The strong do what they must, the weak endure

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The strong do what they must, the weak endure

Published: 14 Jan. 2026, 00:02

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Ko Jung-ae

The author is the editor-in-chief at JoongAng Sunday.

“The strong do what they must, and the weak endure what they have to.”

The phrase feels uncomfortably familiar. It captures the essence of ruthless international politics and traces back nearly 2,500 years to ancient Athens’ ultimatum to the neutral island of Melos, recorded in “The Peloponnesian War” (411 B.C.) by Thucydides. Athens told Melos to surrender or face destruction. The Athenians warned the Melians not to argue that they had done no harm and therefore did not deserve conquest.

Melos protested. It spoke of justice, of the gods and of alliances. Athens responded with cynicism.

Captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is escorted, as he heads towards the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse in Manhattan for an initial appearance to face U.S. federal charges including narco-terrorism, conspiracy, drug trafficking, money laundering and others, at Downtown Manhattan Heliport, in New York City, U.S., January 5, 2026. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

Even if the end of Athenian power were to come someday, Athens said, it was not something to lose sleep over now. They had come, they made clear, for the benefit of their empire and to decide whether Melos would survive. The gods, they added, followed the same rule: Stronger gods ruled weaker ones. Melos, Athens scoffed, was gambling its survival on uncertain future hopes rather than making a rational choice in the present. That, Athens said, was arrogance disguised as morality.

The echoes are hard to miss. In the operation to remove Nicolás Maduro, the United States reportedly told figures close to him to either follow Washington’s directives or be eliminated. The resemblance to Melos is unsettling. The Trump administration described this approach as “flexible realism.” One analyst, Raphael S. Cohen, remarked that the United States appeared to be openly testing whether foreign policy could rest solely on power and national interest.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s experiment may be particularly flamboyant, but he is hardly alone. The rivalry between the United States and China is unfolding across the globe. Venezuela, Iran and Greenland are not isolated cases. They can all be connected by a single thread: oil.

China, the world’s largest energy importer, has been purchasing crude at steep discounts from Venezuela, Iran and Russia, sometimes through so-called shadow fleets, largely because of Western sanctions. An estimated 20 percent of China’s oil imports originate from sanctioned regions. What if China had to pay full market prices?

Kang Ju-myung, a former head of the International Gas Union and an energy expert, has described China’s Belt and Road Initiative in blunt terms: a network designed to secure oil and gas supplies. As the biggest beneficiary of the sanctions regime, he noted, China would struggle if that system were to be shaken. Trump, despite resistance from Ukraine and Europe, has pushed for a cease-fire with Russia and has also sought to intervene in Iran.

Greenland follows the same logic. Trump’s noisy pressure campaign against China reportedly eased only after Beijing demonstrated its leverage through rare earth exports. Greenland matters not only for rare earths but also as a strategic chokepoint along Arctic shipping routes. China is already gaining access to the Arctic through Russia. Trump has been willing to risk friction with longstanding European allies to block that advance.

A Western analyst likened this contest to the 19th-century rivalry between Britain and Russia in Central Asia, calling it the “Great Game of the 21st century,” a phrase used by Rana Foroohar. Europe, Korea, Japan, Australia, parts of Africa and Latin America, she argued, are all entangled in this game. None can afford a simplistic, binary choice between Washington and Beijing. The point resonates.

Europe, sheltered for 80 years under the U.S. security umbrella, now faces the unfamiliar task of defending itself. It must chart a path between deep-seated hostility toward Russia and the realist concern that weakening Russia too far could leave its resources more easily absorbed by China.

President Lee Jae Myung (right) and Chinese President Xi Jinping enter the official welcoming ceremony at the North Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the afternoon of Jan. 5. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

Korea faces its own version of the dilemma. President Lee Jae Myung tried to downplay remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping urging countries to “stand on the right side of history,” saying he took them as Confucian words meaning little more than living decently and well. Days later, however, the Chinese ambassador to Korea effectively contradicted that interpretation, explicitly linking the remarks to the broader international alignment involving Korea, the United States and Japan.

This is no longer a situation that can be brushed aside in the name of harmony. Coexistence with a nuclear-armed North Korea cannot be reduced to vague calls to “get along.” What is required is a serious national debate. Policy zigzags that change with every administration inspire little trust. Even agreeing on a basic direction would be a start. In the United States, despite severe polarization, there is broad consensus on the need to check China.

Melos, in the end, was wiped out. The stakes, then as now, were survival itself.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.