A real estate policy without direction, control or communication

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A real estate policy without direction, control or communication

Published: 28 Oct. 2025, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Cho Min-geun

The author is the business and industry news editor at the JoongAng Ilbo.

The government’s Oct. 15 real estate measures have stirred controversy not only for their severity but for their quality. The flaws began early — from how the policy was drafted to how it was presented and explained. No one seemed to know where the control tower was, and the supposed “pan-government plan” lacked any sign of detailed coordination among ministries. Even after the announcement, communication was clumsy and inconsistent. In every sense, it was a “three-nothing policy” — with no clear direction, no leadership and no strategy for communication.

Signs of dysfunction appeared from the start. Ministries clashed over who should take the lead. Officials at the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) argued that any effective response would require “mobilizing finance and taxation.” The Financial Services Commission (FSC), in turn, insisted that it had already done its part and that the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) and MOLIT should now act. The MOEF distanced itself, saying it would “review options” but could not overhaul tax codes on short notice.

Amid tighter real estate regulations and the resurgence of Covid-19, apartment transactions in Seoul have dropped by half as the housing market turns cautious. The photo shows an apartment complex in northern Seoul in early October. [NEWS1]

Such finger-pointing is common when no one sees a clear solution or when every possible measure risks public backlash. The results were predictable. The FSC’s June 27 policy, which capped housing loans at 600 million won, lost effectiveness within two months. The MOLIT’s Sept. 7 measures fared no better, largely because they failed to include any visible plan for expanding housing supply. With the market already anticipating a supply shortage, the public concluded the government had no real answer. Demand surged as buyers rushed to purchase homes before new restrictions took effect and prices rose further.

In the end, the sweeping designation of Seoul and much of Gyeonggi as land transaction permit zones was not a proactive decision but a desperate one. It was less of a structured policy and more of an emergency move to buy time. Predictably, the resulting plan was patchy and incomplete. It lacked any meaningful measures to spread housing demand to other regions — a puzzling omission for an administration that has declared regional balance as a national priority.

The MOEF failed to play its part. The FSC, too, neglected to design safeguards for genuine homebuyers while tightening lending. When backlash erupted over the ban on refinancing loans for single-home owners, regulators quietly rolled back the rule. The lack of foresight only deepened frustration.

Ordinarily, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs coordinates such cross-ministerial issues. Yet Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol was notably absent from the process. When he did speak, his offhand comments on property taxes only added confusion. The MOLIT, led by a political appointee and an academic vice minister, was hardly equipped to fill the vacuum.

Communication missteps compounded the problem. After imposing such sweeping emergency measures, the Democratic Party (DP) and government should have apologized to legitimate buyers for the inconvenience and promised to present a coherent stabilization plan soon. Instead, they delivered tone-deaf remarks. DP floor leader Kim Byung-ki declared, “We will create a market where people can buy homes without borrowing,” while former Vice Minister Lee Sang-kyeong said, “If prices stabilize and fall, that’s when you can buy.” Such statements came across as patronizing lectures rather than reassurances. The result was public anger and the return of a familiar accusation — hypocrisy within the ruling bloc.

A television at a real estate agency in Seoul airs news coverage of the government’s new housing market stabilization measures on October 15. All 25 districts of Seoul and 12 areas in Gyeonggi Province have been newly designated as regulated zones, including adjusted areas and speculative overheating districts. [YONHAP]

The underlying problem runs deeper than a single failed policy. It reflects the lingering chaos from the government reorganization that left ministries overlapping and weakened. After losing its budget function, the MOEF’s authority as the central economic agency has diminished. The plan to consolidate the FSC’s financial policy role under the MOEF was abruptly abandoned, leaving both institutions demoralized. Within the MOEF, the pride once associated with being the country’s “elite ministry” has eroded, and morale has hit bottom. The FSC, too, suffered leadership fractures and internal scars during the debates over potential restructuring.

If this dysfunction continues, policy failures will inevitably repeat. The government must re-examine how economic policies are conceived and coordinated and move quickly to fix the process. Unlike a product that consumers can simply reject, a poorly made public policy imposes its costs on everyone. Korea can ill afford another low-quality plan — not when critical negotiations such as the Korea-U. S. tariff talks are already testing the government's competence.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.