Home > Opinion > Columns

Decoding Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. 'sensitive country' list

Published: 15 Apr. 2025, 00:02

Yoo Jun-koo

The author is a Senior research fellow, Sejong Institute

More than a month has passed since news emerged that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) had designated Korea as a “sensitive country.” As the designation is set to take effect on April 15, Industry Minister Ahn Duk-Geun made an urgent trip to Washington last month. The move sparked significant debate in Korea, especially because the U.S. did not consult or inform its ally beforehand.

The lack of prior notification fueled speculation. Some interpreted the move as a response to security lapses at state-affiliated research institutes. Others viewed it as a warning from Washington in light of discussions within Korea about developing nuclear weapons. These varied interpretations point to the confusion and concern surrounding the designation.

The Department of Energy headquarters in Washington, DC on Tuesday, February 18, 2025. [UPI/YONHAP]

The Korean government has attempted to calm domestic concerns by noting that Korea was placed in the lowest tier within the Sensitive Country List (SCL), suggesting that the designation would not have serious implications. However, this explanation misses the core issue: the inclusion of a treaty ally like Korea in a group typically reserved for nations that pose a security risk to the United States.

This context makes the DOE’s move highly unusual. Korea is already part of the A-group “white list” under the U.S. Department of Commerce, which denotes countries with the highest level of export control trust. Yet the DOE has taken a different stance, grouping Korea alongside countries such as North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. While the first two are designated state sponsors of terrorism, and the latter two are classified as high-risk nations, Korea — along with Taiwan — was placed in the ambiguous category of “Other Designated Countries.”

The DOE considers a range of factors when designating countries as sensitive, including national security, nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism. The intent is to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies, especially those related to nuclear materials and equipment, to countries where there may be a risk of misuse or diversion. Given these parameters, it is difficult to interpret Korea’s inclusion as the result of a single incident.

What matters now is whether the Korean government can provide sufficient assurances to the United States to secure a prompt removal from the list. History offers a precedent. In 1981, the U.S. designated Korea as a sensitive country due to concerns about its nuclear program. Korea formally requested removal in 1993, and after seven months of negotiations, the designation was lifted in 1994. This suggests that any resolution today could also take considerable time.

The roots of the current designation may lie in the structural changes introduced under the first Trump administration. In 2018, the U.S. enacted the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), which reshaped the country’s export control regime. President Donald Trump championed the legislation as a key pillar of his economic security agenda. The law introduced two significant reforms: tighter controls over emerging and foundational technologies (EFTs), and a push to break down silos among agencies managing export controls.

This interagency coordination has since become more robust. The DOE — along with the Departments of Commerce, State and Defense — now plays a more integrated role in overseeing sensitive exports. In the area of nuclear technology, specific bodies such as the Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls (SNEC) and the Emerging and Foundational Technologies Coordination Committee (ECEP) have been established to ensure a coordinated approach. These developments reflect Washington’s growing concern over dual-use technologies and the potential for their misuse.

Given these changes, Korea must act swiftly to ensure that the current designation does not expand into other areas or obstruct bilateral cooperation in science and technology. Any disruption in the flow of advanced U.S. technologies — such as in artificial intelligence, space, information and communication technology, or biotech — could slow Korea’s innovation and competitiveness. A pre-emptive and strategic response is essential.

Korea's Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Ahn Duk-geun, left, and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick shakes hand at the Department of Commerce in Washington D.C. on Feb. 27. [MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUSTRY, AND ENERGY]

Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that disagreements between Korea and the United States extend beyond the nuclear weapons debate. In the energy sector, tensions have emerged over nuclear technology localization, control lists, and commercial competition between Korean firms and U.S. nuclear energy companies such as Westinghouse.

Amid this complex landscape, overinterpretation of the designation — especially when driven by political agendas — risks further complicating the situation. Rhetoric advocating independent nuclear armament without alignment with the United States could be counterproductive. It could undermine efforts to build trust and may even hinder Korea’s long-term potential in nuclear development. Japan’s experience serves as a cautionary example.

Rather than viewing this designation solely as a diplomatic setback, Korea should use the episode as an opportunity to strengthen interagency coordination and improve transparency in its management of sensitive technologies. Enhancing legal frameworks and export control policies could ultimately position Korea as a more credible and trusted partner. If approached constructively, the designation may serve as a catalyst for reform — a bitter but necessary medicine that strengthens national resilience in the long term.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.