Why are some South Korean officials suggesting scaling back military exercises with the U.S.?
-
- SEO JI-EUN
- [email protected]
A South Korean Army vehicle crosses a floating bridge on the Namhan River during a combined river-crossing drill between South Korea and the United States as a part of Ulchi Freedom Shield 25 in Yeoju, Gyeonggi, on Aug. 27. [AP/YONHAP]
U.S. officials have been signaling that they are not keen on South Korea's gestures to downsize or postpone Seoul-Washington combined military exercises to woo North Korea back to talks, a divisive matter even within South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's administration.
South Korea's Unification Ministry and the ruling party Democratic Party (DP) have signaled openness to at least discussing adjustments to these large-scale combined drills, a sore spot for Pyongyang, if it might help restart dialogue.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said on Nov. 8 that a North Korea-U.S. summit would be “impossible” while full-scale drills are underway, implying a pause might be needed.
Likewise, President Lee told reporters on Nov. 24 that he recognizes that North Korea is "highly sensitive" to these exercises, and said Seoul could consider scaling back or postponing them as part of broader peace efforts.
The Unification Ministry spokesperson echoed this view during a regular press briefing on Monday, noting that combined drills have “important implications” for inter-Korean relations and might be revisited when the conditions allow.
South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young attends a parliamentary hearing on Nov. 28. Chung has advocated a softer approach toward North Korea, even calling for acknowledgment of the two Koreas as “two states” under international law. His more diplomatic stance contrasts with hardliners and influences Seoul’s policy on both inter-Korean issues and the scope of joint South Korea-U.S. drills. [NEWS1]
However, other top officials have been more cautious.
In a press briefing Sunday to mark six months of the Lee administration, National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac publicly downplayed any plans to use drills as a bargaining chip, arguing the government is not “directly considering” such a trade-off at the moment.
Similarly, the following day, acting U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Kevin Kim shared that South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back had called the exercises a "lifeline" for the military, signaling that the alliance expects the drills to continue. Kim also reportedly met with Minister Chung to underscore that sanctions on North Korea must remain in place.
While some Seoul officials are floating the idea of scaling back exercises to reach out to Pyongyang, the matter remains divisive, especially as the United States emphasizes keeping the drills as scheduled for deterrence and readiness.
Allied forces rehearse combined landings and sea deployments during the Ssangryong joint exercises on March 22. U.S. officials emphasize that exercises like these build joint “muscle memory” for crisis response if deterrence fails. [MARINE CORPS]
Why does North Korea so vehemently object to the drills?
North Korea consistently condemns South Korea-U.S. military exercises as provocative rehearsals for war.
Its state media regularly accuse the allies of “warmongers’ madness” and call the drills a “rehearsal for invasion” or even “nuclear blackmail.”
Seoul and Washington usually conduct major combined exercises in the spring and late summer, when tensions on the Korean Peninsula are heightened.
The North's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in May 2023 fumed that intensified drills — which included U.S. strategic bombers and aircraft carriers — were proof of an enemy plot to “crush us militarily,” and vowed “corresponding action” to these “rehearsals.”
Pyongyang portrays the large-scale exercises as direct threats to its regime and sovereignty.
It also justifies its own weapons buildup and drills as “legitimate” self-defense against what it calls American aggression. In recent years, the North has institutionalized two extended, large-scale seasonal exercises of its own — summer and winter training cycles — during which it mobilizes major units for combined-arms maneuvers, live-fire artillery events and readiness inspections, often overseen by leader Kim Jong-un or top military officials.
Whenever the annual South Korea-U.S. exercises are held, however, especially those involving live fire or nuclear-capable forces, Pyongyang’s response has been fierce.
Kim even staged “simulated nuclear counterattack” drills in response last year, warning that Seoul and Washington’s exercises are explicitly perceived as an attempt to unleash a war against Pyongyang.
The adversarial rhetoric could explain why the North consistently demands that the allies halt or reduce drills as a precondition for talks. Pyongyang might read cutting the exercises as a goodwill gesture demonstrating diplomatic sincerity. What is certain is that whenever diplomacy is on the table — from the 2018 Singapore summit to Kim’s 2019 letters to Trump — Pyongyang has repeatedly framed a reduction in exercises as evidence of goodwill and sincerity on the part of South Korea and the United States.
U.S. President Donald Trump, right, shakes hands with North Korea leader Kim Jong-un at the Capella resort on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. [AP/YONHAP]
What was the U.S. stance during Donald Trump's first term?
During U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term from 2017 to 2021, the allies did adjust their combined exercises in the spirit of the high-profile North-U.S. summits.
After Trump’s Singapore summit in June 2018 with North Korean leader Kim, he announced, to many people's surprise, that the United States would suspend several major “war games” with South Korea, calling them "expensive." The needs aligned with the North, as Trump has signaled he wishes to withdraw U.S. troops from allied countries and that partners needed to pay more for defense.
In practice, Seoul and Washington suspended or scaled back several large-scale exercises in 2018 and 2019 to encourage talks with North Korea.
In mid-2018, the allied forces put on hold the summer Ulchi Freedom Guardian air-defense drill and scaled down autumn exercises. In October 2018, the allies canceled Vigilant Ace, a planned December combined air exercise. At the time, the Pentagon chief spokesperson said that suspending Vigilant Ace would “give the diplomatic process every opportunity to continue.”
These concessions were controversial even at the time.
Pentagon officials warned that repeatedly suspending big drills undermined military readiness.
U.S. Army Gen. Robert Abrams, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, during his confirmation hearing in September 2018, called the suspended drills a “prudent risk” but admitted it caused a “slight degradation” in allied readiness.
After the Trump-Kim summits, the allies scaled back some high-profile drills and even conducted the 2018 Ulchi exercise primarily through computer simulation, but smaller, routine exercises continued. When nuclear negotiations collapsed, most of the suspended drills eventually resumed in full.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, Chinese President Xi Jinping, center, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and heads of foreign delegations emerge onto a rostrum in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, China, on Sept. 3. [UPI/YONHAP]
How has the security environment shifted since then?
The security context on the peninsula has shifted significantly since 2018.
Far from moving toward a peace regime, North Korea has intensified its weapons development.
After denuclearization talks between Kim Jong-un and Trump stalled in 2019, Pyongyang quietly revived its missile programs.
In 2022 to 2023, it broke its self-imposed testing moratorium. North Korea launched dozens of ballistic missiles of all ranges — including lofted-angle intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland and intermediate-range missiles over Japan — and tested a submarine-launched missile and hypersonic prototypes.
Kim declared that the moratorium was no longer binding.
In January 2022, North Korea’s politburo announced plans to “resume all temporarily suspended activities” and “bolster more powerful physical means,” explicitly citing Seoul-Washington combined exercises as part of the “hostile policy” that had reached the “danger line.”
In 2023, the North even unveiled new tactical nuclear warhead designs and an underwater drone, underscoring its aim to threaten all U.S. bases in South Korea.
Beyond North Korea’s arsenal, other regional factors have changed.
Kim has moved closer to China and, increasingly, to Russia. In 2023, news reports confirmed Kim traveled to Russia's Vladivostok to discuss an arms-for-technology deal with Vladimir Putin, and Russian officials also floated combined naval drills with North Korea and China.
These moves militarily strengthen the North’s hand and signal coordination among the three powers.
Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China's rising assertiveness in the region have heightened South Korean and U.S. concerns about a multifront security environment.
Taken together, these developments mean the North Korean threat appears more acute than in 2018.
The longstanding allied position of South Korea and the United States is that robust combined exercises are necessary to deter and defend against North Korea.
South Korean and U.S. officials note that while inter-Korean talks are desirable, any lasting peace or denuclearization regime has so far failed to materialize. Without a clear peace treaty or verifiable disarmament steps from Pyongyang, continuing the South-U.S. drills is seen as an essential insurance policy against a deteriorated threat environment.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, right, and U.S. President Donald Trump attend a welcome ceremony for the U.S. leader ahead of their talks at the National Museum in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang, on Oct. 29. [EPA/YONHAP]
Why is Seoul suggesting adjusting the combined drills?
Despite Lee’s call for dialogue with Pyongyang, Seoul’s proposal to tweak the combined drills reflects more profound strategic shifts.
The Lee administration also appears split, with the Unification Ministry prioritizing inter-Korean engagement and quietly pushing to review or postpone exercises to build trust with Pyongyang. The presidential National Security Office, having to take in a global perspective and weighing alliance coordination with the United States, maintains that these military exercises remain “critical” and rejects using them as a bargaining chip.
At the same time, U.S. diplomats are signaling caution, with acting Ambassador Kim meeting with Chung in late November, reportedly warning that mixed messages — South Korea adopting a softer posture toward the North even as Washington publicly rails against it — risk unnecessary confusion. According to diplomatic sources, the U.S. side stressed that maintaining current sanctions is essential for preserving negotiating leverage with North Korea and also underscored the need to keep pressure on Pyongyang over human rights issues.
The South Korean government has downplayed the exchange, saying it was a “routine policy discussion” and rejected the characterization that the allies are out of sync on Tuesday.
Pyongyang’s global alignment and stepped-up missile production suggest it feels less pressure to appease Seoul — raising questions about the payoff of Korea unilaterally scaling back drills.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has been refocused on deterring China.
The new U.S. security doctrine explicitly urges allies like Korea and Japan to boost their own defenses — including capabilities "necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain," referring to the maritime defensive line running from Kyushu, Japan, to Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines — and to host more forward-deployed forces.
In other words, the United States now expects South Korea to help prepare for a China contingency as much as countering North Korea.
BY SEO JI-EUN [[email protected]]





with the Korea JoongAng Daily
To write comments, please log in to one of the accounts.
Standards Board Policy (0/250자)