Reaffirmed transactional diplomacy from Trump raises concerns for U.S. allies

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Reaffirmed transactional diplomacy from Trump raises concerns for U.S. allies

Published: 26 Nov. 2025, 00:00

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping leave the venue at Narae Maru inside the Air Force’s 5th Air Mobility Wing in Busan after concluding their summit on Oct. 30. [YONHAP]

U.S. President Donald Trump spoke by phone with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Nov. 24, nearly a month after their summit in Busan. The hour-long call was warm in tone. Trump reaffirmed his plan to visit China in April and extended an invitation for Xi to make a state visit to the United States next year. He later wrote on social media that the two leaders had made “meaningful progress” in maintaining the Busan agreement and could now “focus on the big picture.”

China’s Xinhua News Agency reported that the two leaders exchanged views on bilateral relations, Taiwan and the war in Ukraine. Xinhua quoted Trump as saying the U.S. “understands how seriously China regards the Taiwan issue.” The comment, if accurate, comes at a tense moment in China-Japan relations following Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks earlier this month that Japan could exercise collective self-defense in a Taiwan contingency. Trump’s apparent neutrality would be unsettling for Japan, though he did not mention the Taiwan remark in his own public statement.

Perhaps with this in mind, Trump held a separate call with Takaichi the next day. According to the prime minister, he briefed her on recent U.S.–China developments, including his conversation with Xi. Yet Trump again stopped short of publicly supporting Japan’s position on Taiwan. Takaichi confirmed “close coordination between Japan and the United States,” but did not clarify whether the Taiwan dispute with China had been discussed.

Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy, which prioritizes national interest over alliance considerations, is not new. In the current China-Japan confrontation, his stance has raised questions. His proposals for ending the Russia-Ukraine war have also drawn criticism in Europe for aligning more closely with Russia’s interests than with those of Ukraine or NATO allies. Both Ukraine and Japan are now facing the latest iteration of his deal-based diplomacy. Another example is his recent imposition of a 20 percent tariff on Taiwan, despite its strategic role in countering China, followed by pressure for U.S. investment commitments far exceeding the level requested of Korea.

Korea cannot assume it is immune. While the U.S. and Korea concluded trade and security negotiations at the Gyeongju summit, disputes are likely during implementation. In trade, tensions could arise over investment allocations or profit-sharing mechanisms. In security, differences may reemerge over North Korea’s denuclearization, the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea and Korea’s potential pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines. Throughout these issues, many in Seoul worry that Washington may adopt a view shaped more by short-term U.S. interests than by alliance principles.

The possibility of a U.S.-China “big deal” cannot be dismissed, and the Korea-U. S. alliance may face new tests. Korea will need a more cautious approach to Washington and a foreign policy rooted firmly in national interest. That is the unavoidable reality of today’s diplomatic and security environment.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.