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The measure of power

Published: 14 Nov. 2025, 00:02

Lee Sang-ryeol

The author is a senior editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

The personnel choices of former President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Lee Jae Myung show more similarities than many observers recognize. Both strengthened control by placing trusted associates in influential posts throughout their administrations.

Each appointed longtime friends who had previously represented them in legal matters to lead the Ministry of Government Legislation. Under Yoon, the position went to Lee Wan-kyu. Under the current government, it is held by Jo Won-cheol, who served as President Lee’s attorney in the Daejang-dong case.

Both also selected their closest confidants as justice minister. Yoon chose Han Dong-hoon, a central figure in the so-called Yoon Suk Yeol prosecutorial network. Lee appointed Jung Sung-ho, his Judicial Research and Training Institute classmate and a leading figure within the pro-Lee bloc.

Acting Prosecutor General Noh Man-seok, who recently expressed his intent to resign after facing criticism for a recent prosecutorial decision not to appeal in the Daejang-dong land development case, leaves the office at the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office in Seocho District, southern Seoul, on Nov. 12. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

Measured purely by political impact, Lee’s appointments have attracted more attention. Yoon's friend Lee Wan-kyu remained relatively low-profile, but Jo, by contrast, has taken on a highly visible role. During a National Assembly hearing, he declared that he believed all five of Lee Jae Myung’s trials and 12 charges would result in acquittal, placing himself at the forefront of efforts to counter the president’s legal risks.

The comparison between Han Dong-hoon and Jung is equally striking. Han battled fiercely with Democratic Party (DP) lawmakers during his tenure. Prosecutors conducted extensive investigations across multiple fronts, but never succeeded in detaining then-DP Chair Lee Jae Myung.

Jung, long considered a moderate and pragmatic five-term lawmaker, emerged as a decisive player in the decision not to appeal the Daejang-dong ruling. Prosecutors reported twice that they intended to appeal. On Nov. 7, the final day of the deadline, the head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office had completed the paperwork. Yet Jung urged prosecutors to “make a careful decision.” To most, the meaning was unmistakable, even without legal expertise. Han later likened the remark to “a mob boss telling an underling to think carefully,” suggesting it was effectively a directive.

President Lee’s appointments reflect a broader strategy. He installed eight former defense attorneys who had represented him in various cases throughout the presidential office and executive agencies. His decision not to appoint a new prosecutor general — leaving Noh Man-seok as acting chief for four months—was significant. Had Noh been the formally appointed prosecutor general, would he have accepted a decision now widely viewed as a dark moment for the prosecution? Under Yoon, former Prosecutor General Lee One-seok, though considered close to Yoon, ultimately clashed with him over the investigation of former first lady Kim Keon Hee and parted ways.

Public frustration with the Yoon administration grew in part because of perceptions that prosecutorial power had been privatized. Kim Keon Hee received what many viewed as preferential treatment during investigations into stock manipulation and a luxury handbag case. The questioning took place not at the prosecutors’ office but inside a facility under the Presidential Security Service, bypassing the prosecutor general. When prosecutors later cleared her, public anger intensified. When the prosecution becomes subordinate to political authority, equality before the law and judicial fairness collapse. The standard for identifying prosecutorial privatization is simple: wether leaders ensure that their own cases—or those involving family or close associates—are handled by the same principles applied to all others.

Suspicion over the abandoned appeal in the Daejang-dong ruling begins there. President Lee was himself indicted in the same case. Legal professionals note that in major corruption cases, it is almost unheard of for prosecutors not to appeal a first-trial acquittal.

The deeper question is why the appeal was dropped. Jung’s explanation—that the trial “went well” and there was no basis for appeal — has not persuaded many. By forgoing the appeal, key figures in the Daejang-dong scheme stand to retain illicit gains worth billions of won. Some critics speculate that the decision protected them from cooperating with investigators, though no evidence supports that view.

Others point to the “dignity of the law.” The breach-of-trust charge under the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes, for which the defendants were acquitted, is the same charge Lee Jae Myung faces. Some argue that if one alleged accomplice is acquitted, convicting another becomes institutionally difficult. Should Lee’s own trial move forward, this dynamic may work in his favor.

Noh eventually resigned, but his departure did not clarify why the appeal was abandoned. Prosecutorial authority must be exercised with integrity. That is the true measure of political power, and it remains unclear whether that standard was met.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.