Manipulated statistics undermine trust in government
Published: 21 Apr. 2025, 00:03
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Ha Hyun-ock
The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.
In July 2020, with Seoul apartment prices climbing at a pace that left many residents anxious and frustrated, a heated public debate erupted over the true scale of the surge. At the center of the dispute stood two competing narratives, each backed by different data sources. The civic group Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) cited KB Kookmin Bank’s housing data to claim that median apartment prices in Seoul had jumped 52 percent since the start of the Moon Jae-in administration. Then-Land Minister Kim Hyun-mee pushed back, citing the Korea Appraisal Board — now the Korea Real Estate Board — which placed the increase at a much lower 14.2 percent for apartments and 11.5 percent for all homes in the city.
![View of apartments in Seoul. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/04/21/fce7f8cc-4807-438f-8729-bb19595934fb.jpg)
The discrepancy was attributed to differences in data sources and methodology. The Land Ministry dismissed the median-price figure as misleading, suggesting that it overstated market sentiment and failed to reflect the full range of transactions. Yet, despite public demand, it offered no transparency about how its own housing price figures were derived. In contrast, when applying tighter loan regulations, the government relied on private-sector data that showed steeper price hikes.
At the time, the apparent contradiction raised questions. Was this a case of “cherry-picking” statistics to suit policy objectives? Possibly. But few suspected that official numbers were being intentionally altered. There remained a basic level of trust — that however flawed or biased, national statistics were at least produced with integrity.
That assumption no longer holds.
On April 17, after a nearly three-year investigation, Korea’s Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) released a 911-page report titled “Survey on the Preparation and Use of Major National Statistics.” It concluded that under the Moon administration, critical statistics on real estate prices, income levels and employment were subject to frequent and deliberate manipulation. The revelations were staggering. In the case of housing data alone, the audit found that statistics were tampered with at least 102 times over four years, leading to figures that diverged from private data by as much as fortyfold.
The details contained in the audit report are especially troubling. Internal messages exchanged between officials at the Blue House and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport suggest sustained efforts to “massage” data to align with political goals. Employees at the Korea Real Estate Board, the state-run institution tasked with compiling housing statistics, appear to have been under repeated pressure. In one internal exchange, a staffer wrote, “Guys, the Land Ministry wants us to lower [the price increase]. Let’s lower it.” Another message said, “They’re going off the rails. Abusing power. These days, they’re openly ordering us to fabricate.”
These are not merely technical errors or interpretive differences. The housing price index produced by the Korea Real Estate Board is a nationally certified statistic. According to the audit, it is a crucial reference point for government decision-making, as well as for citizens contemplating property investments. It is also a core input for major policies like the price cap on presale homes and the redevelopment gains tax. By design, such data must be compiled objectively, using transparent methods and scientific standards. The manipulation of such figures not only misleads the public but also distorts the basis for financial and policy decisions.
The implications are far-reaching. First and foremost, the report confirms that the government’s credibility — rooted in the assumption that state institutions operate with impartiality — was compromised. Second, it reveals the extent to which policy missteps during the Moon administration’s term may have stemmed from flawed data, not merely poor judgment.
The damage was not just abstract. There were material consequences for ordinary citizens. Yoo Kyung-joon, a former commissioner of Statistics Korea and a former lawmaker with the People Power Party, estimated that redevelopment association members paid over 1 trillion won in excess levies due to the manipulated housing data. This is because redevelopment levies are calculated by subtracting general market appreciation from the value increase of a redeveloped home. If official statistics understated the overall market rise, the share attributed to individual redevelopment was inflated — leading to heavier financial burdens.
![The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI) headquarters in Jongno District, central Seoul [NEWS1]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/04/21/1370ba6f-a5a0-4ff7-8801-06a76bb72365.jpg)
Legal challenges are likely to follow. Affected homeowners may seek restitution through class-action lawsuits. Yet accountability remains elusive. To date, neither former government officials nor senior members of the ruling Democratic Party have issued a formal apology. Instead, the party has responded by casting doubt on the audit itself, calling it a “politically motivated investigation” and warning that the BAI “must be subject to reform.”
A group of former Moon administration officials, known as the “Sajo Forum,” went a step further. They accused the auditors of twisting legitimate bureaucratic efforts into a “fictional narrative” of conspiracy, arguing that it is the duty of public servants to understand market conditions and assess the impact of policy interventions.
Such defenses miss the point. The issue at hand is not whether government officials had the right to monitor or interpret data. It is whether they crossed the line by rewriting reality to suit political ends. Manipulating data to conceal policy failures, while branding dissenting figures as misleading, amounts to deception at the state level. In any democratic society, that should be cause for grave concern.
Whether the audit was politically motivated or not, its findings offer an unvarnished explanation for the repeated missteps in Moon’s real estate policies. When decision-makers are denied access to reliable information — or worse, when they themselves suppress it — policy becomes performative, divorced from real-world outcomes. And the cost of that disconnection is ultimately borne by the public.
In a country where housing is central to financial security and quality of life, falsifying real estate data is not just a bureaucratic error. It is a betrayal of trust — one that calls for accountability, not deflection.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.
In July 2020, with Seoul apartment prices climbing at a pace that left many residents anxious and frustrated, a heated public debate erupted over the true scale of the surge. At the center of the dispute stood two competing narratives, each backed by different data sources. The civic group Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) cited KB Kookmin Bank’s housing data to claim that median apartment prices in Seoul had jumped 52 percent since the start of the Moon Jae-in administration. Then-Land Minister Kim Hyun-mee pushed back, citing the Korea Appraisal Board — now the Korea Real Estate Board — which placed the increase at a much lower 14.2 percent for apartments and 11.5 percent for all homes in the city.
View of apartments in Seoul. [YONHAP]
At the time, the apparent contradiction raised questions. Was this a case of “cherry-picking” statistics to suit policy objectives? Possibly. But few suspected that official numbers were being intentionally altered. There remained a basic level of trust — that however flawed or biased, national statistics were at least produced with integrity.
That assumption no longer holds.
On April 17, after a nearly three-year investigation, Korea’s Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) released a 911-page report titled “Survey on the Preparation and Use of Major National Statistics.” It concluded that under the Moon administration, critical statistics on real estate prices, income levels and employment were subject to frequent and deliberate manipulation. The revelations were staggering. In the case of housing data alone, the audit found that statistics were tampered with at least 102 times over four years, leading to figures that diverged from private data by as much as fortyfold.
The details contained in the audit report are especially troubling. Internal messages exchanged between officials at the Blue House and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport suggest sustained efforts to “massage” data to align with political goals. Employees at the Korea Real Estate Board, the state-run institution tasked with compiling housing statistics, appear to have been under repeated pressure. In one internal exchange, a staffer wrote, “Guys, the Land Ministry wants us to lower [the price increase]. Let’s lower it.” Another message said, “They’re going off the rails. Abusing power. These days, they’re openly ordering us to fabricate.”
These are not merely technical errors or interpretive differences. The housing price index produced by the Korea Real Estate Board is a nationally certified statistic. According to the audit, it is a crucial reference point for government decision-making, as well as for citizens contemplating property investments. It is also a core input for major policies like the price cap on presale homes and the redevelopment gains tax. By design, such data must be compiled objectively, using transparent methods and scientific standards. The manipulation of such figures not only misleads the public but also distorts the basis for financial and policy decisions.
The implications are far-reaching. First and foremost, the report confirms that the government’s credibility — rooted in the assumption that state institutions operate with impartiality — was compromised. Second, it reveals the extent to which policy missteps during the Moon administration’s term may have stemmed from flawed data, not merely poor judgment.
The damage was not just abstract. There were material consequences for ordinary citizens. Yoo Kyung-joon, a former commissioner of Statistics Korea and a former lawmaker with the People Power Party, estimated that redevelopment association members paid over 1 trillion won in excess levies due to the manipulated housing data. This is because redevelopment levies are calculated by subtracting general market appreciation from the value increase of a redeveloped home. If official statistics understated the overall market rise, the share attributed to individual redevelopment was inflated — leading to heavier financial burdens.
The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI) headquarters in Jongno District, central Seoul [NEWS1]
A group of former Moon administration officials, known as the “Sajo Forum,” went a step further. They accused the auditors of twisting legitimate bureaucratic efforts into a “fictional narrative” of conspiracy, arguing that it is the duty of public servants to understand market conditions and assess the impact of policy interventions.
Such defenses miss the point. The issue at hand is not whether government officials had the right to monitor or interpret data. It is whether they crossed the line by rewriting reality to suit political ends. Manipulating data to conceal policy failures, while branding dissenting figures as misleading, amounts to deception at the state level. In any democratic society, that should be cause for grave concern.
Whether the audit was politically motivated or not, its findings offer an unvarnished explanation for the repeated missteps in Moon’s real estate policies. When decision-makers are denied access to reliable information — or worse, when they themselves suppress it — policy becomes performative, divorced from real-world outcomes. And the cost of that disconnection is ultimately borne by the public.
In a country where housing is central to financial security and quality of life, falsifying real estate data is not just a bureaucratic error. It is a betrayal of trust — one that calls for accountability, not deflection.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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