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China’s Yellow Sea tactics test Korea’s national resolve

Published: 03 Jun. 2025, 00:04

Jung Ho-sub

The author is a visiting professor at Ulsan University and former Chief of Naval Operations

Tensions are rising regarding a maritime structure China recently installed in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, jointly managed by South Korea and China. But in truth, China’s “West Sea project” has been underway for years.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, China’s rise as an economic power brought increased focus on maritime security. As part of its push to achieve the Chinese dream, Beijing has prioritized securing maritime routes, developing ocean resources and protecting overseas interests. These objectives, framed as national security imperatives, have driven China to steadily expand its naval power.

In December 2008, China dispatched a naval task force to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations — its first overseas mission of that kind. This marked a turning point for China’s expeditionary naval capabilities. Since then, Beijing has intensified its maritime expansion, especially in the South China Sea.

By 2010, China began calling the South China Sea one of its “core interests.” In 2012, it unilaterally occupied Scarborough Shoal within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. In late 2013, China began constructing seven artificial islands in the region, later converting them into military bases. Exploiting the fact that the United States was then preoccupied with counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, Beijing moved swiftly to consolidate its maritime presence.

"Shenlan No. 1," which China installed in 2018 in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone of the Yellow Sea [OFFICE OF REP. EOM TAE-YOUNG]

China’s Yellow Sea activities also began around that time. Following the March 26, 2010, sinking of the ROKS Cheonan by North Korea, South Korea and the United States planned a joint military drill in the Yellow Sea to deter further provocation. China vehemently opposed the exercise, claiming the region was part of its core national interest. The training area was eventually moved to the East Sea. Since then, the Yellow Sea near the Seoul metropolitan area has effectively become a maneuvering space for Chinese naval forces.

China has since installed physical structures in the PMZ under the pretext of constructing mobile fish farms. These include “Shenlan No. 1" in 2018 and “Shenlan No. 2" in 2024. In March 2022, it was also discovered that a steel structure resembling a drilling platform had been anchored to the seabed. Most recently, from May 22 to 28, China declared a no-sail zone west of the 124th meridian, citing military use of the area where the structures are.

These moves evoke China’s prior tactics in the South China Sea, where artificial islands were later converted into military installations. The structures could serve as future leverage in maritime boundary negotiations and as bases for deploying personnel or ships. These are classic examples of gray-zone tactics — coercive, but below the threshold of armed conflict. They clearly reflect China's intent to assert dominance in the Yellow Sea.

"Shenlan No. 2," which China installed last year in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone of the Yellow Sea [OFFICE OF REP. EOM TAE-YOUNG]

Why now? China’s behavior suggests growing confidence in its maritime expansion, especially as U.S. naval dominance appears to be waning. Despite China’s growing number of platforms and military outposts in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy has struggled to counter these moves effectively. While Washington has reiterated its defense commitments to allies like the Philippines, it has not provided a viable deterrent. Under U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, the United States is unlikely to intervene assertively in the face of Chinese maritime assertiveness.

Beijing may also be acting now to pre-empt further strengthening of trilateral security cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan. In April, during the third Korea-China Maritime Cooperation Dialogue, a Chinese delegate labeled Korea’s Ieodo Ocean Research Station "illegal." The recent installation of China’s structures in the Yellow Sea appears to be a response aimed at challenging the status of Ieodo. This suggests that China has no intention of removing or relocating these facilities.

Vietnam’s experience offers a relevant comparison. In response to China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, Vietnam has expanded its own military outposts in the Spratly Islands to nearly the same scale. China has taken no effective action to halt Vietnam’s activities, likely because it remembers Vietnam’s firm stance — even amid casualties — during past territorial disputes.

An aerial view of Southwest Cay, also known as Pugad Island, controlled by Vietnam and part of the Spratly Islands in the disputed South China Sea on April 21, 2017 [REUTERS/YONHAP]

For South Korea, the Yellow Sea is a perpetual theater of operations. Maintaining balance in the region ultimately depends on the readiness of both the Navy and the Coast Guard. As China continues to press forward with its Yellow Sea project, it is not just expanding maritime influence — it is testing Korea’s will to defend its sovereignty.

The new administration, to be inaugurated following the June 3 presidential election, must take this challenge seriously. Like Vietnam, Korea must demonstrate — through both preparation and action — that it will not yield an inch of its maritime sovereignty. A firm and consistent national response is necessary to deter further incursions and to affirm that Korea will defend its maritime rights with resolve.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.