Korea must navigate Trump’s second term with strategic patience and pragmatism
Published: 16 May. 2025, 00:04
Shin Kak-soo
The author is the vice chairman of the Near Foundation and a former ambassador to Japan.
The trade war between the United States and China, once escalating toward extremes, has entered a tentative truce. Last weekend, the two countries held high-level negotiations in Switzerland and agreed to simultaneously reduce retaliatory tariffs by 115 percentage points. The agreement includes a 90-day window for follow-up discussions, and while it is conditional, it offers a moment of relief. Still, for Korea, the outlook is far from reassuring. The Trump administration’s combative diplomacy — now nearly four months into its second term — shows no signs of abating.
![U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 14. [AP/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/16/5553ff5c-dcff-4d49-b8a6-d78348f1d1bc.jpg)
Since taking office again, President Donald Trump has signed more than 140 executive orders, moving with a pace unseen since Franklin D. Roosevelt. He has focused not only on domestic priorities such as immigration and administrative reform but also on wielding tariffs as weapons in trade disputes, while involving the United States in ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. The realignment of global alliances has moved from rhetoric to policy.
Domestically, Trump faces resistance over perceived violations of legal norms and increasing authoritarian tendencies. Abroad, allies and the broader international community are expressing alarm over what they see as a breakdown of the postwar order that the United States itself once constructed and maintained.
Although it has been just over 100 days, the foreign and security policy of Trump’s second term can best be described as chaotic. Unlike the first term, this administration enjoys tighter control over policy, personnel and both chambers of Congress, enabling what some call “Trumpism on steroids.” Still, the underlying strategic direction remains unclear. Is the United States aiming to maintain global primacy through continued engagement, or is it pursuing retrenchment — narrowing its involvement to selected regions?
Recent infighting between hawks and moderates over China policy, as well as personnel reshuffles within the National Security Council, suggests that the traditional conservative Republican goal of U.S. hegemony has lost traction. What emerges is a strategy of selective engagement, or even voluntary isolation, with growing focus on the Western Hemisphere.
![U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer address the media after trade talks with China in Geneva, Switzerland, May 11. [REUTERS/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/16/b218c2a0-7b3a-4760-adc2-edcc78a16da4.jpg)
A reprioritization of strategic interests seems inevitable. The United States appears to be ranking priorities from the homeland to the Western Hemisphere, then East Asia, Europe and finally the Middle East. Trump’s renewed interest in the Panama Canal and even rhetorical claims over Greenland and parts of Canada can be seen as part of this hemispheric pivot.
Instead of offering an “alliance dividend,” Trump has called on allies to increase their roles and burdens. He has portrayed allies as economic free riders benefiting from American security guarantees while undermining U.S. interests — sometimes more so than adversaries. Yet, even as Washington pressures allies, it is unlikely to abandon them altogether. Rather, it will seek to use them more strategically, particularly in the rivalry with China.
More troubling is how Trump’s America increasingly disregards international rules in favor of what it calls national interest, exhibiting a predatory stance uncharacteristic of past administrations. Trump openly prefers bilateral deals to multilateral institutions and often bypasses international law and norms. This approach, reminiscent of 19th-century imperialism, aligns the United States more closely with what some call the “axis of disruption,” including Russia, China and North Korea.
In this environment, constraints on Trump’s agenda come not from Congress, which remains largely inert, but from markets, the courts and public opinion. Markets have proven the most effective check on policies that generate “shock and awe.” Yet public sentiment, especially with an eye on next year’s midterms, also plays a key role. U.S. courts, too, have weighed in through more than 4,000 lawsuits that have slowed or altered Trump’s initiatives.
Still, for Korea — facing both direct and indirect ripple effects from U.S. foreign policy — relying on these internal U.S. checks is not enough. Trump’s second term could destabilize the Korea-U.S. alliance and the broader liberal international order. Worse, the world may face what economists call the Kindleberger Trap, in which a rising power fails to provide global public goods once managed by a declining hegemon.
Korea must respond with a dual-track strategy that distinguishes between Trump-era policies likely to outlast his presidency and those that will recede. U.S. policies focused on China, manufacturing, alliance cost-sharing, universal tariffs and economic security are likely to persist. In contrast, the degradation of alliance values and damage to liberal norms may be reversible under a future administration.
Maintaining the Korea-U.S. alliance remains essential. While burden-sharing demands should be met within reason, Korea must also press for reciprocal gains. In trade, Seoul should leverage its position within Washington’s transactional diplomacy to mitigate negative impacts on Korean industries.
In security, Korea must prevent any weakening of deterrence against North Korea or implicit U.S. recognition of the North as a de facto nuclear state. Here, cooperation with Japan is critical, as both countries face similar security and diplomatic challenges. With the geopolitical climate improving, it is also time to normalize relations with China and consider reengaging Russia after the war in Ukraine.
Korea must uphold its commitment to the liberal international order, expanding cooperation with Japan, the EU, Australia and Canada. As a middle power, Korea should champion multilateralism and rules-based diplomacy, while also strengthening ties with the Global South, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
![U.S. President Donald Trump speaks before swearing in former U.S. Sen. David Perdue (not pictured) as the United States Ambassador to the Peoples Republic of China in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington on May 7. [EPA/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/16/f79e392b-b27c-4213-b948-590ac9673cf5.jpg)
Closer engagement with Southeast Asia and India must move beyond trade and develop into comprehensive strategic partnerships. As Korea navigates the uncertainty, volatility and unpredictability that will define the remaining three years of Trump’s second term, a strategic posture anchored in flexibility, creativity and sensitivity is essential.
In this turbulent era, Korea must adopt what a Chinese proverb calls hoshi-uheng — to watch like a tiger and proceed like an ox: alert, deliberate and unwavering. A national, bipartisan approach combining self-reliance, alliances and global networks will be crucial to enduring the storm.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
The author is the vice chairman of the Near Foundation and a former ambassador to Japan.
The trade war between the United States and China, once escalating toward extremes, has entered a tentative truce. Last weekend, the two countries held high-level negotiations in Switzerland and agreed to simultaneously reduce retaliatory tariffs by 115 percentage points. The agreement includes a 90-day window for follow-up discussions, and while it is conditional, it offers a moment of relief. Still, for Korea, the outlook is far from reassuring. The Trump administration’s combative diplomacy — now nearly four months into its second term — shows no signs of abating.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 14. [AP/YONHAP]
Domestically, Trump faces resistance over perceived violations of legal norms and increasing authoritarian tendencies. Abroad, allies and the broader international community are expressing alarm over what they see as a breakdown of the postwar order that the United States itself once constructed and maintained.
Although it has been just over 100 days, the foreign and security policy of Trump’s second term can best be described as chaotic. Unlike the first term, this administration enjoys tighter control over policy, personnel and both chambers of Congress, enabling what some call “Trumpism on steroids.” Still, the underlying strategic direction remains unclear. Is the United States aiming to maintain global primacy through continued engagement, or is it pursuing retrenchment — narrowing its involvement to selected regions?
Recent infighting between hawks and moderates over China policy, as well as personnel reshuffles within the National Security Council, suggests that the traditional conservative Republican goal of U.S. hegemony has lost traction. What emerges is a strategy of selective engagement, or even voluntary isolation, with growing focus on the Western Hemisphere.
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer address the media after trade talks with China in Geneva, Switzerland, May 11. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
Instead of offering an “alliance dividend,” Trump has called on allies to increase their roles and burdens. He has portrayed allies as economic free riders benefiting from American security guarantees while undermining U.S. interests — sometimes more so than adversaries. Yet, even as Washington pressures allies, it is unlikely to abandon them altogether. Rather, it will seek to use them more strategically, particularly in the rivalry with China.
More troubling is how Trump’s America increasingly disregards international rules in favor of what it calls national interest, exhibiting a predatory stance uncharacteristic of past administrations. Trump openly prefers bilateral deals to multilateral institutions and often bypasses international law and norms. This approach, reminiscent of 19th-century imperialism, aligns the United States more closely with what some call the “axis of disruption,” including Russia, China and North Korea.
In this environment, constraints on Trump’s agenda come not from Congress, which remains largely inert, but from markets, the courts and public opinion. Markets have proven the most effective check on policies that generate “shock and awe.” Yet public sentiment, especially with an eye on next year’s midterms, also plays a key role. U.S. courts, too, have weighed in through more than 4,000 lawsuits that have slowed or altered Trump’s initiatives.
Still, for Korea — facing both direct and indirect ripple effects from U.S. foreign policy — relying on these internal U.S. checks is not enough. Trump’s second term could destabilize the Korea-U.S. alliance and the broader liberal international order. Worse, the world may face what economists call the Kindleberger Trap, in which a rising power fails to provide global public goods once managed by a declining hegemon.
Korea must respond with a dual-track strategy that distinguishes between Trump-era policies likely to outlast his presidency and those that will recede. U.S. policies focused on China, manufacturing, alliance cost-sharing, universal tariffs and economic security are likely to persist. In contrast, the degradation of alliance values and damage to liberal norms may be reversible under a future administration.
Maintaining the Korea-U.S. alliance remains essential. While burden-sharing demands should be met within reason, Korea must also press for reciprocal gains. In trade, Seoul should leverage its position within Washington’s transactional diplomacy to mitigate negative impacts on Korean industries.
In security, Korea must prevent any weakening of deterrence against North Korea or implicit U.S. recognition of the North as a de facto nuclear state. Here, cooperation with Japan is critical, as both countries face similar security and diplomatic challenges. With the geopolitical climate improving, it is also time to normalize relations with China and consider reengaging Russia after the war in Ukraine.
Korea must uphold its commitment to the liberal international order, expanding cooperation with Japan, the EU, Australia and Canada. As a middle power, Korea should champion multilateralism and rules-based diplomacy, while also strengthening ties with the Global South, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks before swearing in former U.S. Sen. David Perdue (not pictured) as the United States Ambassador to the Peoples Republic of China in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington on May 7. [EPA/YONHAP]
Closer engagement with Southeast Asia and India must move beyond trade and develop into comprehensive strategic partnerships. As Korea navigates the uncertainty, volatility and unpredictability that will define the remaining three years of Trump’s second term, a strategic posture anchored in flexibility, creativity and sensitivity is essential.
In this turbulent era, Korea must adopt what a Chinese proverb calls hoshi-uheng — to watch like a tiger and proceed like an ox: alert, deliberate and unwavering. A national, bipartisan approach combining self-reliance, alliances and global networks will be crucial to enduring the storm.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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