Waves in the Taiwan Strait will not stop at Japan

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Waves in the Taiwan Strait will not stop at Japan

Published: 16 Dec. 2025, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Park So-young

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Tensions between China and Japan triggered by remarks from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting possible Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency appear set to linger. Beijing has formally demanded that the comments be withdrawn and has stepped up pressure across diplomatic, military and economic fronts. What is unfolding is not a fleeting exchange of words but a renewed surfacing of structural tensions that have long defined relations between the two countries.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi shake hands ahead of a China–Japan summit held in Gyeongju on Oct. 31. [YONHAP]

The roots of Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks lie in Japan’s security legislation enacted in 2016 under the second administration of Shinzo Abe. That legal framework allows Japan to classify a situation as a “threat to national survival” if armed conflict were to erupt between U.S. and Chinese forces around Taiwan and the consequences spill over in ways that endanger Japan. In such circumstances, an attack by Chinese forces could effectively be treated as an attack on Japan, enabling the limited exercise of collective self-defense.

When the legislation was introduced, domestic backlash in Japan was intense. Legal scholars and civic groups staged daily protests in front of the National Diet, arguing that the law ran directly counter to Article 9 of the Constitution, which renounces the use of force abroad. Neighboring countries also expressed deep concern. Mindful of this domestic and regional opposition, Abe and subsequent prime ministers, including Yoshihide Suga, Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba, refrained from elaborating on specific scenarios in which the legislation might be applied. The legal framework was in place, but Japan maintained what amounted to strategic ambiguity.

Prime Minister Takaichi has broken with that longstanding restraint. Her remarks align with a broader push to expand Japan’s military capabilities and revise its pacifist constitution, part of a trajectory that seeks to elevate Japan from a “normal country capable of war” to a full-fledged security power. Beijing does not view Takaichi’s comments as casual diplomatic rhetoric but as a signal of a shift in Japan’s policy direction. China’s position that Taiwan constitutes a core interest among its core interests has remained unchanged. With tensions already rising ahead of President Xi Jinping’s anticipated fourth term, sensitivities surrounding the Taiwan Strait are especially pronounced.

What makes the situation more troubling is the absence of a clear exit strategy. Takaichi is unlikely to have been unaware of China’s diplomatic red lines. As a political figure closely associated with Abe’s hawkish legacy, she has placed the idea of rebuilding a “strong Japan” at the center of her leadership. The resolute image she has projected since making the Taiwan remarks has resonated with many voters, particularly younger ones. Her approval ratings have exceeded expectations, prompting speculation that she could dissolve the Diet and call a snap election to overturn the current parliamentary balance. In domestic political terms, retreat carries significant costs.

The lack of a coherent China strategy within the Takaichi administration further contributes to the standoff’s persistence. During previous periods of heightened Sino-Japanese tension, informal channels of reconciliation often played a stabilizing role. When disputes flared during Abe’s tenure over visits to Yasukuni Shrine, former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai traveled to China to help mend ties. Under the previous Ishiba government, former Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama visited Beijing twice. Since Takaichi took office, however, no comparable back-channel diplomacy has been visible.

Another complicating factor is the distancing of Komeito, the LDP’s longstanding coalition partner. Komeito’s founder, the late Daisaku Ikeda, honorary president of Soka Gakkai, played a notable role in the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Since the 1990s, Komeito has maintained regular exchanges with Beijing, functioning as an informal buffer in bilateral relations. Its reduced presence in China diplomacy signals the loss of one of Japan’s traditional shock absorbers.

China’s pressure on Japan has already expanded on multiple fronts. Measures that began with restrictions on group tourism and advisories discouraging travel to Japan have extended into the military realm. On June 6, a fighter jet launched from a Chinese aircraft carrier reportedly locked its radar onto a Japanese Self-Defense Forces aircraft over international waters near Okinawa. Three days later, Chinese and Russian bombers conducted a joint flight exercise toward Tokyo.

This handout photo taken on Dec. 9 and received on Dec. 10 from Japan's Ministry of Defense shows a Chinese J-16 fighter jet (L) and a Russian Tu-95 bomber during a joint flight over the sea near Japan. South Korea and Japan reacted furiously on Dec. 10 after Chinese and Russian military aircraft conducted joint patrols around the two countries, with both Seoul and Tokyo scrambling jets. [AFP/YONHAP, JAPAN'S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HANDOUT]

Past experience suggests that the current confrontation is unlikely to be short-lived. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China, which intensified after Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi began visiting Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, erupted into nationwide protests in 2005 over history textbook controversies. Japan’s 2012 decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands triggered mass demonstrations and boycotts of Japanese products. Only after more than two years of diplomatic chill were official dialogue channels gradually restored.

From Korea’s perspective, these developments are deeply unsettling. Korea, too, is embedded in China’s broader strategic calculations. Restrictions on Korean cultural content imposed following the 2016 decision to deploy the Thaad missile defense system, which took effect in 2017, remain largely in place. Against this backdrop, Taiwan recently protested Korea’s electronic entry declaration form listing Taiwan as “China (Taiwan),” a move widely interpreted as pressing Seoul to clarify its position. Tensions surrounding the Taiwan Strait are no longer confined to Japan. They are edging closer to Korea as well.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.