U.S. stance on Taiwan has far reaching implications

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U.S. stance on Taiwan has far reaching implications

Published: 16 Oct. 2025, 00:03 Updated: 16 Oct. 2025, 13:15

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Cha Se-hyeon

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

An intriguing hypothesis about the shifting balance of power in Northeast Asia suggests that as U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan intensify, ties between North Korea and China grow closer — and hopes for denuclearization fade. The logic is that Beijing uses Pyongyang as leverage to influence Washington’s policies on what China regards as its core national interest: Taiwan.

In 2002, during the George W. Bush administration, Chinese President Jiang Zemin urged Washington to go beyond merely “not supporting” Taiwanese independence and instead to “explicitly oppose” it. When Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian proposed a referendum on independence, Beijing saw a red line. The following year, President Bush hosted Premier Wen Jiabao in Washington and declared, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to alter the status quo.”

North Korea’s state-run Korean Central Television reported on Oct. 10 that a ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party was held at 1st of May Stadium in Pyongyang on Oct. 9, attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev, and Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam. [KOREAN CENTRAL TELEVISION SCREEN CAPTURE]

That statement ushered in more than a decade of what might be called a “grand cooperation era” between the United States and China, lasting until around 2017. During this period, Beijing regarded North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as threats to its own security and took an unusually active role in restraining Pyongyang — hosting the Six Party Talks, cutting off oil exports and banking channels and voting in favor of multiple rounds of UN sanctions. Chinese officials publicly described relations with North Korea not as a “blood alliance,” but as “normal state-to-state ties.” When President Xi Jinping visited Seoul in 2014 — breaking the precedent of Chinese leaders visiting Pyongyang first — it symbolized that shift.

The era of cooperation ended with Donald Trump’s presidency. As Washington adopted a harder line on China, it simultaneously deepened ties with Taiwan. In March 2018, shortly after the signing of the Taiwan Travel Act encouraging U.S.-Taiwan exchanges, Xi invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Beijing for the first time. Xi declared that China–North Korea relations “should never change due to a single moment or issue” — a subtle acknowledgment that Beijing’s previous neglect of Pyongyang had been awkward.

Under President Joe Biden, China’s sensitivity to the Taiwan issue became even more visible. After Biden said several times in 2021 that the United States would defend Taiwan if China invaded, Beijing responded by renewing its mutual defense treaty with Pyongyang. In 2022, China and Russia jointly vetoed a UN resolution to sanction North Korea for its intercontinental ballistic missile tests — an unprecedented move.

What stands out is the pattern: China’s behavior toward North Korea shifts in step with U.S. moves on Taiwan. In 2024, when Biden reaffirmed the U.S. position of “not supporting Taiwan independence” following the election of DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, China responded by endorsing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at the Korea–China–Japan summit that May. Pyongyang, angered by the statement, denounced Beijing for a “serious political provocation.”

This theory has resurfaced amid reports that, ahead of the first U.S.-China summit of Trump’s second term, Beijing has asked Washington to move from a stance of “not supporting” to one of “opposing” Taiwan independence. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation that “to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, one must resolutely oppose Taiwan independence.”

To press its point, China is said to be weighing economic measures such as restrictions on rare earth exports, a ban on soybean imports and new fees on U.S.-related shipping — potentially to raise the cost for Washington before the summit.

So far, the Trump administration has not even restated the previous U.S. position of “not supporting” independence. In fact, it provoked Beijing in February by deleting that phrase from the State Department’s Taiwan fact sheet.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raises his thumb in apparent satisfaction after attending the mass gymnastics and art performance “Long Live the Workers’ Party of Korea” at 1st of May Stadium in Pyongyang on Oct. 9, held to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the party’s founding. [KOREAN CENTRAL TV SCREEN CAPTURE]

In early October, China sent Premier Li Qiang — its second-highest official — to attend the 80th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean Workers’ Party. Xi himself sent a congratulatory message reaffirming that “no matter how the international situation changes, it remains the consistent policy of the Chinese Party and government to firmly safeguard, consolidate and develop China–North Korea relations.” Kim Jong-un, in turn, declared that North Korea would soon become “the most splendid socialist paradise on earth” — a sign of newfound confidence. The correlation remains: when tensions rise over Taiwan, the Beijing–Pyongyang axis grows stronger.

Now, ahead of this month’s U.S.-China summit in Gyeongju, all eyes are on whether Washington will accede to Beijing’s demand to “oppose” Taiwan independence outright. The delay in releasing two key documents — the National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlining the U.S. military stance on Taiwan contingencies, and the Global Posture Review (GPR) evaluating U.S. forces worldwide — suggests deep deliberation within Washington.

The outcome will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait. The trajectory of the U.S.-China trade war — and even the Lee Jae Myung administration’s pursuit of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula — may hinge on what unfolds in Gyeongju.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.