Trump's fixation with tariffs ignores strategic considerations with Seoul, U.S. security experts warn

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Trump's fixation with tariffs ignores strategic considerations with Seoul, U.S. security experts warn

Published: 24 Apr. 2025, 17:39 Updated: 24 Apr. 2025, 17:55

SEO JI-EUN
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Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Chung Mong-joon, founder and honorary chairman of the Seoul-based Asan Institute of Policy Studies, left, and Kurt Campbell, former U.S. deputy secretary of State, attend a forum hosted by the Asan Institute of Policy Studies at a hotel in Seoul on April 23. [NEWS1]

The Donald Trump administration’s tariff offensive and shifting defense priorities are raising alarm among former U.S. officials, who warn that the South Korea-U.S. alliance may be reshaped without sufficient bilateral consultation.

Randall Schriver, a former senior Pentagon official under the first Trump administration, criticized the lack of strategic dialogue with Seoul, noting that Washington’s current focus is “taken up with tariffs and tariff relief.”

His concerns echo broader fears among U.S. security experts like Victor Cha and Bruce Bennett that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) may be increasingly reoriented toward Indo-Pacific contingencies like Taiwan, rather than its traditional deterrence role on the Korean Peninsula.

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Busy with tariffs, but not allies

As the Trump administration pushes forward with a sweeping economic agenda — including new rounds of tariffs and a revival of “America First” policy tools — a former top U.S. defense official raised concerns that traditional allies like South Korea may be getting lost in the shuffle.

Speaking at a press roundtable hosted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum in Seoul on Wednesday, Schriver, former assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs and current chairman of the Virginia-based think tank Project 2049 Institute, said that Washington's agenda is “taken up with tariffs and tariff relief,” along with “various investment proposals, shipbuilding cooperation and natural gas.”

While he acknowledged that bilateral discussions on trade and tariffs were taking place — including recent phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo, as well as this week's "two plus two" ministerial meeting of finance and trade ministers from both countries — Schriver expressed concern over the lack of senior-level strategic dialogue on broader alliance issues.

Randall Schriver, former U.S. assistant secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs under President Donald Trump's first term, speaks during a press roundtable hosted by the Asan Institute on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum in Seoul on April 23. [ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES]

“It’s not the type of deep engagement that I think we need to sort through [alliance-related questions like posture and long-term strategy],” he added, in an answer to the Korea JoongAng Daily.

Schriver contrasted the current state of South Korea-U.S. engagement with more active outreach to other Indo-Pacific allies, such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's recent visit to the Philippines, Guam and Japan — the first trip to Asia since his appointment — yet excluding Seoul. South Korea, he added, has yet to receive that level of attention due to “domestic issues to be sorted out” and the ongoing U.S. political transition.

While tariffs dominate bilateral attention, Schriver warned that “a crowded agenda” cannot substitute for genuine strategic alignment — especially when it comes to alliance sustainability and regional security.

As uncertainty mounts over the future of the U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula under Trump’s second term, Schriver warned that dramatically reducing U.S. troops would cost America.

“I’m a strong supporter of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea for our shared interests,” Schriver said. “A change in our posture — if it was a dramatic reduction — we’d lose a lot.”

He added that South Korea is a model ally when it comes to burden-sharing, citing the country's consistently high defense spending and its growing self-defense posture.

“The defense spending here is high by international standards, and Korea is clearly doing a lot for its own defense,” he added.

Rather than the reduction of troops, the former Pentagon official instead urged alliance modernization, calling for enhanced technological integration and preparedness for a wider range of contingencies.

“How do you really leverage emerging technologies like autonomous unmanned systems?" he said. "How do you think about AI applications when it comes to battlespace awareness?”

On the topic of renewed diplomacy with Pyongyang, Schriver, who was present at both the Singapore summit in 2018 and Hanoi summit in 2019 between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, stressed the importance of avoiding past coordination failures between Washington and Seoul.

Reflecting on the Trump-Moon Jae-in years, he noted that although both governments were actively engaging Pyongyang, they often did so in parallel rather than in full synchrony, which at times led to weakened negotiating leverage.

“If President Trump does have an opportunity to re-engage, [I would] hope that it would be in close coordination with South Korea,” he said, underscoring the need for a unified diplomatic front.

Victor Cha, Korea chair at the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, speaks during a press roundtable hosted by the Asan Institute on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum in Seoul on April 23. [ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES]

No deal expected before June 3 election

Victor Cha, Korea chair at the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a former Defense Policy Board adviser under the Joe Biden administration, warned that a breakthrough on the ongoing negotiations over looming tariffs between Washington and Seoul is unlikely before Seoul elects a new government in June.

“It's actually very difficult to imagine a deal can be made before your election on June 3,” said Cha. “Which then puts the incoming government in South Korea in a tough position where they have basically a month to try to negotiate a trade deal before July 9, when the suspension on the 25 percent tariff expires.”

Cha noted that, unlike other U.S. allies such as the European Union and Canada, South Korea has taken a fundamentally different approach in the sense that the reaction is "not to retaliate but to try to negotiate with the United States."

Cha explained that while South Korea’s trade and finance ministers headed off to Washington for talks, Trump is unlikely to abandon his 10 to 25 percent tariff baseline on key sectors like automobiles and steel.

“I don't think Trump will back away from the baseline 10 percent tariff,” he said.

“He really does want to protect the auto industry [...] and the steel industry,” he said. “The most that the leaders can do is they can agree on principle and then the working-level people have to work out the details [...] all of that takes time.”

Trump mentioned a “one-stop shopping” package while speaking with acting President Han, suggesting that tariffs could be linked to other sectors, such as security issues like defense cost-sharing. Cha interpreted this as characteristic of Trump’s transactional diplomacy.

“That is only possible if the two sides really think outside of the box and come up with creative solutions that involve many different aspects of the alliance,” Cha said. But, he added, “I would be very surprised if they reached an agreement before your election.”

In a recent interview with the Financial Times, Han said that while there isn't a "clear framework" for security discussions, South Korea is open to revisiting the cost-sharing deal concluded with the Biden administration "depending on the issues" at hand. The acting President's comment suggests a potential departure from South Korea’s longstanding position of separating trade and security issues in alliance negotiations with the United States.

Beyond trade, Cha warned that the Trump administration may soon revisit the role of USFK, cautioning that the role of the USFK could be fundamentally redefined to serve contingencies outside of Korea — especially a potential Taiwan crisis.

“Trump thinks that South Korea should be able to defend and deter North Korea on its own," he said.

“[Then] that role could shift … [to] the Taiwan contingency," he added. He cautioned that “strategic flexibility,” a concept that came up under the Roh Moo-hyun administration during the Iraq War, is going to "rise again" on the Korean Peninsula.

John Everard, former British Ambassador to North Korea, speaks during a press roundtable hosted by the Asan Institute on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum in Seoul on April 23. [ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES]

U.S. troop withdrawal could be 'inconvenient' for North

North Korean officials may secretly oppose the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, despite their regime’s longstanding public demands for it, former British Ambassador to North Korea John Everard suggested.

“In private, they know that the existence of the USFK gives their regime a reason for continuing its posturing against the United States and against [South Korea]," Everard said. "It would actually be inconvenient for them if there were a complete withdrawal."

Everard, who served as British ambassador to Pyongyang from 2006 to 2008, also voiced skepticism about South Korea’s enhanced efforts to broadcast information into the North under former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s so-called "Aug. 15 Doctrine" — a symbolic policy pledge to increase exposure of North Korean citizens to the outside world through media and digital platforms aimed at fostering conditions for eventual change from within.

“North Korea always has been a closed society but it is now much more closed than it was when I was there," Everard replied to a question asked by the Korea JoongAng Daily. "If you imitate a South Korean accent, haircut or fashion [...] you will be in deep trouble."

"How far present efforts to penetrate the North Korean information will succeed? I'm not so optimistic,” he added.

With South Korea’s snap presidential election coming up, Everard noted that the regime is more focused on what it can gain from the incoming administration, rather than whether a conservative or more progressive government wins.

“What they want to know is whether they can somehow extract money from the South Korean government,” he said. “They tried this very hard under President Moon Jae-in [...] but that came to nothing because he pointed out that he was not prepared to breach the United Nations sanctions.”

Despite ongoing discussions about the reopening of Western diplomatic missions in Pyongyang, the former ambassador confirmed that the British Embassy in North Korea remains closed, with no clear timeline for reopening.

“We, the Brits, have been trying for a long time now to get back into North Korea," he said. "Every now and then, we seem to make progress, and then the doors just slam shut.”

“My own theory … is that the North Koreans have decided to allow back in embassies from the Neutral Nations [Surpervisory] Commission set up at the end of the Korean War, but not embassies from the United Nations Command,” he added, noting that the Polish and Swedish embassies have reopened. Poland and Sweden are part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the California-based think tank RAND Corporation, speaks during a press roundtable hosted by the Asan Institute on the sidelines of the Asan Plenum in Seoul on April 23. [ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES]

North shifts to tactical nuclear saturation

North Korea is shifting its military doctrine from conventional deterrence to tactical nuclear saturation, aiming to deploy "over 300" tactical nuclear warheads on short-range ballistic missiles, according to Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the California-based think tank RAND Corporation.

Bennett explained that the missiles likely include KN-23 and KN-25 systems.

“A couple of years ago [Kim] showed 30 KN-25 launchers with six tubes each, 180 missiles potentially [...] and Kim said every one of them would be nuclear,”

This, he warned, represents more than a symbolic threat.

“North Korea was shifting its nuclear strategy from a defensive strategy to one in which nuclear weapon employment would be seriously contemplated in appropriate crisis situations.”

Beyond nuclear buildup, Bennett cited growing internal instability within the regime due to the deployment of elite North Korean troops to Russia.

“If he [the only son in a North Korean family] goes to Russia and is killed, that’s the end of that family," Bennett said. "Their posterity is gone. That’s not going to go well.”

He urged the U.S. and South Korea to exploit this vulnerability through targeted psychological operations.

“We seem to forget that information may be one of our most powerful weapons,” Bennett said.

Regarding the evolving role of the USFK, Bennett pointed to a strategic pivot facing China.

“USFK is going to be prepared to swing either way for now [...] to fight on the peninsula or to deal with China,” he said. “You can’t get much closer to China than being in South Korea.”

BY SEO JI-EUN [[email protected]]