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China’s dilemma over North Korea

Published: 23 Jan. 2026, 00:04

John Everad

The author is former British Ambassador to North Korea.

It is often said that U.S. policy toward DPRK, the official name for North Korea, has been inconsistent and confused. Less frequently noted is that China also struggles to formulate a coherent policy, albeit for different reasons.

For decades after the Korean War, China’s approach rested on two pillars. One was strategic calculation: the DPRK was seen as a necessary buffer against U.S. forces stationed in the ROK — the official name of South Korea. The other was emotional: Chinese soldiers had fought and died in Korea, creating what was often described as a relationship “sealed in blood.” Today, both pillars have eroded. Chinese experts acknowledge that in an era of hypersonic missiles, the notion of the DPRK as a territorial buffer carries little weight in internal discussions. The emotional bond has faded with the passing of the war generation.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, holds hands in greeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping before the Victory Day parade in Beijing on Sept. 3. [NEWS1]

Among postwar generations in China, any residual warmth toward the DPRK has been chilled by North Korean behavior. Chinese frustration has grown over Pyongyang’s reluctance to acknowledge, let alone express gratitude for, China’s sacrifices during the Korean War or the extensive aid it has provided since. Many Chinese also resent the openly hostile attitudes they encounter, including derogatory language used by North Koreans and what Chinese businesspeople perceive as discriminatory treatment.

The sources of North Korean resentment toward China are complex. Longstanding dependence has fostered a sullen and resentful posture toward its principal benefactor. As one Chinese diplomat put it, China saved the DPRK’s country, its government and its economy, “and they will never forgive us.” Negative day-to-day encounters have reinforced this attitude. Chinese businesspeople are often accused of exploiting North Korean workers, while Chinese tourists are criticized for disrespectful behavior at sites North Koreans regard as sacred. Pyongyang was also deeply angered by Beijing’s support for UN Security Council sanctions following North Korea’s nuclear tests.

As a result, the foundations of the traditional “blood alliance” have weakened considerably. Chinese analysts now speak of recalibrating the relationship into a more modern “strategic partnership,” pointing to the Sept. 4 summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as a symbolic starting point. Yet, what this partnership actually entails remains unclear. North Korea’s pursuit of absolute strategic autonomy, including unrestricted nuclear development, would leave China facing a nuclear-armed neighbor beyond its influence.

Some argue that worsening U.S.-China relations make the partnership inevitable under the logic that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” But this rationale is fragile. Should relations between Washington and Beijing improve, it would quickly collapse. Moreover, it is unclear how China benefits strategically. Supporting an unpredictable, nuclear-armed DPRK risks creating not an ally but a dangerous liability.

The costs of the relationship, by contrast, are tangible. The DPRK consumes an extraordinary amount of senior Chinese leadership attention. This risks alienating other countries China seeks to cultivate. The opaque scale of Chinese aid to North Korea, which both sides work hard to conceal, represents a substantial burden on Chinese taxpayers.

From this perspective, China’s new strategic partnership with the DPRK appears expensive and of uncertain value. One possible explanation lies beyond official rhetoric. Chinese scholars rarely address the DPRK’s growing closeness with Russia, yet it is difficult to ignore the possibility that China’s recalibration is driven by concern over losing primacy in what it has long considered its strategic backyard. If so, the new policy is shaped by emotion as much as the old alliance, albeit a different kind. In this narrow sense, the policy has already succeeded: China’s centrality to the DPRK is no longer in doubt.

In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia's President Vladimir Putin (center right) and North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un (center left) leave after their meeting in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2025. Putin on Sept. 3 thanked Kim for sending troops to oust Ukrainian soldiers from Russia's Kursk border region, saying they fought ″heroically.″ [AFP/YONHAP]

This raises a further question. If the partnership has achieved its implicit objective, where does China go next?

An unstable and unpredictable nuclear state on China’s border is not in Beijing’s interest. While Chinese officials continue publicly to call for U.S.-DPRK negotiations, privately they regard such an outcome as unlikely. Over the longer term, China may need to find a way to transform North Korea into something closer to a normal state. If Russia’s influence wanes after the war in Ukraine, China may face a rare opportunity.

At that point, Beijing would have two options. One would be coercion through the threat of cutting aid, risking violent retaliation. The other would be to revive an economic-for-nuclear trade similar to what failed at the Hanoi summit. Estimates suggest that roughly $300 billion in capital inflows over a decade would be needed to place the DPRK on a growth path comparable to the ROK’s. Such an approach would be difficult, particularly given Pyongyang’s insistence that it will never surrender its nuclear weapons. It might succeed only if North Korea judged economic collapse to be a greater threat than external invasion.

Whether China is willing or able to pursue such a course remains uncertain. For now, its policy may moderate some DPRK behavior but, like the fractured U.S. approach, it seems unlikely to prevent North Korea from remaining an international menace.