Locking the gate on defense technology requires swift revision of the espionage law

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Locking the gate on defense technology requires swift revision of the espionage law

Published: 22 Jan. 2026, 00:04

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Park Jong-seung

The author is a professor at KAIST and former head of the Agency for Defense Development.

The news that the former employees who leaked Samsung’s core semiconductor technologies to China have been indicted and detained has sent shock waves through Korea. The case unmasked the fragility of the country’s industrial technology protection regime. Advanced technologies accumulated over decades through massive investment and talent development have flowed outward because safeguards failed. The potential damage is enormous, and the incident serves as a warning in an era defined by the U.S.-China technological rivalry.

Marines stationed on Yeonpyeong Island fire K9 self-propelled howitzers during a live-fire drill near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea on June 25, 2025. [NEWS1]

Although semiconductors are a civilian industry, their impact reaches deeply into national security. The same risks surrounding semiconductor technology information leaks could surface even more acutely in the defense sector. Korea’s global standing in defense exports has risen sharply thanks to indigenous weapons systems such as the Cheongung air defense system, the Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher, the K2 main battle tank, the K9 self-propelled howitzer and the FA-50 light combat aircraft. As exports expand, however, so does the risk that defense technologies directly tied to national security may be exposed.

Defense exports today extend beyond the sales of finished products. They increasingly involve technology transfers, local production arrangements and joint development programs. This shift has made the management of core technologies far more important. Modern weapons systems integrate design skill, software and operational concepts into a single architecture. Even the leak of partial technologies can lead to imitations or significantly enhance an adversary’s countermeasures. The consequences go beyond industrial loss and directly affect the lives of service members.

If semiconductor technology leaks translate into industrial damage, defense technology leaks can escalate into a national crisis. But awareness and institutional safeguards have not kept pace with the rapid growth of the defense industry. The expanding network of subcontractors, the rise in overseas joint development and the movement of specialized personnel have all introduced new security vulnerabilities. With the semiconductor sector already demonstrating how easily technology can be siphoned off, there is no guarantee that defense industries will not follow the same path.

The global defense market has evolved from a competition over performance into a battlefield of information. The United States enacted the Economic Espionage Act in 1996 and treats the leak of strategic technologies as a grave national security offense. Attempts to steal data on the F-35 fighter jet design, for example, are regarded not as acts of ordinary theft but as threats to national survival.

Russia has punished scientists who attempted to leak hypersonic missile technologies with charges of treason. Japan and Britain have strengthened economic security laws to block advanced domestic technologies from flowing to third countries. A common feature of these approaches is that espionage is defined broadly, not limited to acts on behalf of an “enemy state” but extended to any foreign country or agent that harms national interests.

Korea stands in stark contrast. Article 98 of the Criminal Act restricts espionage to acts conducted “for an enemy state.” Under this framework, even if core design data for Korean weapons systems were sold to a country masquerading as an ally or to a multinational corporation, prosecution under the espionage statute would be impossible. The industrial technology protection act carries lighter penalties and lacks the gravity required to address threats at the national security level.

From my experience overseeing weapons development, the moment defense technologies are leaked overseas, the strategic advantages built up by the Korean military are eroded, and the competitiveness of defense exports is undermined. A weak punishment risks signaling to foreign intelligence services and industrial spies that Korea is a place where stealing technology, so long as it is not for an “enemy state,” results in minimal consequences.

Operators move into position to prepare for the launch of a Cheongung-II surface-to-air missile during a live-fire interception drill in the Yellow Sea region on Nov. 6, 2024. [NEWS1]

To ensure the sustainable future of Korea’s defense industry, a shift in the legal paradigm is urgently needed. The outdated distinction of whether the recipient is an enemy state must be abandoned. Protection should instead center on the universal values of national interest and security.

This is why the Criminal Act amendment, already passed by the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee but still awaiting a plenary vote, must be handled without delay. The goal is not merely to punish offenders. It is to create an environment in which Korean defense firms can pursue research with confidence and to safeguard national assets created with public funds.

If advanced weapons systems serve as shields against physical threats, robust laws and institutions form another line of defense against invisible technology leakage. Korea must urgently secure this legal lock to ensure that the spears and shields built to protect the nation do not return as a boomerang aimed at itself.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.