The Korean ant and American grasshopper

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The Korean ant and American grasshopper

Published: 15 Apr. 2025, 00:01

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Suh Kyoung-ho

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Korea’s trade relationship with the United States dates back 143 years to May 22, 1882. On that day, the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) signed the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation with the United States, its first trade treaty with a Western power. The first article of the treaty began on a hopeful note: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Joseon and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.”

But the implications of Article 14 were more troubling. It stated that if the King of Joseon granted any commercial privileges or monetary concessions to another country or its merchants, the same would automatically extend to U.S. officials and citizens. In effect, it was a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause — later enshrined in the post-World War II trade order through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which prohibit discriminatory trade practices favoring one country over another.

A press conference marking the implementation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is held at the Grand InterContinental Seoul in Samseong-dong on March 15, 2012, hosted by the Korea International Trade Association. [JoongAng Ilbo]

After Russia took control of Joseon’s foreign policy following the 1896 Agwan Pacheon (Korean royal refuge at the Russian legation in 1896), it claimed timber and mining rights. Other Western powers rushed to secure similar rights, invoking their own MFN clauses. For the technologically and institutionally unprepared Joseon Dynasty, these treaties quickly became lopsided and exploitative. And it was the United States that had opened that door.

In the postcolonial and postwar era, Korea chose an unconventional development strategy. Instead of the import-substitution model recommended by many international organizations at the time, Korea embraced an export-oriented strategy. That decision allowed it to emerge as a standout performer in the U.S.-led liberal trade order.

Yet, prosperity in goods exports soon brought pressure to open the service sector. In the early 1990s, negotiations with the United States over liberalizing Korea’s financial markets were particularly contentious. A 1992 Wall Street Journal article quoted a U.S. trade official as saying Koreans “must be ruled with clubs.” Kang Man-soo, a former finance minister who led the talks from Korea’s side, later wrote in his memoir: “In nearly every round of negotiations, we yielded to U.S. demands. When they insisted on things we could not easily offer — such as interest rate deregulation or capital account liberalization — we felt helpless and infuriated.”

The Korea-U.S. FTA (FTA), which took effect in 2012, is widely seen as a major achievement of former President Roh Moo-hyun. “When difficult situations arose, our people never failed,” Roh once said. “That resilience, that belief in our people’s capability — that was why I made the decision to pursue the FTA.” His words still resonate.

Although the initial agreement was concluded in 2007 under the Roh administration, it had to be supplemented under President Lee Myung-bak in 2008 with a renegotiated beef import agreement, followed by further amendments in 2010. The ratification process in 2011 descended into chaos, with hammers and tear gas used on the National Assembly floor. In 2018, the deal was renegotiated again under President Donald Trump’s first term.

Now, in Trump’s second term, the Korea-U.S. FTA appears at risk of being sidelined. Given the steep price Korea paid to bring the deal into existence, Washington’s disregard for it is difficult to accept. From the perspective of public diplomacy — of earning the goodwill of partner nations — Trump’s America scores poorly. If continued, this posture may stoke anti-American sentiment even in close allies, as it has in Canada.

Protesters opposing the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) confront police during a street march after a rally at Seoul Plaza on the afternoon of November 25, 2011. [JoongAng Ilbo]

The repeated renegotiations have already chipped away at the balance of benefits that should be the foundation of any trade deal. Yet Korea has maintained a surplus in bilateral trade, largely thanks to its people’s adaptability — just as Roh had described. Korea worked hard like the ant, tightened its belt, saved more than it spent and built up foreign reserves. America, on the other hand, consumed beyond its means and ran up trade deficits — resembling the carefree grasshopper.

In Aesop’s fable, the grasshopper either starves or survives by appealing to the ant’s sympathy. In reality, the American grasshopper brandishes tariffs and pressures the Korean ant to relocate its industry and jobs to the United States. Whether the ant will actually move, or whether the grasshopper is capable of laboring like the ant, remains to be seen.

But there are signs that faith in the grasshopper’s village may be waning. What should be avoided at all costs is a modern fable where the ant dies of overwork or leaves its village behind — turning it into a hollow shell. That is not a story anyone wants retold.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.