The return of the oil curse as Venezuela’s spring slips further away

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The return of the oil curse as Venezuela’s spring slips further away

Published: 14 Jan. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Cha Se-hyeon

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Venezuela, home to the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves at roughly 17 percent of the global total, appears once again to be falling victim to what is often called the “oil curse.” Under former president Hugo Chávez, massive oil revenues were poured into welfare programs. When oil prices collapsed, the country was left with hyperinflation, shortages of basic goods and a shattered economy. This time, however, the curse is not merely domestic mismanagement but intervention by great powers seeking access to Venezuelan oil.

On the evening before President Donald Trump is set to meet with U.S. oil executives to discuss Venezuela, activists staged a large-scale projection opposing oil-driven intervention and the use of U.S. taxpayer dollars to subsidize Big Oil, in Washington on Jan. 8. [AP/YONHAP]

On Jan. 3, U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly detained Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and moved him to stand trial, according to Washington’s announcement. Trump has since reached an understanding with Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, now serving as acting president, and has begun moving rapidly to secure Venezuelan oil supplies. Official justifications such as drug interdiction and the restoration of democracy have increasingly appeared secondary to energy interests.

Opposition leader María Corina Machado has openly courted U.S. support for early regime change through elections, even remarking that she would like to share the Nobel Peace Prize she received last year with Trump. The U.S. president, however, has opted against a strategy of forcibly dismantling the existing power structure. Instead, he has chosen what aides describe as a “repair and reuse” approach, removing the leader while steering the existing system in a direction aligned with U.S. interests.

Since the military operation that led to Maduro’s arrest, Trump’s effort to assert control over Venezuelan oil assets has unfolded at remarkable speed. By applying pressure for additional military action, Washington secured cooperation from figures close to the former president. The United States first took possession of between 30 million and 50 million barrels of crude that had been stranded in storage tanks after exports were blocked by a U.S. naval blockade in the Caribbean.

U.S. forces also seized a fifth oil tanker at sea to prevent exports and cut off shipments of Venezuelan crude to Cuba. These moves were followed by a meeting at the White House with the chief executives of major U.S. energy companies, including Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Trump reportedly urged them to pursue oil development on an unprecedented scale, pledging security guarantees and encouraging investments totaling $100 billion.

Energy Secretary Chris Wright said U.S. involvement would sharply increase Venezuelan oil production. Trump announced that proceeds from oil sales would be deposited into accounts controlled by the U.S. Treasury and later allocated for approved uses. To guard against unforeseen contingencies, he signed an executive order shielding those accounts from seizure or judicial action. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signaled Washington’s willingness to lift sanctions that had previously blocked Venezuelan oil exports.

Behind the immediate cash flow from oil sales, Washington’s broader objectives can be summarized in two points. First, securing Venezuelan oil would strengthen what Trump has called U.S. “energy dominance,” with the president claiming ambitions to control 55 percent of global crude supply, thereby increasing leverage over China and Russia.

China has spent years cultivating allies in Latin America through its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing maintained close ties with the Chávez and Maduro governments and is now Venezuela’s largest creditor, having extended more than $70 billion in loans. Most of that financing was backed by oil, with repayment made through discounted crude exports.

As the world’s largest oil importer, China has relied on Venezuela’s heavy crude as a buffer for energy security, helping sustain its manufacturing competitiveness. China National Petroleum Corporation has invested heavily alongside Venezuela’s state oil firm, PDVSA, in oil field development, refining facilities and transportation infrastructure.

Trump’s intervention has now left China facing not only the prospect of unrecoverable investments but also heightened risks to its future energy supply. For the United States, by contrast, the move opens the door to a full-scale energy dominance strategy aimed at Beijing. In the broader U.S.–China rivalry, analysts note that where China wields rare earths, the United States can now wield oil.

At the same time, Russia’s energy influence is expected to weaken. After its 2014 annexation of Crimea triggered sanctions pressure from the European Union, Moscow turned energy exports into a strategic weapon, exploiting Europe’s heavy dependence on Russian oil and gas. Even amid the war in Ukraine, European countries continued importing Russian gas out of necessity, a situation that fueled internal divisions within the bloc. Successive U.S. administrations, including Trump’s, pushed Europe to increase imports of American LNG and oil.

A flame burning natural gas is seen at an heavy-crude treatment plant operated by Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA, in the oil rich Orinoco belt, near Cabrutica at the state of Anzoategui on April 16, 2015. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

If the United States supplies Venezuelan crude at relatively low prices, with Trump suggesting a cap of $50 per barrel, Russia’s strategy of sustaining its wartime economy through energy exports could suffer a significant blow. Cheap energy supplies would also give Washington additional diplomatic leverage over allies and partners.

Trump’s intervention in Venezuela is also closely tied to domestic politics ahead of November’s midterm elections. While his support among conservative voters remains solid, his overall approval rating has slipped into the low to mid-40 percent range as centrist and younger voters have drifted away in response to hard-line policies. Historically, high oil prices and inflation have been among the most damaging factors for incumbent parties. Many analysts expect Trump to use cheaper Venezuelan oil to ease inflation concerns and improve the electoral environment.

There is also the political effect of projecting strength abroad. Past examples, such as President Ronald Reagan’s invasion of Grenada in 1983 and President George W. Bush’s Iraq War in 2003, suggest that displays of force framed as “peace through strength” can boost approval ratings. Trump’s stance may resonate with voters in the South and Midwest who oppose Democratic environmental policies, as well as immigrants who fled what U.S. conservatives often call the “axis of dictatorship” of Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.