Expanding Techint and Humint to follow even Kim Jong-un’s shadow

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Expanding Techint and Humint to follow even Kim Jong-un’s shadow

Published: 15 Jan. 2026, 00:03

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Jeong Yong-soo

The author is an editorial writer and the director of the Unification and Culture Research Institute of the JoongAng Ilbo.

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) is an organization wrapped in secrecy. Its headquarters does not appear on navigation apps and its location is blurred on online maps. Classified as a top-tier national security facility, the agency exists much like a ghost, with secrecy as its lifeline. Although it operates with a substantial public budget, the National Assembly reviews that budget behind closed doors, and even the total amount remains classified.

Then president Moon Jae-in (right) looks at the stone memorial bearing the “Nameless Stars,” honoring National Intelligence Service officers who died in the line of duty, alongside then-NIS Director Seo Hoon at the agency on July 20, 2018. [CAPTURED FROM THE BLUE HOUSE FACEBOOK PAGE]

Much about the agency’s people is also concealed. Aside from a handful of senior officials whose appointments are publicly announced, the identities of NIS officers are not disclosed. Even when outside visitors tour the premises and take commemorative photographs, officers deliberately step aside. Once an officer’s face becomes known, future missions can be compromised. It is considered basic discipline not to inquire about the work of the colleague at the next desk. Some officers are said not to reveal their profession even to family members. After living their careers in the shadows, retired officers named their alumni association “Yangjihoe,” meaning a society of sunlight, reflecting a wish to finally live in the open.

The NIS’s primary mission is the collection of overseas and North Korea–related intelligence, along with counterintelligence covering industrial and economic security. It also gathers and analyzes information on terrorism and transnational crime. The agency functions both as a spear that collects intelligence and as a shield that prevents sensitive information from leaking abroad. As governments worldwide tighten their defenses against espionage, the risks faced by intelligence collectors have only grown.

Those risks are particularly acute in operations involving North Korea. In October 1996, Choi Duk-geun, a Korean consul and intelligence officer, was killed in Vladivostok while tracking North Korea’s counterfeit currency and drug trafficking networks. The NIS commemorates officers who die in the line of duty as “nameless stars,” engraving stars within its compound. The practice mirrors the Memorial Wall at the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia. In July 2018, then president Moon Jae-in unveiled a monument bearing 18 such stars, marking officers who had died since the founding of the agency’s predecessor in 1961. By 2021, the number had increased by one and additional deaths have followed at intervals of one or two years.

Under the Lee Jae Myung administration, the NIS, led by director Lee Jong-seok, a longtime North Korea specialist, has placed renewed emphasis on strengthening intelligence capabilities related to Pyongyang. This includes expanding technical intelligence, or Techint, using satellites and surveillance systems, as well as human intelligence, or Humint, built through human networks. Some within the intelligence community have expressed concern that the agency may be placing too much weight on North Korea–focused collection, reflecting the director’s priorities. According to accounts, discussions of North Korea dominate meetings chaired by the director.

Officers assigned to the North Korea division are often told they must internalize Kim Jong-un and follow him like a shadow. One example cited as demonstrating recent NIS capabilities was the acquisition of information that Kim would attend China’s Victory Day military parade last September. Until Kim boarded his train to China, the situation remained fluid. Nevertheless, the NIS assessed the intelligence as credible through a combination of Humint and Techint, shared it with the United States and briefed the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee.

The agency also tracked shifts within North Korea’s leadership last October, when U.S. President Donald Trump proposed a North Korea–U. S. summit during a visit to Korea. The NIS detected signs that Choe Son-hui, North Korea’s foreign minister, was considering delaying a planned visit to Russia and that Pyongyang was analyzing background information on potential U.S. participants who might attend a meeting with Trump.

Earlier this month, the NIS played a significant role in the arrest of 26 members of a scam ring in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, that impersonated state institutions and committed sexual exploitation crimes against women. Since late 2023, the agency had recognized the seriousness of Cambodian-based criminal networks and strengthened its intelligence capacity by frequently dispatching officers from headquarters. Even so, critics point out that despite recognizing the threat, the agency failed to prevent the death of a Korean college student last August.

The only formal channel through which intelligence obtained by the NIS is shared externally is the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, the institution representing the public. Even then, disclosures are minimal. Once operational details are exposed, human networks can collapse and future missions may be jeopardized. Successful operations therefore remain permanently buried in the shadows.

The inscription on the monument bearing the National Intelligence Service’s motto in front of the agency’s headquarters was restored in July 2025 to read “Intelligence Is National Power.” [PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE]

Recently, however, the NIS has been pushed into the spotlight. Controversy arose after allegations that the son of former Democratic Party floor leader Kim Byung-kee attempted to obtain sensitive diplomatic intelligence through a lawmaker’s aide. During the Moon Jae-in administration, the agency hired dozens of lawyers as full-time staff to ensure operations remained within legal boundaries. Yet in the intelligence world, purpose often precedes procedure. If allegations that someone used family connections to expose operational matters prove true, it would contradict the fundamental nature of intelligence work.

Concerns have also surfaced over disclosures suggesting NIS involvement in investigating a massive personal data leak at Coupang and over the July 2024 indictment in the United States of Korea expert Sumi Terry for allegedly passing classified U.S. information to Korea. The indictment described NIS officers purchasing gifts with credit cards, leaving trails that exposed operational methods. Intelligence professionals refer to such exposure as a “pixari,” a slang term for a disastrous off-key note.

Such lapses can be fatal for an intelligence agency. More dangerous still is when an agency caters to political power or when politicians seek to use it. An intelligence service must belong to the state, not to any particular administration. Signs of friction have recently emerged between a faction within the NIS that favors strategic autonomy and a diplomatic line that prioritizes the U.S. alliance. Some analysts say Washington, aware of this divide, uses both sides as circumstances dictate. In a world where intelligence failures can have existential consequences, allowing internal rivalries to spill over into institutional conflict is a risk Korea cannot afford.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.