Consent in South, reciprocity by North are keys to aid plan

There are several reasons why our government's policies toward North Korea, based on the "sunshine" policy, aren't working. We don't react strongly enough to North Korea's breach of promises. We lack unity in support of the policy. We don't have a detailed blueprint. Putting all this into consideration, setting aside 1 percent of our annual budget for aid to North Korea should have its prerequisites.

Last Feb. 8, North and South Korea, after six months of negotiations, reached an agreement on the conditions of military security in the Demilitarized Zone during the restoration of the Gyeongui railroad and highway. It was decided that the defense ministers of North and South would sign and exchange written agreements in six days. But three days later, the South Korean representative, Kim Gyeong-deok, received the following telegram from the North Korean military: "We cannot exchange written agreements due to administrative reasons. We will inform you of the change of dates in due time." This wasn't the only time the North had withdrawn from an agreement unilaterally.

In a survey conducted by Joong-Ang Ilbo last September, 63.4 percent of the Korean public answered that North-South relationships should be based on reciprocity. Voices demanding reciprocity will surely get louder if we use 1 percent of our budget for aid to North Korea. Should North Korea continue its tendency to break its word, it will obviously become difficult to give it any aid. "It would be difficult to apply strict reciprocity, but we should make it clear to the North Korean government that there will be no 'giving without taking,' " emphasized Kim Young-yun, senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

What we demand in return is a guarantee of peace, and this begins with constructing a foundation of trust in military affairs. A direct military hotline between North and South, mutual observation of large-scale military training, notification of large-scale troop movements and establishing a standing North-South military organization to prevent military collision are all specific steps to build trust.

"North Korea mentioned the building of trust in its announcement of armament reduction in May 1990, so we can expect some kind of favorable response in that area," said Professor Moon Chung-In of Yonsei University.

North Korea should embrace economic cooperation and cultural exchange opportunities that will provide the atmosphere for the guarantee of peace. The four agreements on economic cooperation between North and South, including the agreement on investment security, were signed but never carried out. They should be implemented, and the work on the Gyeongui railroad restoration should be finished. Above all, North Korea should respond to issues of humanitarian cooperation, like establishing a reunion house for separated families and the return of prisoners of war and kidnapped people. A Ministry of Unification official said, "North Korea should at least allow letter exchanges and money transfers for the separated families."

North Korea experts point out that the 1992 Basic Agreement should be the main basis for our demands of the North. A former deputy minister of unification, Song Young-dai, said, "The 1992 Basic Agreement contains concrete demands for the peaceful coexistence of North and South. We should try to get North Korea to implement the agreement with the promise of giving 1 percent of our budget as aid."

Opinions vary on how to use the promise of aid in persuading North Korea to listen to our demands. But all opinions take account of the different economic levels in North and South and apply an "asymmetrical" offer of economic aid in return for a guarantee of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

Further, all opinions expect long-term results but require demonstrated progress at each step. Yun Deok-min, professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said, "There is the risk of North Korea refusing our aid if we make demands for it. However, it is imperative that we get North Korea to agree to certain terms of peace and security and carry out these terms in exchange for the aid."

Unified public support is essential for government-level aid to North Korea to have the intended flexibility and effect. In the end, it is the people who pay for this aid through their taxes. Heretofore, all administrations, including President Kim Dae-jung's, have carried on their aid programs to North Korea without building public consensus, in the end losing both legitimacy and the expected results. Even the aid agreed on at the minister-level meeting in Jeju in September 2000 was announced by the Ministry of Unification after only a two-day survey of 1,000 respondents, despite the ministry's announcement that "all aid to North Korea will be given under social consensus." In the survey, 55.3 percent approved of sending the North 500,000 metric tons of food worth $90 million, while 42.6 percent disapproved.

"We gave 13 billion won, 0.017 percent of our budget, to North Korea last year," a government official admitted. "But we acted as if it was a great amount, without even reading the public's reaction correctly." The government knows it was at fault to have announced an aid program to North Korea before getting public support, and then to have compromised itself by telling North Korea it would give aid through unpublicized negotiations.

"There should be a consensus between the government and the public concerning the strategic approach to North Korea," said Suh Choo-suk, a researcher for the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. "The procedures should call for the consent of the National Assembly and for public discussions if there is not to be conflict later on."

"The people must be assured that inter-Korean affairs won't be used in political fights between the ruling party and opposition," prescribed Huh Moon-young, senior researcher at Korea Institute for National Unification. "Only then would government policies be supported by the people,"

Yu Seog-yeol, another professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, called for structural changes to assure nonpartisan policies.

This year - the last in President Kim's tenure - will provide an important testing ground for securing a long-term North Korea policy regardless of who wins the next election.

by Oh Young-hwan