Kim Jong-un raises his value, but even recognition of his nuclear status leaves a long road ahead

Home > Opinion > Columns

Kim Jong-un raises his value, but even recognition of his nuclear status leaves a long road ahead

Published: 31 Oct. 2025, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Jo Dong-ho

The author is a professor emeritus at Ewha Womans University and chairman of the North Korea & Global Forum

U.S. President Donald Trump returned home yesterday after attending the APEC Summit in Korea. During his visit, he made an unusual effort to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Despite unease among Koreans, he referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” and went so far as to suggest that Kim’s regime could extend its rule indefinitely. When Pyongyang offered no response, Trump hinted that he might consider easing sanctions.

U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un cross the military demarcation line at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019, after greeting each other on the northern side. [YONHAP]

But North Korea answered not with words, but with action. On Tuesday, the day before Trump’s arrival, it launched sea-to-surface cruise missiles. Trump has never tried so hard to meet anyone. Kim Jong-un, meanwhile, was no longer the same leader who had once rushed to meet him at Panmunjom after reading Trump’s 2019 tweet — “I will go to Panmunjom tomorrow” — and had clung to hopes of sanctions relief at their Hanoi summit.

North Korea’s economy remains in dire straits. The Bank of Korea estimated its growth last year at 3.7 percent, though many experts consider the figure inflated. Even if accurate, the gain is negligible given the country’s tiny economic base. North Koreans endured catastrophic hardship in the mid-1990s, and the international sanctions of the mid-2010s added further weight. In the 2020s, as the state tightened its grip on commerce and trade, even modest market activity — the main lifeline for many households — became difficult. Studies suggest household income has fallen by about half compared with pre-sanctions levels, while GDP has dropped roughly 25 percent. Once praised for improving efficiency and expanding local autonomy, Kim’s early economic reforms now appear spent.

Yet in a broader sense, he has achieved what he sought. Domestically, the burden has been heavy; externally, the gains significant. The collapse of the Hanoi talks in February 2019 shocked Pyongyang. Faced with a choice between compromise and confrontation, it chose the latter. At the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee that December, the Workers’ Party declared a new “frontal breakthrough offensive,” vowing to undertake “another arduous and prolonged struggle.” At the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, Kim reaffirmed continued nuclear development. The slogan was “strength-for-strength,” but in practice the strategy was endurance.

Hence the heightened emphasis on “self-reliance.” As Pyongyang proclaimed, “The more vicious the enemy’s obstruction and the harsher the difficulties we face, the more we must advance along the path of self-reliance.” It was both an assertion of resilience amid crisis and a message to Washington: our nuclear capabilities will grow — come to the table before it is too late.

North Korea believed time was on its side and pressed ahead. On Monday, the Rodong Sinmun declared that under “the great Party’s leadership” the nation had “internalized the spirit of self-reliant development” and would “prove to the world that its strength cannot be subdued by any force.” It was a final signal to Trump, who had been courting Kim.

Kim’s plan worked. Trump, unaccustomed to being ignored, appeared increasingly restless. The same president who often slighted long-time allies now showed a deference toward an old enemy that bordered on flattery. For the moment, Kim Jong-un had won. He had avenged the humiliation of Hanoi.

Having seized the upper hand, Kim had no reason to accept Trump’s offer of talks. He likely believed that his value would only rise with time. Without an official letter or invitation, responding to Trump’s trademark showmanship risked embarrassment. Without explicit and public commitments to recognize his nuclear status and ease sanctions, any surprise summit could become another Hanoi. His decision to dispatch Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui abroad on Sunday was a signal of non-engagement; the missile launch targeting the range of a U.S. base in Japan as Trump visited that base was perhaps a message—bring a bigger offer next time.

Even if the two leaders meet again later this year or next and the United States recognizes North Korea’s nuclear status and lifts sanctions, will that solve Kim’s problems? Hardly.

Remember his first public speech in 2012, when he promised his people they would “never again tighten their belts.” In 2013, he introduced the byungjin line, placing economic development on equal footing with nuclear armament. In his 2016 New Year address, he proclaimed, “Our Party regards the improvement of the people’s livelihood as the foremost task of the state.”

The logic was simple. Nuclear weapons defend the regime from outside threats, but economic growth sustains it from within. When livelihoods collapse, public support erodes, and even a dictatorship faces instability. That is why Kim has continued to stress the economy while building his arsenal—and why he launched the “20 × 10 Regional Development Policy” last year to revive provincial industries.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump met at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019, according to the Korean Central News Agency on July 1. The photo, released on the agency’s website, shows the two leaders smiling as they talk in the VIP room of the Freedom House on the southern side of Panmunjom. [YONHAP]

Even if a future summit brings recognition and sanctions relief, the economy will not improve overnight. Few companies will risk investing in a nuclear-armed state fraught with political danger. Even before sanctions, North Korea’s trade options were limited and foreign investment minimal. Now, in an era defined by economic security, stable supply chains matter more than cheap production. Moreover, by branding South Korea as one of two “hostile states,” Kim has closed off his most natural partner in economic cooperation. If Korean companies stay away, foreign firms surely will too.

For now, Kim Jong-un may appear confident, but he faces a deeper and more fundamental dilemma. Inter-Korean economic cooperation is the litmus test for foreign investment. To rescind his recent “two hostile states” declaration would diminish his authority; to relinquish his hard-won nuclear status for economic gain would strip him of credibility. Caught between these choices, Kim may lie awake wondering, “What now?”

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.