China's relocation of contentious sea platform eases tensions with Korea, but hints at ulterior motives

Home > National > Diplomacy

China's relocation of contentious sea platform eases tensions with Korea, but hints at ulterior motives

Published: 04 Feb. 2026, 16:21 Updated: 05 Feb. 2026, 13:53

SEO JI-EUN
[email protected]

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Satellite imagery from CSIS shows the Atlantic Amsterdam, a Chinese-claimed "management platform," after it was removed from the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) and relocated to a shipyard in Weihai, China, on Feb. 5. [CSIS/BEYOND PARALLEL/PLANET 2025]

[NEWS ANALYSIS]

China has recently relocated a contentious maritime management platform from disputed waters in the Yellow Sea, a step hailed in Seoul as meaningful toward restoring bilateral ties.

Yet a closer look at China's emphasis on the relocation being a decision made by a private entity also suggests a calculated diplomatic move aimed at securing strategic gains while deflecting responsibility.

The Atlantic Amsterdam, a Chinese-claimed "management platform" for its two aquaculture cages [OFFICE OF REP. EOM TAE-YOUNG]

For now, removing one of three Chinese offshore platforms from the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) has eased a major flashpoint, while the other two remain within the PMZ. The PMZ is a jointly managed maritime area in the Yellow Sea between China and Korea.

Experts in Seoul caution that China’s underlying position has not fundamentally changed — namely, its insistence that the remaining structures are lawful civilian aquaculture facilities that need not be dismantled. They warn that Beijing's moves reflect a deliberate strategic calculation rather than a policy shift.

Chinese maritime management platform leaves the Yellow Sea PMZ [LEE JEONG-MIN]

Relocation of the most contentious facility

The Chinese maritime management platform, called Atlantic Amsterdam, has been widely viewed by Korean experts as the most contentious of the structures for potential dual-use purposes.

Converted from an oil-drilling rig, the semi-fixed installation features a helipad and can house over 20 personnel.

Such features fueled concerns that even if it was operated as a civilian facility in peacetime, the platform could be converted for military or surveillance purposes in a contingency.

China suddenly began relocating the Atlantic Amsterdam platform out of the PMZ on the night of Jan. 27, according to a notice issued by the Weihai Maritime Safety Administration.

A navigation warning issued by the Weihai Maritime Safety Administration on Jan. 26, citing the planned relocation of the offshore structure “Atlantic Amsterdam.” [SCREEN CAPTURE]

Korea's Foreign Ministry confirmed Tuesday that Atlantic Amsterdam had left the PMZ and arrived at a shipyard in Weihai, some 250 kilometers away, on Jan. 31.

The relocation was also independently confirmed through satellite imagery analyzed by the Washington-based think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in its Beyond Parallel report released the day before.

“The management facility matched the concerns raised by the Korean military,” said Lee Dong-gyu, a research fellow and China expert at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “By moving this specific structure, China intends to alleviate Seoul’s immediate security concerns and lower our vigilance.”

However, the think tank also found that the two other deep-sea aquaculture platforms, Shenlan 1 and Shenlan 2, continue to operate inside the PMZ.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun takes a question from a journalist at a press conference in Beijing, China, on Jan. 7, 2025. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

A 'business decision'

The relocation followed an agreement reached upon during a summit between Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Jan. 5.

Both sides reached a “natural consensus” that the large management rig, given its sensitivity, should be addressed first, a diplomatic source said.

Kang Young-shin, director-general for Northeast Asian affairs at Korea's Foreign Ministry, lauded the rig’s relocation as “a change that will aid the development of Korea–China relations.”

China's public messaging, however, portrayed the move as a company-led decision to avoid admitting state involvement, which could potentially undercut its longstanding legal and diplomatic arguments.

"We’ve learned that a Chinese company is moving the platform," China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said on Jan. 27, describing it as "an adjustment made by the company itself to meet the needs of its operation and development."

He added that China's broader stance on the "aquacultural facilities in the southern Yellow Sea remains unchanged."

The Korean government has refrained from publicly challenging China’s explanation.

“The relocation of the management platform itself is a meaningful development coming amid efforts to stabilize bilateral relations,” a senior Korean Foreign Ministry official said, underscoring that the move had Beijing's consent regardless of how it was packaged.

Chinese steel structures in the Yellow Sea [YUN YOUNG]

Beijing's characteristic approach

Some experts in Seoul point out that China is deliberately trying to avoid international criticism by refraining from making claims to the Yellow Sea.

“Beijing’s decision to frame the relocation as a company-driven move was intended to distance the Chinese government from accusations that it is using offshore structures to expand state influence or turn the Yellow Sea into de facto internal waters,” Lee Dong-gyu said.

Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, said the description was "a way of indirectly showing that the government was not involved, while at the same time demonstrating that China has taken visible action for the sake of bilateral relations.” In effect, it allows Beijing to avoid legal responsibility while still scoring diplomatic points — a dual calculation.

Some analysts draw parallels to China’s backlash against Korea’s deployment of the U.S.-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) missile defense system in 2017, when Beijing denied imposing official sanctions while appearing to allow market-driven retaliation to unfold.

Victor Cha, Korea Chair at CSIS, in a press roundtable in Seoul in April 2024, said Thaad shows an “example of economic coercion that China has used quite frequently for decades" against countries in the Indo-Pacific, calling it a typical "gray zone" strategy, or using nonmilitary means to gradually change the status quo without open conflict.

Applying the same logic, experts warn that China could again blur the lines of responsibility and invoke business decisions to justify reinstalling or taking additional measures should relations deteriorate.

Beyond the management platform now being relocated (No. 14), the Shenlan 1 and Shenlan 2 aquaculture platforms (Nos. 15 and 16) remain inside the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). Thirteen additional buoys (Nos. 1–13) are also positioned in and around the PMZ. [CSIS/BEYOND PARALLEL]

Salami tactics and the clash of principles

The Atlantic Amsterdam may be gone, but potential surveillance infrastructure remains.

With 13 associated buoys and the two remaining Shenlan platforms, Beijing retains the capacity to monitor Korean maritime activities while claiming the remaining structures are purely for "deep-sea aquaculture."

In a written response to the Korea JoongAng Daily on Thursday, the Chinese Embassy in Seoul said China has “already clarified its position on aquaculture facilities in the southern Yellow Sea on multiple occasions,” adding that there is "no change" to that position. The embassy added that the two sides maintain “friendly and practical communication" on maritime issues, and expressed hope that China and South Korea would “work together to make the Yellow Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.”

Chinese Ambassador to Korea Dai Bing reiterated in an interview with Yonhap on Monday that the remaining maritime structures are "deep-sea aquaculture facilities for salmon farming, not a military installation."

He also stressed that the facilities "do not violate" the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or China's domestic law, nor do they undermine the maritime rights and interests claimed by China and Korea.

Key developments in the Korea-China Yellow Sea dispute [LEE JEONG-MIN]

Korean scholars argue that constructing and operating installations in an undelimited maritime zone runs counter to the spirit of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 74(3) of the convention urges states to refrain from actions that could “jeopardize or hamper” the conclusion of a final boundary agreement — an obligation often referred to as the duty of restraint.

The core of the dispute lies in the fundamental clash over how to draw the permanent maritime boundary.

Korea advocates the median-line principle, which draws an equal-distance boundary between coastlines. China, by contrast, argues for an equitable principle that takes into account coastline length, population and geological features such as sediment deposits from the Yellow River.

“If the remaining facilities are tolerated, the baseline used in maritime delimitation talks could shift,” Prof. Kang said. “This would mirror the salami tactics or the so-called cabbage strategy China has used in the South China Sea — an initial step toward turning the Yellow Sea into de facto internal waters.”

According to Kang, applying China’s logic could push the boundary roughly 70 kilometers closer to the Korean side, potentially placing up to three-quarters of the Yellow Sea under Chinese jurisdiction. The buoys and aquaculture platforms China has installed could then be cited as evidence of effective occupation to support such claims.

Korean President Lee Jae Myung, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping prior to their bilateral meeting at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, China, on Jan. 5. [XINHUA/YONHAP]

Remaining tasks

With a foreign ministers’ meeting scheduled for the first quarter, Seoul faces the challenge of turning this symbolic gesture into a lasting rule of law.

“The PMZ must ultimately become a clean, structure-free zone for genuine maritime boundary negotiations to begin,” Kang said. “If China is sincere about improving relations, it should relocate all remaining facilities into its own waters.”

Prof. Lee noted that the current geopolitical climate gives Seoul some leverage.

“With Sino-U.S. competition intensifying, China has strong incentives to keep Korea in a cooperative or balancing role,” Lee said.

For Korea, the relocation of one platform is not the conclusion, but the beginning of a high-stakes negotiation. To protect its maritime sovereignty, experts say that Seoul must move beyond accepting "company decisions" and demand a clear, enforceable boundary that recognizes the PMZ as a zone free of unilateral installations.

UPDATE, Feb. 5: Updated with an official statement from the Chinese Embassy in Seoul.

BY SEO JI-EUN [[email protected]]

More in Diplomacy

Prime Minister Takaichi's election victory sparks concerns about impact on Korea-Japan relationship

Korea, Saudi Arabia sign MOU on defense research, development

차와 춤, 그리고 배려… 문화의 온기 나눈 한·일 대학생들

Trump signs executive order to impose additional tariffs on any country trading with Iran

Trump signs order to prioritize arms sales to countries investing in their own self-defense

korea joongAng daily

Home > National > Diplomacy

China's relocation of contentious sea platform eases tensions with Korea, but hints at ulterior motives

Related Article

Korea calls China's move to relocate Yellow Sea structures 'meaningful step' in reducing tensions

China begins relocating contentious maritime structure in disputed Yellow Sea zone

China sells salmon raised in Yellow Sea structures, raising concerns about their possible dismantlement

What’s below the surface of the Korea–China tensions over steel platforms in the Yellow Sea?

Relocation of the most contentious facility

A 'business decision'

Beijing's characteristic approach

Salami tactics and the clash of principles

Remaining tasks

More in Diplomacy

Related Stories

You might also like