Is Washington accepting a nuclear North Korea?

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Is Washington accepting a nuclear North Korea?

Published: 26 Jan. 2026, 00:00

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Elbridge Colby, under secretary of war for policy, prepares for his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill in Washington on March 4, 2025. [AFP/YONHAP]

The Trump administration’s second-term National Defense Strategy (NDS), titled the “2026 Defense Strategy,” was released on Friday. The document stresses a sharper focus on defending the U.S. homeland and calls on allies to shoulder greater security responsibilities. It even states that the United States will not fill security gaps caused by what it describes as irresponsible choices by allied leaders. The message reflects an expanded “America First” approach in defense policy. For allies such as Korea, this shift is likely to increase strategic and financial burdens, making careful preparation essential.

For Korea, one omission in the new strategy is particularly concerning. While it acknowledges that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to advance, the document makes no mention of denuclearization. This follows a similar omission in the National Security Strategy (NSS) released late last year. The absence of denuclearization language in both documents suggests more than a change in wording, and raises questions about whether Washington’s policy stance is evolving.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s own remarks have fueled such concerns. Since taking office last January, he has repeatedly referred to North Korea as a nuclear power, language that appears to recognize Pyongyang’s nuclear status. During his visit to Korea in October, he proposed another meeting with Kim Jong-un and hinted at the possibility of easing sanctions. Against this backdrop, doubts have grown, as noted recently in a Washington Post editorial, that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula may no longer be a priority for Washington and that the United States could be moving toward tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

This uncertainty is compounded by the interaction between the new U.S. defense strategy and the Lee Jae Myung government’s approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. President Lee has emphasized pragmatic realism and proposed a three-stage framework of freeze, arms reduction and eventual denuclearization. While denuclearization remains the stated final goal, the inclusion of arms reduction talks as an intermediate step could provide Pyongyang with leverage to press its longstanding claim that it should be treated as a nuclear weapons state. North Korea has argued that arms control talks should be conducted only among nuclear powers, a framework that would marginalize nonnuclear Korea.

The issue gains urgency with the visit to Korea by Elbridge Colby, the U.S. undersecretary of war for policy and a key architect of both the NSS and NDS. He is expected to stress U.S. priorities such as homeland defense and countering China, issues linked to debates over the role of U.S. Forces Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control.

The government should seek clarity on what a defense strategy without denuclearization implies and press Washington to maintain coordination on the principle of North Korea’s denuclearization. It should also use the opportunity to secure stronger U.S. support for bolstering Korea’s own defense capabilities.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.