Why is Pyongyang likely to shun talks about the inter-Korean frontier?

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Why is Pyongyang likely to shun talks about the inter-Korean frontier?

Published: 19 Nov. 2025, 19:25 Updated: 19 Nov. 2025, 19:26

SEO JI-EUN
[email protected]

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Maj. Gen. Kim Do-gyun, left, head of the South Korean delegation, poses for a photo with Lt. Gen. An Ik-san, chief of the North Korean delegation, before their general-grade talks at Tongilgak, a North Korean building in the truce village of Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone, on Oct. 26, 2018. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

[EXPLAINER]

South Korea offered to meet North Korea for rare military talks earlier this week — the first inter-Korean official talks proposed by the Lee Jae Myung government.

The proposal, announced Monday, was centered on clarifying the military demarcation line (MDL), the sensitive de facto border running through the heavily fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ). Seoul's defense officials claim this is not a political gesture but a practical one, warning that without clear delineation and communication, the situation could escalate into armed confrontation.

With military hotlines silent and Pyongyang reinforcing its doctrine of "hostile" and "separate states," Seoul’s call for talks — even on limited military issues — may not bear fruit.

But if the offer is accepted, it would mark the first inter-Korean military talks in seven years since the tenth round of general-level military talks held in October 2018.

North Korea, however, had yet to respond as of Wednesday.

A senior Unification Ministry official told reporters Tuesday that the government continues to attempt daily contact through the inter-Korean liaison line — the so-called “pink phone” — but has received no reply. Pyongyang’s only recent comment came in response to the Korea-U.S. joint fact sheet, warning it would take “legitimate and realistic” countermeasures.

This file photo, provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 27, shows North Korean troops repairing fences at the eastern border. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]

What's the deal with the MDL?

The MDL is the precise line that separates South and North Korean military forces.

It was established in the 1953 Armistice Agreement following the 1950-53 Korean War and runs roughly across the center of the Korean Peninsula. More than 1,200 yellow signposts once dotted the border at 500-meter intervals.

Surrounding the MDL is the DMZ, a buffer area extending 2 kilometers north and 2 kilometers south of the MDL.

Though called “demilitarized,” the DMZ is among the most heavily guarded areas in the world, with both sides maintaining high-alert military postures just outside its bounds.

What led to the South's proposal?

North Korean troops have increasingly crossed the MDL in recent months while constructing fences, roads and laying mines near the DMZ.

These movements have triggered multiple incursions across the boundary and prompted South Korean troops to issue warnings and, in some cases, fire warning shots.

A key cause of the confusion, according to Seoul, is the deterioration of the original yellow MDL markers. Today, fewer than 200 — or less than 20 percent of the total — remain visible, leading to differing perceptions of where the boundary actually lies and raising the risk of an unintentional military confrontation.

By redefining the MDL baseline, Seoul hopes to "prevent accidental clashes and ease tensions," according to a televised statement by Kim Hong-cheol, South Korea's deputy defence minister for national defence policy, released Monday.

Experts say tasking a policy-level official rather than the defense minister reflects the South's intent to lower the political stakes while keeping the door open to incremental engagement.

“It shows Seoul seeks a down-up format,” said Yang Moo-jin, chair professor at the University of North Korean Studies.

The statement further suggested that any future talks could begin with procedural coordination via the inter-Korean communication line at Panmunjom, sidestepping more politically charged overtures.

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, left, and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shake hands at the Joint Security Area (JSA) inside the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas on Nov. 3, in what marked the first joint visit to the JSA by the two nations' defense chiefs in eight years. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE]

Government officials confirmed that the proposal was coordinated in advance with the Ministry of Unification and the United Nations Command (UNC), which continues to supervise armistice-related matters, while the South Korean military handles the practical implementation.

Why might Pyongyang find even low-level talks risky?

Despite Seoul’s outreach, observers expect North Korea to ignore or reject the proposal, as accepting it could risk both ideological inconsistency and domestic confusion over North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s political direction.

The North's leader Kim Jong-un inspects the armored defensive weapons institute and the electronic weapons institute under the Academy of Defence Sciences in this photo carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 13. [KCNA]

Kim declared a “hostile two-state” doctrine in late 2023, which has since been codified not only in speeches but also in actions, including a border fortification campaign near the DMZ that some describe as a “North Korean Berlin Wall.”

North Korea is expected to codify the policy further during upcoming political events, including a party congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly in early 2026.

"Politically, engaging in such dialogue would make it a 'South-North military meeting' format, which amounts to reviving and a de facto acknowledgment of special inter-Korean ties [which the North has worked to erase]," said Hong Min, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. "It could also raise the possibility of mistaking or softening of its strategic commitment to the 'hostile two-state' doctrine."

Moreover, North Korea considers only itself, the United States and China to be formal parties to the 1953 armistice, thus any dialogue with Seoul over its boundaries would contradict that stance.

“South Korea is not considered a proper counterpart to discuss the armistice or MDL — not even the UNC is recognized as legitimate in Pyongyang’s view,” Hong added.

There are also reputational costs at home.

Engaging in military talks over the MDL could be perceived domestically as an implicit admission that the North has indeed violated the boundary. Instead, it frames the incursions as incidental by-products of “internal construction work” aimed at strengthening its own "southern frontier."

What are Seoul's calculations?

For the Lee administration, now five months into its term, the urgency to reestablish any channel of communication with Pyongyang is growing, as it has yet to achieve a breakthrough despite signaling a departure from its predecessor’s approach to its neighbor.

Lee has taken measures to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula since he took office in June and has advocated a phased policy centered on "exchange," "normalization" and "denuclearization," or the so-called END initiative.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump shake hands during their summit at the truce village of Panmunjom near the inter-Korean border on July 1, 2019. [RODONG SINMUN]

The latest proposal for military talks comes after a missed opportunity at the APEC summit in late October for a highly anticipated summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim — a move that could have opened space for inter-Korean diplomacy.

Lee, who has offered to help set the pace for U.S. peace initiatives toward the North, was left with fewer options and greater pressure to take the initiative.

The military talks thus signal pragmatism and test Pyongyang’s willingness to respond, all while sidestepping more politically volatile agenda items, such as denuclearization.

“The proposal suggests a potential shift from a sequencing strategy — where North Korea-U.S. dialogue comes first — to a more parallel approach,” said Yang. “That said, the presidential office’s decision not to front the initiative directly also shows that Seoul is still preserving its 'pace maker' stance [without overstepping].”

BY SEO JI-EUN [[email protected]]