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Can the next president end the era of the ‘N-Po Generation?'

Published: 19 May. 2025, 00:02

Kim Dong-ho

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Though the presidential election was called suddenly, it is striking how little attention has been paid to campaign pledges. In past elections, there were moments when manifestos sparked heated competition. The term itself — “manifesto,” meaning a public declaration — was once used by candidates to frame serious, verifiable proposals. This time, however, such language is nearly absent. The result has been a flood of spontaneous, populist promises with little scrutiny or accountability.

Election officials hang presidential candidate posters on a wall in Jongno District, central Seoul on May 15. [NEWS1]

When examining these pledges, it is difficult to distinguish between conservative and progressive camps. The early election timeline has fueled a race to outbid one another in giveaways. During the 2012 presidential race that elected Park Geun-hye, cost estimates accompanied major policy pledges. No such efforts have emerged this time. Candidates are promising cash to senior citizens, young people and families with children, but none have clearly explained how they would fund such policies.

Unfortunately, many voters, burdened by the realities of everyday life, are tempted by these sugar-coated promises. Yet few of them are feasible or sustainable. The Korea Development Institute (KDI) recently warned that Korea’s potential growth rate could fall below zero by the late 2040s. Even without such forecasts, anyone following economic trends in Korea knows the outlook for the next decade is bleak.

Older adults gather at a park in central Seoul in 2021. According to Statistics Korea, a total of 34.3 percent of Korea's population will be over 65 by 2040. [NEWS1]

Given the nation’s unparalleled combination of low birthrates and an aging population, it is not hard to imagine a negative growth trajectory. Since the second quarter of last year, Korea has recorded nearly zero real economic growth for four consecutive quarters. A fall in the potential growth rate indicates that the country’s basic economic capacity is weakening. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that by 2030, Korea’s economy will drop from the world’s 12th largest to 15th. As the working-age population shrinks, such projections appear unavoidable.

If growth stalls, campaign promises become little more than wasted paper. In particular, fiscal pledges will lack credibility unless the government finds a way to raise revenue. Still, there is a path forward. If the next administration can reverse Korea’s growth slowdown, some of the current promises could become reality.

That path might be summarized as building “a country without the N-po Generation.” The term N-po, in Korean, refers to a demographic of young people in society who have given up on a number of key things in life — primarily dating, marriage and having children, home ownership, interpersonal relations, hope, employment, health and physical appearance — often due to economic pressures. According to the KDI and other research institutions, the main reason for bleak long-term projections lies in Korea’s demographic structure: too few babies are being born while the number of older individuals is rapidly increasing.

As of December last year, more than 20 percent of the Korean population was aged 65 or older, officially classifying the nation as a super-aged society. The aging trend is accelerating, as the first- and second-generation baby boomers and their children — the echo boomers — are all approaching retirement. The average age in Korea is now 45. In contrast, the countries expected to overtake Korea economically by 2030 all have lower median ages: Spain (43), Australia (38) and Mexico (29). Even Spain, which has a relatively older population, benefits from its tourism industry, which accounts for 12 to 15 percent of GDP. In Australia and Mexico, a younger workforce contributes to economic vitality.

This suggests a logical conclusion: reducing the pressures that fuel the N-po phenomenon could go a long way toward solving Korea’s low-growth problem. The three biggest contributors to youth disengagement are job insecurity, housing costs and the financial burden of education. Alleviating these obstacles could revive economic dynamism — something previous presidents have also recognized and attempted to address.

Increasing job opportunities would directly address youth unemployment and indirectly lead to higher rates of dating, marriage and having children. Yet many companies continue to leave Korea, citing regulatory hurdles and militant labor unions. On the housing front, the dream of homeownership has been hampered by excessive regulations and politically motivated tax policies, even as stable supply and fair regulation remain key to affordability.

Young applicants attend a raffle event for a youth rental housing program in Yeosu, South Jeolla, on Aug. 29, 2024. [YEOSU]

Education costs are another serious barrier. The burden of private tutoring has made many young couples hesitant to have children. Social mobility has declined so sharply that the idea of “rags-to-riches” success feels obsolete. The saying that only grandchildren of the wealthy can afford to attend elite universities no longer seems like an exaggeration.

In the midst of this snap election and a flurry of populist pledges, any candidate who is serious about implementation must prioritize building a country where young people do not feel compelled to give up on life milestones. Addressing the N-po generation’s core concerns is not just about fairness — it is about the future of Korea’s economic survival.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.