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Does this administration encourage anonymous accusations?

Published: 19 Nov. 2025, 00:02

Ko Jung-ae

The author is the editor-in-chief at JoongAng Sunday.

Additional criticism of the government’s “Constitutional Order Reform Task Force” — already embroiled in controversy over its alleged disregard for the Constitution — came from Rep. Park Kyoon-taek of the Democratic Party, a lawyer by background. Responding to a question on what constitutes “aiding insurrection,” he offered an example. If a public official “was repeatedly criticized by colleagues for expressing concern whenever an unfavorable situation unfolded for Yoon Suk Yeol,” then, even without hard evidence, “that official should face personnel disadvantages if substantial grounds are established.” He added that under a democratic administration “such anonymous accusations would not happen.”

Prime Minister Kim Min-seok speaks during a Cabinet meeting at the Seoul Government Complex on Nov. 18. [YONHAP]

If a public official expressed sympathy for the former president and said so publicly, one may question her or his judgment, but does that amount to “aiding insurrection?” Expanding the definition this broadly only reinforces the criticism that the government is engaging in political attack.

But the real issue today is the practice of anonymous tipoffs, a chronic feature of Korea’s bureaucracy. How entrenched is it? Deep enough that it existed even under the U.S. military occupation. Veteran journalist Oh In-hwan’s book “The Life and State of Syngman Rhee” (2013) recounts this practice. General John Hodge “emotionally criticized Rhee as insincere, unstable, mean, corrupt and unpredictable. Yet he did not stoop to the level of filing petty denunciations intended to end Rhee’s political life. He ignored the many anonymous letters about Rhee, including allegations related to political funds.”

To say that such tipoffs “would not happen under a democratic administration” ignores history. Experience suggests otherwise. Twenty years ago, in January 2004, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial titled “South Korea’s Purge.” It addressed then-President Roh Moo-hyun’s decision to replace Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan amid tensions between pro-alliance and self-reliance factions in the administration. According to the report, an offhand critical remark made by a Foreign Ministry official at a dinner gathering was anonymously reported to the Blue House. The WSJ, naming the official, wrote, “If dismissal is justified simply because one disagrees with the president’s policies, then many in the U.S. State Department would be fired. What is more troubling is that if even left-leaning scholars regarded as pro-alliance cannot survive in the Roh government, it will be even harder for Seoul to manage its relationship with Washington.”

Under the Moon Jae-in administration, a senior official at the Financial Services Commission who was considered influential took sudden medical leave. Later, he said, “I was told various defamatory tipoffs were delivered to the presidential special inspection team.”

Those who once weaponized anonymous letters could also be undone by them. A former member of the presidential office responsible for personnel vetting recalled, “For a single position, two or three, sometimes five or six people compete. Some just ask for the job. Others bad-mouth rivals and file anonymous letters.” Another official involved in vetting said, “Sometimes the tipster has a real name and bank information, but both turn out to be fake. Toward the end, we stopped looking at the letters.”

How many people could have meaningfully “aided” the alleged insurrection in the six hours martial law was in effect? Yet authorities say they will examine 10 months of records under the banner of “overcoming insurrection” and have even created a reporting center. The pool of potential targets includes 750,000 public officials. This is nothing less than institutionalizing and encouraging the very anonymous denunciations that have long caused damage. As the saying goes, “The one who snitches first survives.”

Song Eon-seog, floor leader of the People Power Party, holds a press briefing at the National Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul, on Nov. 18 to discuss the party’s response to the government’s “Constitutional Order Reform TF” and other pending issues. [YONHAP]

Whether clothed in the language of “respecting the Constitution” or “eradication of deep-rooted evils,” once public officials are asked, “Whose side are you on?” the institutions to which they belong begin to break down. It happened before with the National Intelligence Service, with the Foreign Ministry, and with the courts, prosecutors and police. Only two types of officials remain under such systems: ambitious actors who pin their careers on political loyalty, and professionals who avoid politically exposed positions altogether. The former must live with the consequences of their choices. The latter collect their salaries in silence. As for ordinary citizens? Under such a system, how can the state produce even the second-best decisions, let alone the best?

One scholar advised, “Forcing a single way of thinking is stealing the future.” Building a government staffed only with one camp is no different.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.