Fractured alliances, rising tensions: What should Korea do?

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Fractured alliances, rising tensions: What should Korea do?

 
 
Yun Byung-se
 
The author is a former foreign minister.
 
“The golden age of America has only just begun. Something unprecedented is about to happen.”
 
These were the words of U.S. President Donald Trump during his address to the joint session of Congress on Wednesday. Since the launch of Trump’s second term, the world has been witnessing the decline of the liberal international order that has prevailed since World War II, as well as a shifting landscape where the boundaries between allies and adversaries are blurring. Against the backdrop of escalating tariff wars originating from the United States, Washington has found itself at odds with Europe and Ukraine over the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Meanwhile, in an unprecedented turn of events, the United States has voted alongside Russia and North Korea against Western-backed resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly.
 
Vice President JD Vance and House Speaker Mike Johnson applaud as President Donald Trump addresses a joint session of Congress at the Capitol in Washington on March 4. [UPI/YONHAP]

Vice President JD Vance and House Speaker Mike Johnson applaud as President Donald Trump addresses a joint session of Congress at the Capitol in Washington on March 4. [UPI/YONHAP]



A fractured trans-Atlantic alliance
 
Only three years ago, the United States and European nations adopted NATO’s “new concept,” which identified Russia and China as threats. However, since last month, the public rift between Europe and the United States — exacerbated by the breakdown of talks between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — has delivered a severe blow to the trans-Atlantic alliance.
 
Friedrich Merz, leader of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union and soon-to-be chancellor, has called for the swift establishment of an independent European defense system. Similarly, at an emergency European summit hosted by Britain, the country and France spearheaded a proposal for a “coalition of the willing.” These moves reflect Europe’s growing sense of urgency as its security faces an existential crisis.
 
The divisions within the West were starkly illustrated by the conflicting resolutions adopted at last week’s UN General Assembly and Security Council meetings, marking the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Three years ago, a Western-backed emergency resolution passed overwhelmingly in the General Assembly with 141 votes in favor, five against, and 35 abstentions. This year, however, the number of supporting nations dropped to 93, with 18 voting against and 65 abstaining — a loss of 48 supporting countries. While the Western alliance is fracturing, the anti-Western bloc is consolidating, and the geopolitical sway of the Global South is expanding significantly.
 
On the same day, a U.S.-led Security Council resolution narrowly passed with 10 votes in favor and five abstentions. Notably, all five European members of the Council abstained, while Russia and China unexpectedly sided with the United States — an unusual alignment.
 
The Korean government’s decision to support both the Western-backed General Assembly resolution and the U.S.-led Security Council proposal reflects a careful balancing act. While adhering to its longstanding diplomatic principles, Seoul is also navigating the evolving power dynamics to maintain a stable relationship with the Trump administration.
 

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A return to the era of spheres of influence
 
The implications of this fragmentation for Korea’s diplomacy, security, and the international order are profound.
 
First, the movement toward the “Europeanization” of European defense will accelerate. The push for a European Defense Union will gain momentum, along with discussions on a nuclear deterrent led by the region’s nuclear powers, Britain and France. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO allies, his recent reaffirmation of collective defense commitments in meetings with leaders from Britain and Poland, as well as the continued U.S. military presence in the central European country, offer a measure of reassurance.
 
Second, if the United States and Russia broker a cease-fire in Ukraine without incorporating European and Ukrainian interests, it could embolden nuclear-armed states in the Indo-Pacific to consider military provocations. North Korea, for instance, may see an opportunity for arms reduction talks and partial agreements. Meanwhile, observing Ukraine’s predicament — having forfeited its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances — could strengthen arguments in favor of independent nuclear armament. A report from the Atlantic Council, which surveyed global experts on projections for 2025, identified South Korea as the third-most likely country to likely to pursue nuclear weapons within the next decade, followed by Japan in fourth, Ukraine in fifth and Taiwan in seventh.
 
Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) attend a meeting at the United Nations headquarters on Dec. 17, 2024. [AFP/YONHAP]

Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) attend a meeting at the United Nations headquarters on Dec. 17, 2024. [AFP/YONHAP]

 
Third, as U.S. priorities shift under the “America First” policy, China’s influence over the Global South will grow. Beijing’s economic outreach to developing nations has already surpassed Washington’s, and in January, Indonesia joined the BRICS bloc, led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
 
Fourth, with conflicts in Latin America and the Middle East already underway, the United States will intensify its focus on the Indo-Pacific as tensions in Ukraine evolve. While this shift is critical for deterring North Korea, it will also pressure Indo-Pacific allies and Taiwan to assume greater regional security roles, including increased financial contributions and enhanced military cooperation aimed at countering China.
 
Fifth, the geopolitical landscape is undergoing a seismic shift, reminiscent of 19th-century great-power diplomacy. Realignments among major powers are accelerating, with U.S.-China strategic competition, Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, Washington’s engagement strategy with Moscow, the North Korea-Russia strategic alliance, the United States recalibrating its alliance network, and the rising influence of BRICS. Even the prospect of renewed North Korea-United States summits is adding to the complexity.
 

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Strengthening the United States-South Korea alliance and national resilience
 
For Seoul, the most urgent task is to expand areas of cooperation with the Trump administration to underscore its indispensability as a U.S. ally. This includes bolstering partnerships in shipbuilding, nuclear energy, advanced technology and energy resources, while responding pragmatically to Washington’s calls for greater regional security engagement.
 
The agreements reached during last month’s U.S.-South Korea-Japan and U.S.-South Korea foreign ministerial meetings — reaffirming extended deterrence and a commitment to North Korea’s complete denuclearization — are significant. However, meticulous coordination is needed regarding a potential North Korea-United States summit and the additional strategic cooperation options for South Korea mentioned by Elbridge Colby, the U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, during his recent confirmation hearing. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s upcoming visit to Northeast Asia presents an opportunity for in-depth discussions between Washington and Seoul.
 
In particular, Korea must closely monitor the Trump administration’s stance on the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group and Europe’s efforts to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. It is also worth considering a Nuclear Planning Group among key Indo-Pacific allies, as proposed by former senior officials and U.S. think tanks over the past several years. Strengthening potential nuclear deterrence capabilities could serve as a strategic asset.
 
In tandem with deepening U.S.-South Korea-Japan security cooperation, Korea should continue engaging with the Quad alliance and fostering trilateral cooperation with Japan and China. The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Gyeongju this October, where leaders from the United States, China, and other key nations will convene, could serve as a pivotal moment to enhance great-power diplomacy.
 
As relations between the United States and Europe strain, Korea must deepen its partnerships with key allies such as Japan and Australia while expanding its outreach to the increasingly influential Global South. In this era of survival-of-the-fittest and geopolitical turbulence, Seoul must construct multiple layers of strategic alliances and formulate a long-term national strategy to safeguard its interests amid the high-stakes power plays of major nations.


Translated using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
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