Ticking clock on U.S. Forces Korea: Strategic flexibility back on the table

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Ticking clock on U.S. Forces Korea: Strategic flexibility back on the table

Published: 22 May. 2025, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Cha Se-hyeon

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

During a recent tour of the Middle East, U.S. President Donald Trump remarked that there are “no eternal enemies,” referring to the possibility of befriending Iran should it abandon its nuclear ambitions. In global politics, allies and adversaries shift with strategic interests. That the Korea-U.S. alliance has endured since the Korean War is precisely why it is often called a “Great Alliance.”

Yet that alliance now faces renewed pressure. A potential shift in the deployment of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and renewed emphasis on “strategic flexibility” — allowing U.S. troops stationed in Korea to be deployed elsewhere — appears imminent with the launch of Korea’s new administration in June. It echoes the tension of 2003, when Richard Lawless, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, introduced the concept of strategic flexibility under the George W. Bush administration.

U.S. President Donald Trump and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan talk at Qasr Al Watan on May 15 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. [AP/YONHAP]

Back then, the trigger was the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “War on Terror.” Today, the spark is Taiwan. The U.S. Department of Defense is expected to release new strategic guidance in August, indicating a shift from strategic ambiguity to explicit commitment to defend Taiwan at a level equivalent to homeland defense. General Douglas MacArthur once described Korea as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Now, Taiwan has become the centerpiece of American military posture in the Indo-Pacific.

Between 2003 and 2006, South Korea largely acceded to Washington’s realignment plans. The troop reduction, initially projected at 12,500, stopped at 10,000 after a partial reversal requested by the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008. Korea also agreed to respect the necessity of strategic flexibility while deploying its own troops to Iraq. U.S. military bases were consolidated at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and a roadmap for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) was established.

Apache attack helicopters are seen at Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi on April 10. [YONHAP]

The period was politically fraught for the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Domestically, it was caught between pro-alliance conservatives and pro-autonomy progressives. Conservatives accused the administration of weakening Korea’s security posture by floating a “balancer” role in Northeast Asia. Progressives criticized it for caving to U.S. demands on troop deployments and the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The discord cost Roh’s party any chance of a second term in power.

The renewed concerns in 2025 are compounded by Trump’s return to office. Although most experts expect USFK’s troop levels to remain steady — given Korea’s geographical proximity to China — the focus is likely to shift toward the deployment of those forces in the event of a Taiwan contingency. General Paul LaCamera, formerly the USFK commander, once called Korea a “fixed aircraft carrier,” a frontline asset in any conflict with China. As such, U.S. demands to enhance strategic flexibility may effectively function as a reduction in South Korea-specific defense capabilities.

The 2006 joint statement between the two countries could come under review. It currently acknowledges Korea’s position that U.S. forces should not become involved in regional conflicts, such as a cross-strait military clash, without consultation. However, during his Senate confirmation hearing, Michael D. Swaine, nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, openly suggested that the United States should encourage its allies to support Taiwan. Japan has already declared Taiwan’s defense a national interest and is boosting military preparedness accordingly.

This file photo, released by the Korea Defense Daily, shows U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson during his inauguration ceremony at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 65 kilometers south of Seoul, on Dec. 20, 2024. [YONHAP]

The U.S. is also likely to push for an increased Korean contribution to shared defense costs. Washington’s evolving defense posture — prioritizing China and delegating other regional threats like Russia, North Korea and Iran to allies — means Korea may be expected to handle conventional deterrence against North Korea, while the United States retains responsibility for nuclear deterrence. In this context, the transfer of OPCON, a contentious issue in conservative administrations, could accelerate if conditions are deemed sufficiently met.

The first summit between President Trump and Korea’s new leader, expected either at the G7 meeting in Canada or the NATO summit in the Netherlands in late June, could be the stage where this strategic time bomb detonates. Trump has a history of surprise diplomacy. In 2018, during then-President Moon Jae-in’s first U.S. visit, Trump unexpectedly announced renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. FTA.

U.S. Forces Korea Commander General J.B. Brunsen recently said Korea’s new leadership “must face the reality that the alliance is at a juncture.” The future of the alliance is, once again, uncertain. Remaining steadfast allies may be a noble goal, but in geopolitics, it remains an increasingly difficult path to maintain.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.