How should South Korea tackle the North Korea issue in the Trump era?
Published: 21 May. 2025, 00:01
Updated: 21 May. 2025, 14:15
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Kim Byung-yeon

The author is a chair professor of economics at Seoul National University.
There was a time when sanctions were viewed as essential in pushing North Korea toward denuclearization. In a lecture some years ago, I argued that economic sanctions were the most realistic and peaceful method to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table. After the talk, a fellow academic questioned my stance. “Didn’t you once advocate for supporting North Korea’s marketization and economic integration through cooperation? Why the sudden turn to sanctions?”
My reply was clear: “North Korea with nuclear weapons is fundamentally different from a nonnuclear North Korea. This is an emergency. One arm is already severed and must be operated on immediately. Dwelling on why both arms aren’t still intact strikes me as dangerously complacent.”
![North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump met at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019, according to a report by the North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on July 1. The photo, released on the agency’s website, shows the two leaders smiling during a conversation in the VIP lounge of the Freedom House on the South Korean side of Panmunjom. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/21/5f69c0fa-2c42-4c73-9585-ba9547f9261f.jpg)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump met at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019, according to a report by the North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on July 1. The photo, released on the agency’s website, shows the two leaders smiling during a conversation in the VIP lounge of the Freedom House on the South Korean side of Panmunjom. [YONHAP]
Korea must develop a North Korea policy aligned with Trump’s interests — one that supports South Korea’s security and serves U.S. strategic goals. A joint mineral development agreement between the U.S. and North Korea could be the key. Trump’s push for mineral agreements with Ukraine, and even his expressed interest in acquiring Greenland, stem from a desire to reduce U.S. dependency on China’s rare earth exports — a major vulnerability in the U.S.-China rivalry.
North Korea is believed to have abundant rare earth deposits. If the U.S. can access these resources, its supply chain vulnerabilities could be significantly reduced. A trilateral agreement involving the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea — modeled after the U.S.-Ukraine mineral cooperation — could create a breakthrough. Under such a deal, North Korea retains resource ownership, while the U.S. and Korea invest under favorable terms. Most of the profits would be earmarked for North Korea’s economic development.
This approach would also benefit South Korea. For U.S. firms to invest in North Korean mineral resources, normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations and North Korea’s accession to international financial institutions would be necessary. Ordinarily, such progress would take years. But in extraordinary times, resource development could fast-track these steps. The mere presence of U.S. companies in the North could act as a deterrent against nuclear use. Any aggression would collapse U.S.-North Korea relations and inflict significant economic costs on Pyongyang.
This could carve out a new path toward denuclearization. Revenue from mineral exports could be placed in an escrow account, to be released incrementally in exchange for verified disarmament steps.
North Korea’s reaction, however, remains a crucial variable. The entry of American firms might be seen as threatening to regime control. Yet the economic benefits of such an agreement would be hard for Kim Jong-un to ignore. North Korea’s current crisis is structural, and unresolvable under its existing system. Over time, the regime’s survival, and even hereditary succession, could be at risk.
Military and economic strength must be balanced to sustain the regime. But North Korea currently suffers from an excess of nuclear investment and a deficit in economic capacity. A mineral cooperation deal would provide not only new resources but also political justification for shifting some focus from weapons to development. The presence of U.S. firms might also dispel Pyongyang’s unfounded fear that Washington intends to launch a military attack.
Still, for North Korea to accept such a proposal, the geopolitical environment must shift. Closer ties with Russia have eased its diplomatic isolation, reducing incentives to improve relations with the U.S. Rushed engagement could actually backfire by strengthening Pyongyang’s bargaining power and shifting the goalpost from denuclearization to mere nuclear freeze.
![U.S. President Donald Trump meets with China's President Xi Jinping at the start of their bilateral meeting at the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. [REUTERS/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/21/e03f8a92-b5a9-4e63-8c80-972e92119c03.jpg)
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with China's President Xi Jinping at the start of their bilateral meeting at the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
We should not expect President Trump to take initiative on his own. This is an era marked by greater crises than just North Korea’s nuclear program. It is up to South Korea to present creative ideas and a clear roadmap. Trump may be willing to open the door, but it is Korea that must walk through it.
North Korea policy must blend strength with flexibility and balance principle with pragmatism. It requires tireless effort to carve a narrow path at the intersection of geopolitics and Trump-era realism. Yet Korean politics appears too content to repeat the past.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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