestic politics in pursuit of its “two hostile states” policy. Following the declaration of this policy in December 2023, Kim has overtly sought to sever ties with the South, stating, “We neither regard them nor wish to face them.” North Korea has dismantled more than 10 South Korea-related organizations, including the United Front Department, and even destroyed railway and road connections between the two nations.
Pyongyang has consistently ignored overtures from Seoul, such as the South’s proposal last August to provide flood relief aid for the Yalu River region and President Yoon’s offer to establish intergovernmental dialogue channels in his Aug. 15 Liberation Day speech. This contrasts sharply with Kim Yo-jong’s scathing denunciation of Yoon’s “bold initiative” in 2022, issued just four days after the proposal.
Even during the recent plenary session, North Korea referred to South Korea only once, dismissing it as an “anticommunist outpost,” without elaborating further. This dismissive stance suggests a strategic move to dismantle the “special relationship” between the two Koreas and solidify a framework of mutual hostility as two separate states.
North Korea may also be weighing the costs and benefits of exploiting impeachment crisis for domestic propaganda. Since 2020, the regime has enacted laws such as the Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture and the Youth Education Guarantee Act to intensify its crackdown on capitalist influences. In this context, Pyongyang might selectively publicize the South’s political instability to bolster Kim’s image as a benevolent and protective leader.
Looking ahead, North Korea is likely to monitor Seoul’s political situation closely while refining its strategy under the framework of its two hostile states policy. At the same time, it will likely continue covert operations, such as cyberattacks and online disinformation campaigns, to exacerbate social discord in the South.
Given the gravity of the current security environment on the Korean Peninsula, it is imperative for South Korea to restore political stability, strengthen its national security posture and enhance intelligence capabilities against North Korea.
Translated using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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