Politics without urgency, youth without a future

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Politics without urgency, youth without a future

Published: 09 Apr. 2025, 00:01

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Park Sun-Young

The author is a professor of economics at Dongguk University.

According to Employment Trends by Statistics Korea, more than 500,000 young Koreans said they were “just resting” and not participating in any economic activity in February — the highest figure ever recorded since the agency began compiling the data in 2003. Many cited difficulty in finding desirable jobs, while the agency noted that companies’ growing preference for experienced hires is working against young applicants. The outlook is dimming further, as businesses are expected to cut back on hiring amid mounting uncertainty in the global economy, much of it driven by trade policies initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump.

A person looks over job information in Seoul. [YONHAP]

The 2024 Youth Life Survey, released by the Office for Government Policy Coordination, found that 5.2 percent of young Koreans are largely isolated, spending most of their time at home. Among them, 32.8 percent pointed to employment difficulties as the main reason. About one-third of respondents — 32.2 percent — reported experiencing burnout in the past year, citing career anxiety, excessive workloads, a lack of purpose at work and poor work-life balance.

The financial situation of young Koreans paints a troubling picture. Their average annual income was 26.25 million won ($17,747), while average debt stood at 16.37 million won. Average personal assets amounted to 50.12 million won — not enough to purchase a home or secure long-term financial stability in today’s high-cost environment.

The struggle extends into their personal lives. According to expanded census data from November 2023, the unmarried rate for Koreans in their 20s was 95.2 percent and 51.3 percent for those in their 30s — the age group most commonly associated with marriage and childbearing. In the 2024 Social Survey, 31.3 percent of respondents said they remained unmarried because they could not afford it. Other reasons included concerns about the cost of raising children and unstable employment.

At first glance, these patterns may seem to reflect generational inequality in a slow-growth economy where young people must grapple with high asset prices. But a deeper look reveals a more nuanced reality. The majority of wealth in Korea is concentrated in the hands of older people. Those aged 50 and above are estimated to hold 60 to 70 percent of total household assets.

The inequality is especially stark within generations. Among people in their 50s, the wealthiest 20 percent have 58 times more than the poorest 20 percent; for those over 60, the gap widens to 75 times. On average, top-tier households in this group hold assets worth 1.86 billion won, while the bottom tier has only 23.98 million won.

In effect, Korea’s wealth is highly concentrated among a small, successful segment of the baby boomer generation. This has serious implications for younger Koreans, whose socioeconomic status is increasingly determined by whether they receive financial support from their parents. For instance, the top 20 percent of households in their 20s have only 2.45 times the income of their bottom 20 percent counterparts, but their assets are 38 times larger.

This gap is compounded by the role education plays in social mobility. In a society where access to quality jobs is tightly linked to academic credentials, disparities in private education spending entrench inequality. Gaining admission to prestigious universities or medical schools, landing a stable job, buying a home in Seoul, or starting a family often requires not only money but also information, guidance and social networks — all of which tend to be inherited. These conditions form barriers that are difficult to overcome without family support.

Job seekers wait to apply for unemployment benefits at a social welfare center in Mapo District, western Seoul. [YONHAP]

In this context, the term “intergenerational inequality” does not fully capture the underlying structure of today’s Korean society. Rather than a broad generational divide, the country is increasingly split between the upper-tier baby boomers and their children — who possess wealth and opportunity — and a growing population left out of these networks. The real divide, then, is not simply between generations but between those with access to inherited capital and those without.

This trend is not unique to Korea. A recent article in The Economist warned of the rise of an “inheritocracy” — a society where inherited wealth, rather than earned income, plays the dominant role in shaping one’s future. In many developed countries, baby boomers have amassed wealth through rising property values and are passing it down to their children, resulting in a class of rentiers more invested in asset preservation than innovation or labor. These elites often rely on legal loopholes to minimize taxes and maintain property values. Meanwhile, those without inheritances find themselves increasingly marginalized, breeding resentment and political frustration.

As homeownership becomes unattainable and economic stability elusive, younger generations lose motivation to participate in the labor market. If they come to see the system as fundamentally unfair, the risk of political radicalization grows. In the United States, such disillusionment helped pave the way for the rise of extreme political movements.

Despite these mounting pressures, Korean lawmakers remain locked in fruitless political battles, including over the national budget. The average net worth of a lawmaker in the 22nd National Assembly is 3.3 billion won — 7.6 times the national average. As members of the most affluent segment of the baby boomer generation, they often display little urgency or willingness to reform the system. Their indifference only exacerbates the structural inequality and suffering faced by the younger generation.

Can a society trust its future to a political class more concerned with preserving its own privileges than with addressing the mounting despair of its youth? Increasingly, for young Koreans, the answer appears to be no.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.