China’s projects in Yellow Sea pose risk to Korean sovereignty
Published: 12 May. 2025, 00:02
The author is a professor of Chinese studies, Kyung Hee University
In March 2022, a South Korean maritime patrol vessel discovered a massive steel structure in the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, resembling an oil drilling platform. The installation, constructed by China, followed earlier deployments — Shenlan-1 in 2018 and Shenlan-2 in May 2023. More recently, evidence emerged suggesting that China had begun securing ships to the structures, reinforcing concerns that Beijing is laying the groundwork for a long-term presence.
![Rep. Um Tae-young of the People Power Party on April 24 released images of three structures unilaterally installed by China in the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, where the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Korea and China overlap. From left: Shenlan-1 (2018), Shenlan-2 (2024), and a drilling platform-like facility installed in 2022, which China claims is for management purposes. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/12/fdbfedb8-1f6b-49e4-8768-1d349020b955.jpg)
Rep. Um Tae-young of the People Power Party on April 24 released images of three structures unilaterally installed by China in the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, where the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Korea and China overlap. From left: Shenlan-1 (2018), Shenlan-2 (2024), and a drilling platform-like facility installed in 2022, which China claims is for management purposes. [YONHAP]
History offers no shortage of examples where physical occupation has overridden legal claims. The dispute over the Northern Territories between Japan and Russia illustrates this clearly. Despite Tokyo’s consistent appeal to international law, Moscow has held effective control of the islands since the end of World War II. In international politics, the principle of “effective control” often overrides legal arguments, particularly in regions where sovereignty remains unresolved and where international institutions lack enforcement power.
Territorial conflicts tend to be decided not in courtrooms but on the ground — or in this case, at sea. That is why China's recent activities in the Yellow Sea deserve more than passive observation. The strategic placement of maritime structures within a zone where boundaries have yet to be settled suggests Beijing is attempting to secure leverage in any future negotiations over maritime demarcation with Korea. Control today could very well shape the outcome tomorrow.
Despite this, Seoul continues to emphasize diplomatic engagement. While diplomacy is vital, China’s past behavior casts doubt on its willingness to resolve such disputes through negotiation. Beijing has rarely settled territorial disagreements amicably with noncommunist states. Most of China’s successful boundary negotiations — such as those with North Korea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia — have taken place within its ideological sphere. Even China’s symbolic concession of two lines in the South China Sea to Vietnam during the 1960s can be viewed as a calculated gesture within a broader strategy of influence.
The diplomatic challenges are compounded by Beijing’s selective interpretation of international agreements. China’s foreign ministry has insisted that the newly constructed platforms are for aquaculture, comply with both domestic and international law, and do not violate the Korea-China Fisheries Agreement. Yet Article 3.1 of the 2000 agreement clearly requires both parties to consult annually on fishing zones and conditions, with a mutual obligation to notify one another of relevant developments. Article 7.2 mandates joint conservation measures to be determined by the Korea-China Fisheries Committee. China’s unilateral construction of these structures, without notification or consent, appears to violate both the letter and the spirit of the agreement.
Further complicating matters, Beijing has pointed to Korea’s Ieodo Ocean Research Station — located near the disputed waters — as a supposed infringement on China’s exclusive economic zone. This mirrors China’s broader pattern of turning legal arguments on their head to suit its strategic interests. Such behavior is not new. China’s repeated circumvention of global norms, including as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, underscores why diplomacy may struggle to yield meaningful results.
Beneath the surface lies a broader strategic calculus. The area in question falls within China’s so-called “First Island Chain,” a geopolitical boundary that Beijing views as critical to its national defense. Chinese naval strategy documents as early as 1986, and again in a 2016 naval journal, emphasized the need for maritime control within this perimeter. From this perspective, the installation of semipermanent structures in the Yellow Sea serves not only economic or legal purposes, but also signals China’s intent to establish military and political dominance over the area.
![A China Coast Guard vessel No.2502 sails near a Japan Coast Guard vessel Motobu off Uotsuri Island, one of a group of disputed islands called Senkaku Islands in Japan, also known in China as Diaoyu Islands, in the East China Sea April 27, 2024, in this photo released by Kyodo. [KYODO/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/12/ce688c1d-f82e-4750-85b6-f72e23b3f587.jpg)
A China Coast Guard vessel No.2502 sails near a Japan Coast Guard vessel Motobu off Uotsuri Island, one of a group of disputed islands called Senkaku Islands in Japan, also known in China as Diaoyu Islands, in the East China Sea April 27, 2024, in this photo released by Kyodo. [KYODO/YONHAP]
Korea is not alone in facing this challenge. Countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia have all confronted similar assertions of Chinese maritime control. In many cases, tensions eased only after these nations responded with physical presence or military deterrence. Notably, when a Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Japanese coast guard ship near the Senkaku Islands in 2010, the United States voiced support for Japan. In 2023 and 2024, when the Philippines moved to occupy the Second Thomas Shoal and faced Chinese retaliation, the United States again sided with its ally.
Korea may need to draw on such precedents. If diplomacy continues to stall, Seoul should consider proportionate and measured responses — ideally backed by the United States and other partners — to assert its sovereign rights. This is not to promote confrontation, but to ensure that inaction does not become acquiescence.
Territorial issues are rarely resolved quickly or cleanly. But history suggests that when one party unilaterally acts to change the status quo, a lack of response can solidify those changes. Korea must weigh its options carefully, recognizing that the defense of sovereignty often requires more than words.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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