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Could Lee Jae-myung become Korea’s most powerful president since Chun?

Published: 18 Apr. 2025, 00:02

Kim Jung-ha

The author is the politics editor at the JoongAng Ilbo.

With Korea’s 21st presidential election scheduled for June 3, the outcome remains uncertain. Lee Jae-myung, the Democratic Party (DP) frontrunner, currently holds a strong lead, but the race could shift once the People Power Party (PPP) selects its nominee. If the conservative camp manages to consolidate anti-Lee sentiment, a dramatic reversal cannot be ruled out. Still, from a probabilistic perspective, Lee’s victory remains the most likely outcome.

Former Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung delivers a speech regarding his policy vision and campaign engagement schedule National Assembly in Yeouido, western Seoul, on April 11. [YONHAP]

If Lee is elected, what kind of presidency would follow? One underappreciated possibility is that his administration could become the most powerful since the authoritarian rule of Chun Doo Hwan. Korea’s five-year, single-term presidency tends to concentrate power in the early months. Presidents, aware of this dynamic, often push key reforms early when their political capital is at its peak. But these efforts have repeatedly run up against legislative constraints.

Many past presidents struggled to command the National Assembly from the outset. Roh Tae-woo, Roh Moo-hyun, and Yoon Suk Yeol all faced legislative gridlock during their first year. Roh Tae-woo managed to consolidate control through a controversial three-party merger, and Roh Moo-hyun’s party rebounded with a win in the 17th general election. Yoon, by contrast, was unable to gain legislative traction and was ultimately forced out of office.

Coalition politics and internal party divisions also handcuffed other leaders. Kim Dae-jung had to navigate an uneasy alliance with the United Liberal Democrats. Lee Myung-bak faced persistent internal opposition from Park Geun-hye’s faction. Park herself, despite holding a legislative majority, was hamstrung by the National Assembly Advancement Act. Moon Jae-in secured a legislative supermajority in his fourth year, but by then his administration had lost momentum. Only Kim Young-sam entered office with relatively strong authority, and even he had to secure defections from opposition lawmakers to stabilize his majority.

Lee Jae-myung would enter office under very different conditions. From day one, he would enjoy near-total legislative control. The DP commands a large majority in the National Assembly, giving him the ability to pass nearly any bill. Resistance from opposition committee chairs can be bypassed by placing bills on the fast-track system, which guarantees eventual passage. Physical confrontation, once a tool for minority parties to stall legislation, has been outlawed by the Advancement Act. Today, minority lawmakers are limited to verbal objections.

This environment would allow a Lee administration to enact sweeping changes quickly. Laws form the framework of governance, and Lee would be in a rare position to reshape that framework without resistance. Progressive legislative proposals that had been blocked by presidential veto under Yoon — such as the so-called Yellow Envelope Bill or amendments to the Commercial Act — would likely pass swiftly. Other priorities, including local currency expansion, a retirement age extension and a four-day work week, could also be fast-tracked.

Chun Doo Hwan, Korea's authoritarian leader of the 1980s, photographed in March 2019. Prosecutors recommended a one-and-a-half-year jail sentence for the ex-president. [YONHAP]

The result could be higher corporate taxes and expanded labor rights. A special law addressing past authoritarian abuses may also be introduced. Prosecutors would lose more authority, while progressive-leaning judges, particularly those affiliated with the Society for Research on Our Law, would gain prominence. The legislative shift would likely strengthen Korea’s progressive base while weakening the conservative one.

For the PPP, this would pose an existential crisis. Already struggling to appeal to centrists due to hardline rhetoric, the party could find itself further marginalized if the legal and institutional environment turns hostile. Yet there is little visible urgency within the party. Even after Yoon’s impeachment, its leadership remains unchanged and its primary rules untouched. It raises the question of whether the PPP believes the presidential race is still within reach without internal reform.

Whatever the final result, the implications are profound. A Lee Jae-myung presidency could bring rapid political transformation. The PPP may have chosen its course, but it must be fully aware of the consequences if Lee assumes office with unchecked legislative power.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.