Kim Jong-un reaching new levels of international power
Published: 14 Oct. 2025, 00:03
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Yoo Jee-hye
The author is the head of the diplomatic and security news department at the JoongAng Ilbo.
On Dec. 12, 2015, the Moranbong Band, often described as North Korea’s all-female pop group, abruptly returned home just hours before its first-ever overseas concert at Beijing’s National Centre for the Performing Arts. The performance, which many Chinese and North Korean officials were scheduled to attend, was suddenly canceled, triggering speculation across diplomatic circles.
Neither Pyongyang nor Beijing issued an official explanation. At the time, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service told the National Assembly that China had downgraded the guest list because the program was dominated by songs praising Kim Jong-un. North Korea reportedly canceled the event in protest, seeing it as an attempt to undermine Kim’s legitimacy as the third leader of the Baekdu bloodline. Other reports suggested that Chinese authorities were uncomfortable with scenes showing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches and extreme anti-American messages projected on the concert’s background screen.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang is seen standing on the right of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during the celebrations for the 80th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Workers’ Party held in Pyongyang on Oct. 10. [KOREA CENTRAL TV CAPTURE]
Neither side could have imagined that just a decade later, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the country’s second most powerful leader, would stand beside Kim Jong-un watching a massive military parade in Pyongyang where the new Hwasong-20 ICBM was unveiled for the first time.
The moment was especially symbolic. In May last year, North Korea suffered international embarrassment after a failed attempt to launch a reconnaissance satellite — a failure that followed Li’s participation in a Korea-China-Japan summit where the joint declaration called for the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Now, just over a year later, Kim’s invitation of Li to the parade, coupled with his recent visit to China with his daughter Ju-ae, signal something different: a calculated bid to showcase not only his restored ties with Beijing but also a fourth generation of Baekdu lineage succession aimed at Chinese President Xi Jinping himself.
Kim Jong-un’s international stature has clearly shifted. Once a pariah in global diplomacy, he has found new leverage in the shifting geopolitics of war and rivalry. When North Korea sent special forces to support Russia in the war in Ukraine last year, many saw it as reckless adventurism. Critics predicted that Pyongyang’s usefulness to Moscow would fade quickly.
Yet the partnership between the two authoritarian regimes — sometimes called a “malignant alliance” — has proven more durable than expected. North Korean troops that played a role in Russia’s recapture of the Kursk region from Ukraine are now deployed as engineers in postwar reconstruction projects. By remaining intrinsically involved, Pyongyang has ensured that Russia cannot easily cast it aside. In exchange, North Korea seeks access to technologies it still lacks, including advanced ICBM and weapons systems.
China, once wary of the deepening North Korea-Russia axis, has also changed its stance. As tensions with the United States intensify — from the trade war to semiconductor restrictions — Beijing increasingly views a trilateral anti-U. S. alignment with Pyongyang and Moscow as strategically advantageous. This calculation culminated in the image of the three leaders standing shoulder to shoulder atop Tiananmen Gate, projecting a show of unity.
The Oct. 10 military parade marking the 80th anniversary of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party also symbolized this new diplomatic landscape. Alongside Li Qiang, Kim welcomed Vietnamese Communist Party chief To Lam and Dmitry Medvedev, chairman of Russia’s ruling United Russia party and deputy head of its Security Council. Indonesia sent its foreign minister, and Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith also visited Pyongyang shortly before the event.
The lineup resembled that of a full-fledged multilateral summit, a remarkable shift for a country long isolated on the global stage. Since Kim took power, only a handful of heads of state — former Korean President Moon Jae-in among them — have visited Pyongyang. The recent influx of foreign dignitaries underscores how Kim’s international standing has transformed.
Some analysts suggest the current moment could mark a turning point in the North Korean nuclear issue. The regime appears to be edging closer to de facto acceptance as a nuclear-armed state within the international community.
The Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party, reports on Oct. 11 that a grand military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the party’s founding took place on Oct. 10 at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang. [YONHAP]
President Lee Jae Myung’s “E.N.D. Initiative,” unveiled during his address to the United Nations General Assembly last month, reflects this complex reality. The proposal — standing for Exchange, Normalization and Denuclearization — has been described both as a pragmatic approach that accounts for North Korea’s rejection of disarmament talks and as a risky framework that could blur the path toward denuclearization. The presidential office has emphasized that the three components are not sequential, but critics warn that prioritizing normalization while Pyongyang pursues recognition as a nuclear state could legitimize its arsenal.
Concerns deepened when Seoul dismissed North Korea’s military parade as “an internal event marking the founding anniversary of the Workers’ Party.” The parade featured not only new ICBMs but also hypersonic missiles and tactical weapons aimed at South Korea. Treating these displays as distant political theater may be dangerously complacent.
Kim Jong-un’s “nuclear sword” remains pointed squarely at the South. His growing legitimacy on the world stage, combined with the backing of both Moscow and Beijing, means his ambitions can no longer be dismissed as bluster.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.





with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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