Trump wants more money for troops from Korea. Will Korea pay up?

Home > National > Diplomacy

Trump wants more money for troops from Korea. Will Korea pay up?

Published: 13 Apr. 2025, 14:49 Updated: 14 Apr. 2025, 22:08

SEO JI-EUN
[email protected]

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington on April 9. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

[NEWS ANALYSIS]

U.S. President Donald Trump is signaling that he could pressure South Korea to pay more for the deployment of U.S. troops, despite the two countries having signed a defense cost-sharing deal just last year.

At the heart of Trump’s approach is a desire to bundle issues long treated separately. In his Tuesday phone call with Han Duck-soo, the first with a South Korean leader since returning to office, Trump proposed a “one-stop shopping” deal — linking Seoul's military contributions to economic issues, such as his so-called reciprocal tariffs and liquefied natural gas investment.

Alongside the tariff measures, Trump's administration signaled the potential evolving role of United States Forces Korea (USFK). Trump is also constantly reiterating his willingness to reengage with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un — which has raised concerns in Seoul about potential sidelining in possible future denuclearization talks.

The convergence of security and economic pressure has left Seoul's caretaker government politically vulnerable ahead of the June 3 snap presidential election following the ousting of impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol.

Despite Trump's surprise 90-day suspension of his previously announced “reciprocal” tariffs, and full exemption of electronics, including smartphones and computers, worries are mounting in Seoul as its closest ally continues to blur the line between alliances and transactional dealmaking.

U.S. experts warn that Trump's surprise 90-day suspension of his previously announced “reciprocal” tariffs, and full exemption of electronics, including smartphones and computers, reflects not only oscillating personal preference, but also deeper structural changes to his administration's philosophy regarding alliances — potentially forcing South Korea to prepare its own strategic answers.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, right, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg sign the 12th Special Measures Agreement at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in central Seoul on Nov. 4, 2024. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

Defense contributions enter trade talks

Trump’s latest remarks to reporters suggest that he views the 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) — the bilateral defense cost-sharing accord signed under the Joe Biden administration in October 2024 — as void.

The deal raised Seoul’s contribution to U.S. troop costs by 8.3 percent to 1.52 trillion won ($1.1 billion) starting in 2026, pegging future increases to inflation.

Korea's defense cost-sharing contributions for U.S. troops [LEE JEONG-MIN]

“We pay for military over in Europe,” he told press Wednesday in Washington. “We don't get reimbursed by much … South Korea too.

“It would be nice to wrap it all up in one package for each country,” he added. “You know, it’s nice and clean.”

Trump added that he'd discussed “payment for the big-time Military Protection [the United States] provides to South Korea,” with Han in a Truth Social post the previous day — reviving his earlier labeling of South Korea as a “money machine.".

Acting President Han Duck-soo, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump are pictured in this combined image. [YONHAP]

South Korea “began these Military payments during my first term, Billions of Dollars, but Sleepy Joe Biden, for reasons unknown, terminated the deal,” Trump wrote. This is factually wrong, as talks stalled amid tense negotiations during Trump's first term.

Experts say the president’s framing of defense spending as “military protection payments” reflects a shift in U.S. thinking.

“In the current U.S. administration, there is a radically different way of thinking about defense ties, host nation support, the link between U.S. treaty commitments to defend allies and what the United States expects in return,” said Evans Revere, former U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

“Many experts previously interpreted this as meaning that allies needed to increase their own defense spending, and that allies also needed to boost their contributions to the cost of maintaining U.S. forces,” Revere added. “It would appear that this is no longer necessarily the case and that Donald Trump is seeking more concrete 'payment,' or economic concessions, in return for the defense and deterrence commitments that the U.S. provides.”

To pre-empt positions that Trump may take in the SMA negotiations, Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, argued that Seoul should take “significant” action.

He proposed that the National Assembly pass a bill to raise defense spending from 2.5 percent to 2.7 percent of GDP — roughly $4 billion — before the June election, specifically urging Lee Jae-myung, former Democratic Party leader and leading presidential contender, to champion the effort.

“While these would be large budget increases, it is important to note that Trump has been seeking significant actions by U.S. allies,” Bennett said.

An Apache helicopter is seen parked at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on April 10. [YONHAP]

Washington rethinks troops' role

The Pentagon, under Trump's second term, has increased its aggression toward China, raising questions of whether USFK will take on new regional missions beyond deterring North Korea.

The U.S. Senate's recent appointment of known China hawk Elbridge Colby as under secretary of defense for policy further fueled such speculation.

Colby has long advocated that allies, rather than U.S. forces, handle threats outside of China, a vision reflected in the recently leaked “Interim National Defense Strategy Guidance,” through which the U.S. military is refocusing on deterring China's seizure of Taiwan and strengthening homeland defense. The document, according to a Washington Post report, suggests that U.S. allies like South Korea take more responsibility for regional challenges like North Korea's threats, implying that allies will need to invest more in their own defense.

Still, top U.S. commanders continue to stress USFK’s strategic value.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned the Senate on Thursday that any reduction to the USFK could increase the “probability that [Kim] would invade.”

USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson emphasized that while the troops continue to deter North Korea, doing so had the “potential to impose costs” in the East Sea, to Russia, and the Yellow Sea to China.

His comments underscored not only the force’s primary role in deterring the North, but also its broader strategic utility, hinting at future mission expansion or more flexible deployments. At least one Patriot missile battery is widely reported to have already been redeployed from South Korea to the Middle East.

Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, described the alliance as being in a “quiet crisis” and warned of mounting U.S. pressure for “strategic flexibility” — a policy that would allow USFK to operate beyond the peninsula.

Bennett reinforced this by citing the deployment of the U.S.-led antimissile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system in 2016 as precedent, noting that China had strongly objected, despite Thaad being capable only of intercepting missiles aimed at South Korea.

“Having Thaad in South Korea may become an important part of U.S. coalition defense preparations against China,” he said.

“We will likely see what the Trump administration does over the next year or so,” he added, warning that Washington is likely to increase pressure on Seoul to accept strategic flexibility.

Some South Korean analysts view this moment as an opportunity.

Jeon Kyung-joo, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, argued Seoul should stress its irreplaceable military value — including conventional capabilities and the U.S. base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi — rather than fear role adjustments driven by U.S. interests.

“This includes the mission of USFK, the transition of wartime operational control and the future of combined deterrence posture,” she wrote in a column in JoongAng Ilbo, an affiliate of the Korea JoongAng Daily. “Rather than worry about being adjusted according to U.S. national interests, it is time for [Korea] to clearly determine what best serves its national interest on each issue — and to be the ones who present it first.”

Ahn Duk-geun, minister of trade, industry and energy, center; Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, right; and Japanese Trade Minister Yoji Muto pose for a photo ahead of their trilateral trade ministers' meeting in Seoul on March 30. [JEON MIN-KYU]

Will Trump’s tariff blitz unite friends — and foes — in Northeast Asia?

Trump’s sweeping tariff campaign — claiming that “in many cases, friends are worse than enemies” — drew sharp criticism even in Washington itself, with lawmakers warning that it could inadvertently push South Korea and Japan, two of the United States' strongest allies, toward China.

Democratic Sen. Brian Schatz of Hawaii, during a Senate legislative session on April 4, referenced the March 30 trilateral meeting of trade ministers from South Korea, Japan and China, which took place just days before Trump's tariff announcement, calling it one of “the most shocking” images he'd seen.

Democratic Sen. Brian Schatz of Hawaii reenacts a photo of Korean Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun, holding hands with Japanese and Chinese counterparts during a Senate floor speech on April 4. He referenced a photo taken at a Korea-Japan-China trade ministers’ meeting on March 30. [SCREEN CAPTURE]

Tim Kaine, the Democratic junior senator from Virginia, blasted the tariffs as “economic idiocy” and pointing to Korea and Japan as examples.

“This is no way to treat a friend,” Kaine said. “And guess what these friends are doing? They met with China to talk about a free trade. They met with China to talk about how they need to band together to protect themselves from the economic policy of the United States.”

Seoul now faces the highest tariffs among all U.S. free trade partners.

Han, however, dismissed the idea of joining a counterbloc with Japan and China.

“We will not take that route,” he told CNN on Tuesday, adding, “I don’t think that kind of fighting back will improve the situation dramatically. I don’t think it will be really profitable for the three of us, and especially for Korea.”

Still, the broader sentiment in Washington is clear.

Joseph Yun, the U.S. acting ambassador to Seoul, reportedly told Korean lawmakers that U.S. officials are frustrated when South Korean leaders speak of balance between Beijing and Washington.

Despite Trump's tariff imposition rising calls for South Korea's strategic neutrality, Revere believes Trump's tariff campaign is “highly unlikely” to drive South Korea and Japan closer to China due to the threats that “China and its North Korean ally” pose.

“Both Seoul and Tokyo would be wise to craft a considered response, perhaps in conjunction with the EU, Canada and Mexico,” Revere said.

BY SEO JI-EUN [[email protected]]