A bromance to Trump, but a headache to Kim?

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A bromance to Trump, but a headache to Kim?

Park Won-gon
 
The author is a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University. 
 
As soon as Donald Trump returned to the White House, he wasted no time in invoking North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. On his first day in office, Jan. 20, Trump responded to a reporter’s question by referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power” and confidently stating, “Kim Jong-un will be happy that I’m back.” But is that really the case?
 
On Jan. 23, Trump went a step further, expressing his willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea. If sincere, this places the decision squarely in Kim’s hands. However, Kim’s feelings toward Trump likely extend beyond mere resentment to outright animosity. His response to Trump’s overtures has been strikingly hostile — launching a missile on Jan. 25 and making a high-profile visit to a nuclear facility, as reported on Jan. 29.
 
Kim’s deep-seated aversion to Trump can be traced back to February 2019, when Trump unilaterally walked away from the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi. The abrupt collapse of negotiations left Kim publicly humiliated. In its aftermath, he reportedly lamented, “Did I really endure over 60 hours on a train for this?”
 
Further insight into Kim’s sentiments comes from a North Korean directive intercepted in South Korea’s Chungbuk Comrades Association espionage case. On Mar. 12, 2019, Pyongyang issued orders to its espionage network, instructing operatives to expose Trump’s “ignorant and arrogant behavior” and to highlight his “thuggish and shameless nature.” Yet, just a few months later, in a personal letter to Trump on Jun. 10, Kim wrote, “I still believe in the magical power of our deep and special friendship.” If these reports are accurate, it suggests that even as Kim put on a diplomatic front, he remained haunted by the trauma of Hanoi.
 
North Korean children playing folk games at last years Lunar New Year celebration at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea Feb. 10, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]

North Korean children playing folk games at last years Lunar New Year celebration at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea Feb. 10, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]

Despite this, Trump has consistently maintained, both during and after his presidency, that he “gets along well” with Kim. This is likely infuriating for the North Korean leader. Trump, of course, is fully aware of this dynamic. His recent comments about Kim are not necessarily an attempt at reconciliation; rather, they serve as a form of psychological pressure. It may, in fact, be the opening move of a renewed “maximum pressure” campaign — reminiscent of Trump’s 2017 threats of “fire and fury.”
 
The current situation is reminiscent of the June 2019 U.S.-North Korea meeting at Panmunjom. At the time, Trump, while attending the G20 Summit in Japan, casually posted on social media: “I will be visiting the DMZ tomorrow, and if Chairman Kim sees this, I wonder if he would like to meet and shake hands?”
 
Despite having suffered a major setback in Hanoi just months earlier, Kim responded positively, and the Panmunjom meeting was set in motion. Many North Korea experts were caught off guard, as Kim — the absolute ruler of a monolithic regime — had, for the first time, answered a direct Twitter invitation from the leader of the “imperialist enemy.”
 
Kim’s willingness to engage, despite the diplomatic impropriety of Trump’s approach, led to speculation that he had fallen into the U.S. President’s trap. During the meeting, Kim requested a halt to U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Trump “reaffirmed” his commitment to stopping the drills. However, the Dongmaeng 19-2 exercises proceeded as planned, and it later emerged that Trump had never issued an official order to suspend them.
 
Feeling deceived yet again, Kim vented his anger on South Korea, infamously deriding the Blue House as a “boiled cow’s head” (a North Korean idiom used to express utter contempt). These experiences remain fresh in Kim’s memory. Yet Trump, acting as if nothing had happened, continues to insist, “He liked me.” It’s no surprise that Kim would find this infuriating.
 
Even from a purely strategic standpoint, Trump’s recent remarks fall far short of what Kim would hope for. While Trump’s reference to North Korea as a “nuclear power” on his first day back in office was striking, it is more likely a calculated negotiation tactic than a genuine acknowledgment of North Korea’s nuclear status.
 
The U.S. government has previously referred to North Korea as a “de facto nuclear state” or an “illegal nuclear power.” But Trump’s words should not be taken at face value — his rhetoric is often improvisational. The White House’s clarification on Jan. 28 further reinforces this point: “President Trump, as he did in his first term, will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea.” This is, in fact, a more explicit stance than that of the Biden administration, which maintained a vague commitment to Korean Peninsula denuclearization.
  
There are concerns that Trump may pursue a “small deal” in which North Korea agrees to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for partial sanctions relief. This would be a troubling outcome for South Korea, which has long pushed for complete denuclearization. However, it is important to note Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy. As a former real estate mogul, he prioritizes endgame wins over process-oriented diplomacy. Whether through a big deal or a small one, Trump will likely seek an agreement that at least neutralizes North Korea’s ability to strike the U.S. mainland.
 
The real question is whether North Korea would accept such terms. The United States will almost certainly demand verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program — Pyongyang’s primary means of striking the American mainland. Yet, if Kim concedes this point, he will be exposing himself to overwhelming U.S. retaliation, thereby rendering his nuclear arsenal strategically useless. A war confined to the Korean Peninsula, in which Pyongyang cannot credibly threaten Washington, would be suicidal for Kim’s regime.
 
In this context, Kim’s recent visit to a highly classified uranium enrichment facility is particularly telling. On Sep. 13, 2023, he toured the country’s nuclear weapons research institute and fissile material production sites, publicly showcasing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. The Jan. 29 state media coverage of his latest visit once again emphasized his commitment to the “relentless strengthening of the nuclear shield.”
 
This facility was a focal point of the failed Hanoi talks — Trump had demanded its disclosure, but Kim refused, leading to the breakdown in negotiations. By publicly revisiting the site now, Kim is sending a clear message: he will not make the same concessions as before. The North Korean leader is deliberately raising the stakes, ensuring that he will not suffer another diplomatic humiliation.
 
Trump’s return places Kim in a precarious position. Rather than heralding a triumphant “nuclear moment” for North Korea, it instead rekindles memories of past humiliations. And the more Kim dwells on those experiences, the more likely he is to fall into Trump’s trap once again. 
 
Translated using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.  
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