U.S. maritime security is no longer a distant problem
Published: 18 Apr. 2025, 00:01
Choi Yoon-hee
The author is President of the Korea Maritime Institute, Former Chairman of Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff
On April 7, as U.S. President Donald Trump initiated a new phase in his tariff war with China, I attended the Sea Air Space 2025 Exhibition hosted by the Navy League of the United States. Now in its 60th year, the event is the largest maritime defense exhibition organized by the U.S. military. This year’s focus was on the resurgence of America’s shipbuilding and shipping industries amid growing maritime threats from China.
![The U.S. Navy’s logistics support vessel, the USNS Wally Schirra, arrived at Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard in Geoje, South Gyeongsang, on Sept. 2 for depot-level maintenance. Officials from both countries take a commemorative photo during the welcoming ceremony on Sept. 3, 2024. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/04/18/a360cf8c-79a0-4509-97b0-abaf56e1882d.jpg)
Top figures from the U.S. military, government, and industry voiced deep concern that America’s naval capabilities have significantly fallen behind those of China. U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan made a rare appearance, underlining the urgency. More than a dozen high-ranking admirals also participated, listening to assessments that framed the current state of U.S. naval power as a critical threat to national security.
The exhibition underscored how seriously the United States now views the decline of its maritime industrial base — a shift that carries important implications for Korea.
From its founding, the United States viewed its merchant marine as a pillar of national security. During World War I, a lack of commercial vessels severely hindered the transport of strategic goods. In response, the United States enacted the Jones Act, which provided subsidies for shipbuilding and seafaring personnel training. The federal government also established the U.S. Maritime Commission as a central authority for maritime policy.
![U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan appears at a Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing in Washington on Feb. 27. [AP/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/04/18/f7de0026-13db-4efc-be7f-93600df40344.jpg)
By the 1940s, with innovations like modular shipbuilding using cranes, the U.S. entered a golden era of naval production. Between 1940 and 1945, the United States built more than 4,600 merchant vessels. By 1960, the U.S. merchant fleet included more than 700 domestically flagged ships, and the country used its naval and merchant fleets to extend its global influence.
However, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a decline. Budget constraints led to reduced subsidies, and globalization prompted ship orders to shift overseas where costs were lower. The rise of “flags of convenience” allowed U.S. companies to register ships in countries with fewer regulations, reducing domestic fleet numbers. The strategic neglect from both civilian and military leadership — no longer pressured by Soviet competition — exacerbated the downturn.
By the 2000s, the U.S. merchant fleet had dropped to about 200 ships, with the average vessel more than 45 years old. Despite quadrupling the size of its economy, the U.S. saw its merchant fleet shrink to a third of its former size. Its share of international commercial shipping declined from 60 percent in 1947 to just 1 percent. This has hampered the U.S. military’s ability to carry out expeditionary operations that require large-scale logistic support.
During the 1950-53 Korean War, the United States implemented its Military Sealift concept for the first time, deploying 255 merchant vessels. Today, such a feat would be difficult to replicate. The decline of America’s shipbuilding sector directly affects Korea’s security as well.
While the U.S. maritime sector waned, China systematically pursued maritime expansion. Through annual subsidies of more than $1 billion, Beijing fostered hundreds of shipyards. Whereas the United States now builds only five commercial ships a year, China builds roughly 1,700 — more than 230 times as many.
China’s merchant fleet now exceeds 7,000 vessels, and its maritime work force is estimated at 600,000, compared to the United States' 153,000. China produces 50 percent of the world’s containers and 97 percent of related equipment. In naval terms, China surpassed the U.S. in fleet size in the early 2020s and could expand its advantage to around 140 ships by 2030.
At the same time, China has established naval footholds in eight countries — including Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mozambique and even the Mariana Islands — while building seven artificial islands in the South China Sea and establishing a military base in Djibouti. Its ambitions extend beyond the Pacific, aiming for maritime dominance across multiple seas, including the Yellow Sea.
The United States has only recently begun responding to this challenge. During the Biden administration, a bipartisan New Maritime Strategy was developed. President Donald Trump, now back in office, has proposed shipbuilding cooperation with Korea. The long-term plan involves a massive federal investment — more than $1 trillion — to build 364 naval ships and expand the strategic merchant fleet to 250 vessels.
Still, restoring America’s maritime dominance will take time. Trump’s outreach to Korea should be seen as a stopgap — an attempt to fill critical capacity shortfalls by leveraging Korean shipbuilding expertise.
![The U.S. Navy’s logistics support vessel USNS Wally Schirra is docked at a pier at Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard in Geoje, South Gyeongsang, on Sept. 2, 2024 for maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). [HANWHA OCEAN]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/04/18/14df032f-2a6f-4097-b5e7-92946ca6abe3.jpg)
The reality is that the United States no longer has the capacity to unilaterally secure the maritime domain as it once did. Instead, it now looks to allies like Korea for support. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has introduced a Provisional National Defense Strategy that places primary responsibility for defense on allies such as Korea and Japan while concentrating U.S. forces on Taiwan.
This shift underscores the likelihood that crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait could occur simultaneously. Despite this, Korea’s readiness for such a scenario remains limited. An old Korean Navy anthem includes the line, “Without the sea, there is no land. Where there is land, there is a homeland.” That principle is more relevant than ever.
Korea must develop a strategic, long-term maritime policy built around its advanced shipbuilding capabilities. This includes expanding its role in ship maintenance, repair and construction, particularly for allied navies. It also means investing in human capital — training seafarers, engineers and logistics professionals — to secure its maritime future.
As China pushes forward and the United States seeks recovery, Korea must not remain complacent. Its place in the evolving maritime order depends on swift, decisive action.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
The author is President of the Korea Maritime Institute, Former Chairman of Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff
On April 7, as U.S. President Donald Trump initiated a new phase in his tariff war with China, I attended the Sea Air Space 2025 Exhibition hosted by the Navy League of the United States. Now in its 60th year, the event is the largest maritime defense exhibition organized by the U.S. military. This year’s focus was on the resurgence of America’s shipbuilding and shipping industries amid growing maritime threats from China.
The U.S. Navy’s logistics support vessel, the USNS Wally Schirra, arrived at Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard in Geoje, South Gyeongsang, on Sept. 2 for depot-level maintenance. Officials from both countries take a commemorative photo during the welcoming ceremony on Sept. 3, 2024. [YONHAP]
Top figures from the U.S. military, government, and industry voiced deep concern that America’s naval capabilities have significantly fallen behind those of China. U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan made a rare appearance, underlining the urgency. More than a dozen high-ranking admirals also participated, listening to assessments that framed the current state of U.S. naval power as a critical threat to national security.
The exhibition underscored how seriously the United States now views the decline of its maritime industrial base — a shift that carries important implications for Korea.
From its founding, the United States viewed its merchant marine as a pillar of national security. During World War I, a lack of commercial vessels severely hindered the transport of strategic goods. In response, the United States enacted the Jones Act, which provided subsidies for shipbuilding and seafaring personnel training. The federal government also established the U.S. Maritime Commission as a central authority for maritime policy.
U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan appears at a Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing in Washington on Feb. 27. [AP/YONHAP]
By the 1940s, with innovations like modular shipbuilding using cranes, the U.S. entered a golden era of naval production. Between 1940 and 1945, the United States built more than 4,600 merchant vessels. By 1960, the U.S. merchant fleet included more than 700 domestically flagged ships, and the country used its naval and merchant fleets to extend its global influence.
However, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a decline. Budget constraints led to reduced subsidies, and globalization prompted ship orders to shift overseas where costs were lower. The rise of “flags of convenience” allowed U.S. companies to register ships in countries with fewer regulations, reducing domestic fleet numbers. The strategic neglect from both civilian and military leadership — no longer pressured by Soviet competition — exacerbated the downturn.
By the 2000s, the U.S. merchant fleet had dropped to about 200 ships, with the average vessel more than 45 years old. Despite quadrupling the size of its economy, the U.S. saw its merchant fleet shrink to a third of its former size. Its share of international commercial shipping declined from 60 percent in 1947 to just 1 percent. This has hampered the U.S. military’s ability to carry out expeditionary operations that require large-scale logistic support.
During the 1950-53 Korean War, the United States implemented its Military Sealift concept for the first time, deploying 255 merchant vessels. Today, such a feat would be difficult to replicate. The decline of America’s shipbuilding sector directly affects Korea’s security as well.
While the U.S. maritime sector waned, China systematically pursued maritime expansion. Through annual subsidies of more than $1 billion, Beijing fostered hundreds of shipyards. Whereas the United States now builds only five commercial ships a year, China builds roughly 1,700 — more than 230 times as many.
China’s merchant fleet now exceeds 7,000 vessels, and its maritime work force is estimated at 600,000, compared to the United States' 153,000. China produces 50 percent of the world’s containers and 97 percent of related equipment. In naval terms, China surpassed the U.S. in fleet size in the early 2020s and could expand its advantage to around 140 ships by 2030.
At the same time, China has established naval footholds in eight countries — including Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mozambique and even the Mariana Islands — while building seven artificial islands in the South China Sea and establishing a military base in Djibouti. Its ambitions extend beyond the Pacific, aiming for maritime dominance across multiple seas, including the Yellow Sea.
The United States has only recently begun responding to this challenge. During the Biden administration, a bipartisan New Maritime Strategy was developed. President Donald Trump, now back in office, has proposed shipbuilding cooperation with Korea. The long-term plan involves a massive federal investment — more than $1 trillion — to build 364 naval ships and expand the strategic merchant fleet to 250 vessels.
Still, restoring America’s maritime dominance will take time. Trump’s outreach to Korea should be seen as a stopgap — an attempt to fill critical capacity shortfalls by leveraging Korean shipbuilding expertise.
The U.S. Navy’s logistics support vessel USNS Wally Schirra is docked at a pier at Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard in Geoje, South Gyeongsang, on Sept. 2, 2024 for maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). [HANWHA OCEAN]
The reality is that the United States no longer has the capacity to unilaterally secure the maritime domain as it once did. Instead, it now looks to allies like Korea for support. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has introduced a Provisional National Defense Strategy that places primary responsibility for defense on allies such as Korea and Japan while concentrating U.S. forces on Taiwan.
This shift underscores the likelihood that crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait could occur simultaneously. Despite this, Korea’s readiness for such a scenario remains limited. An old Korean Navy anthem includes the line, “Without the sea, there is no land. Where there is land, there is a homeland.” That principle is more relevant than ever.
Korea must develop a strategic, long-term maritime policy built around its advanced shipbuilding capabilities. This includes expanding its role in ship maintenance, repair and construction, particularly for allied navies. It also means investing in human capital — training seafarers, engineers and logistics professionals — to secure its maritime future.
As China pushes forward and the United States seeks recovery, Korea must not remain complacent. Its place in the evolving maritime order depends on swift, decisive action.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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