Campaigns must act as transition teams

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Campaigns must act as transition teams

Published: 29 Apr. 2025, 00:01

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Suh Kyoung-ho

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

“A sound country where common sense is restored, a dynamic economy led by the private sector and backed by the government, a warm society of shared prosperity and a nation where everyone is happy...”

These were the beautifully worded national goals announced in May 2022 by the presidential transition committee of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration. Reading them again now, they only elicit yawns. Rather than becoming a sound and dynamic country, Korea has turned into a strange place where the Bank of Korea, not private businesses, pays the most corporate taxes. Instead of happiness, the public has been forced to wrestle with the absurdity of martial law and the sudden political instability that followed.

The Democratic Party officially confirmed its presidential candidate two days ago. Today, the results of the People Power Party's second primary will be announced, with the final nominee to be selected over the weekend. Whether the conservative party can unify around a single candidate or form a broader “big tent” coalition remains a point of interest. Before major candidates enter a full-fledged battle over campaign pledges, there is one critical issue to confront: whether they are leading in the polls or chasing from behind, every candidate must recognize the gravity of the fact that the next government will have to launch without a transition committee.

On March 16, 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol, then President-elect, takes a stroll after having lunch with his transition team in Tongui-dong in Jongno District, central Seoul. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

Normally, after a December election, a transition committee operates for about 60 days until the new administration takes office in February. The transition team refines national policy goals based on the president-elect’s philosophy, identifies realistic constraints, screens key personnel and tests both the capabilities and temperaments of those who will enter government. It also serves as a reality check, revising and scaling back any overly ambitious campaign promises based on budgetary constraints and feasibility. Without a transition committee, there is no time to troubleshoot policies or craft detailed implementation plans. Campaign pledges go unvetted for realism, and as a result, poorly prepared policies may flood the early months of the new administration. This leads to confusion over the national direction and a serious erosion of public trust. The Moon Jae-in administration, which took office without a formal transition team, rushed through major initiatives such as a sharp increase in the minimum wage, the conversion of irregular workers to regular status, and the nuclear phaseout — all of which produced significant aftershocks. Moon's administration delegated some planning to a national policy advisory committee, but by then, the new government was already operating and lacked sufficient time to properly execute plans.

Campaign teams must fully grasp the weight of this situation. They must act with the responsibility and seriousness of a future transition committee. Campaign pledges should be realistic and rational. If candidates are thinking not only of winning the election but also of successfully governing afterward, they will find it difficult to casually propose costly, overly optimistic promises. During the last presidential race, Yoon Suk Yeol and Lee Jae-myung’s campaign pledges were estimated to require over 266 trillion won ($184.2 billion) and 300 trillion won, respectively, over five years. These were figures calculated by their own campaigns and excluded regional promises, meaning the true cost would have been far higher.

Many of their flagship pledges became the basis for national policy. Yoon’s first campaign pledge — to compensate small business owners and the self-employed for pandemic-related losses — became the administration’s first policy priority. In May 2022, the Yoon government submitted a supplementary budget bill worth 59 trillion won that passed in the National Assembly at 62 trillion won — the largest supplementary budget in Korean history. Of this, 23 trillion won was distributed to 3.73 million small business owners. While compensating businesses that cooperated with national quarantine guidelines was necessary, the scale of the support should have been adjusted more realistically, considering inflation and fiscal health. The national debt increased by 409 trillion won during the five years of the Moon administration and by another 205 trillion won in the first three years of the Yoon administration. When accounting for the Yoon government’s off-budget use of the foreign exchange stabilization fund, the two administrations’ fiscal performances are nearly indistinguishable.

On March 2022, former President Yoon Suk-yeol, then President-elect, points to the Defense Ministry main building in Yongsan District, where the presidential office relocated to, in a press conference at his transition team's headquarters in Samcheong-dong, central Seoul. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

The current administration’s worsening fiscal position stems largely from a decline in corporate tax revenues due to the economic downturn, compounded by tax cuts. A serious candidate, under these circumstances, would find it difficult to recklessly propose sweet-sounding tax policies simply to win votes. Expensive pledges must be weighed by clear priorities — one must know where one can realistically “lie down” before taking big steps.

It is not only Lee but also the candidates chasing him who must think like a transition committee. Even if a candidate loses the election, a party that recklessly tosses around unrealistic promises will find it difficult to become a credible opposition that can effectively hold the new government accountable.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.