When an inept opposition still brings down a government

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When an inept opposition still brings down a government

Ahn Hai-ri


The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.
 
 
“An incompetent opposition cannot change a government.”
 
It is a familiar refrain, often uttered with a click of the tongue whenever people criticize an opposition that fails to play its role, including the People Power Party (PPP) today, where former and current party leaders Han Dong-hoon and Jang Dong-hyeok are locked in a bitter internal power struggle.
 
Jang Dong-hyeok, leader of the People Power Party, stages a hunger strike in the National Assembly Rotunda Hall on the afternoon of Jan. 15, urging the Democratic Party to accept the so-called dual special counsel bill over allegations of political lobbying by the Unification Church and nomination bribery. [LIM HYUN-DONG]

Jang Dong-hyeok, leader of the People Power Party, stages a hunger strike in the National Assembly Rotunda Hall on the afternoon of Jan. 15, urging the Democratic Party to accept the so-called dual special counsel bill over allegations of political lobbying by the Unification Church and nomination bribery. [LIM HYUN-DONG]

 
But the claim is not entirely true. An inept opposition can, and often does, bring down a government. In fact, the past two transfers of power in Korea unfolded in precisely that way. No matter how incapable an opposition may be at checking the government or presenting policy alternatives, an arrogant ruling camp can lose power through its own excesses. Governments that mocked a divided opposition and behaved as if they would rule forever ended up destroying themselves. One need only recall the Moon Jae-in administration, which lost power after a single five-year term despite rhetoric about “100 years in office,” to see how this happens.
 
Consider the record. Just 14 years ago, in 2012, the Democratic Party (DP) closely resembled today’s PPP. It is human nature that generosity follows power. Having lost office and with little to distribute, party members spent their days fighting one another. That year’s April 11 general election was widely described as “unlosable” given conservative President Lee Myung-bak’s rock-bottom approval ratings. Yet the results told a different story. The ruling Saenuri Party, the predecessor of today’s PPP, won 152 seats, while the DP secured only 127, a clear defeat for the opposition.
 

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As is often the case with failing parties, nominations were at the heart of the problem. Pro-Roh Moo-hyun faction-centered candidate selections triggered backlash in Gwangju-Jeolla, the party’s traditional base, leading to defections and splinter parties. There was no real reflection. Party leaders consoled themselves by noting narrow losses or claiming victory in the Seoul metropolitan area, indulging in hollow “valiant defeat” narratives. Instead of fighting the government, they sank into internal strife, ensuring they could not regain power. In short, they were incompetent, much like the opposition today.
 
Power then fell into the DP’s hands almost by default amid the ruling party’s self-destruction during the Sewol ferry disaster and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. From that point, the mantle of an inept opposition passed to the PPP, under its previous names. Even after the DP won a landslide in the 2018 local elections and secured a record 180 seats in the 2020 general election, the conservative camp failed to pursue genuine reform or expand its base. Instead, it fixated on internal leadership battles and ultimately recruited a sitting prosecutor general as its presidential candidate. Remarkably, such an unprepared opposition still won the 2022 presidential election.
 
There were multiple factors behind that victory, but one point is clear. Policy failures by the Moon Jae-in administration played a decisive role. Having come to power largely through the absence of alternatives in the wake of impeachment, the government needed integration more than ever. Instead, it focused narrowly on “eradication of past wrongs.” The scandal surrounding Cho Kuk in 2019, triggered by admissions irregularities, returned as a boomerang of perceived double standards and ignited public judgment against the administration. Real fuel, however, came from housing policy.
 
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a Cabinet meeting at Cheong Wa Dae on Feb. 3. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a Cabinet meeting at Cheong Wa Dae on Feb. 3. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

 
Around 100 days into his term, President Moon declared confidently that he had a powerful solution to soaring home prices. Yet over the course of his presidency, the government rolled out 28 separate real estate measures, mobilizing every regulatory tool, including taxes, in an aggressive demand-suppression strategy targeting multiple homeowners. The more determined the campaign became, the faster prices rose. By the end of his term, Moon’s final words on housing were blunt: he had “nothing to say.” Power then changed hands.
 
This long detour into recent history reflects unease about President Lee Jae-myung’s growing confidence. After announcing the revival of heavier capital gains taxes on owners of multiple homes on Jan. 23, he posted more than 10 real estate-related messages on X. On Tuesday, he used harsh language, asking whether critics had lost “even the minimum conscience,” and vowed to crack down “by any means necessary.”
 
Few Koreans oppose efforts to rein in runaway housing prices. But there are also few who support policies that demonize all multiple-home owners as speculators or dismiss reasonable concerns about contradictory regulations and their side effects. Pushing ahead in that manner risks breathing life back into an opposition that is otherwise on its last legs. It is unclear whether the president realizes that this is exactly how governments lose power.


This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
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