People to people: brothers or foreigners?

In the early 1980s, in Yeoksam-dong, southern Seoul, a group of residents at one apartment complex gathered for a bansanghoe, a meeting of residents. Housewives, each representing their families, gathered over yogurt and snacks, talking about better ways to collect garbage and keep the elevator running. Flash forward to Rajin-Sonbong Village in North Hamgyeong province in northern Korea in 2024. A group of workers at a private textile factory are gathered for the same civic purpose. The residents are all from the former North Korea. Drinking Bacchus, a Korean caffeinated drink, and munching snacks, the residents are learning how to pay utility bills and vote in elections. Guiding them through the intricate world is a Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs official who was dispatched to the village to teach residents the capitalistic and democratic way of life. He works, side by side, with former Workers Party members who did not reach high positions in the Kim Jong-il regime. Most of the residents of Rajin-Sonbong live in the same houses, work at the same workplaces and attend the same schools that they used when the Koreas were divided. The community is familiar, the buildings are the same and neighbors have known each other for a generation. But the similarities stop there. The residents own their houses or apartments; they received titles from the unified Korean government. Workers receive wages, with incentives for productivity. And Koreans from the south are visibly active in the new government organizations, in the schools with their new curriculums and in the community. There are also South Korean volunteers who teach Chinese characters and English to school children and adults alike. Church services are held on Sundays and Buddhists worship at temples. “We don't want sudden change. North Koreans will live where they used to live, but with ownership of property. They may have new jobs or they may continue to work at the old jobs but with different goals. They will relearn the democratic and capitalistic way of life,” predicted Suh Jae-jean, a senior research fellow of the state-run Korea Institute of National Unification. Perhaps the biggest thing they won’t be able to do freely is travel to the southern part of the country. “We may adopt a visa system in the initial stages, until the two Koreas grow more familiar with each other,” Mr. Suh said. Down in the former North Korean capital of Pyeongyang in 2024, in a modern building along Changgwang Street, travel agencies have posted ads for group tours to Mount Baekdu. Walk down a little further, and you can watch the state-run Korea Broadcasting System filming “Imjin Wars.” Lee Woo-young, a professor of sociology at Kyungnam University's Graduate School of North Korean Studies, said, “Our goal of achieving $20,000 gross domestic product per capita would really translate into better quality of life, not another $20,000 poured into maintaining South Korea's 650,000 soldiers and the North's 1.17 million.” A majority of North Korean experts forecast that unification could come within two decades. That prediction is based on the assumption that the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, now 62, may expire at about the same age as his father, Kim Il Sung. Those experts said that there is no concrete sign that Kim Jong-il's sons are being groomed to succeed him; even if they were, North Koreans may not accept a third generation. The integration of the two Koreas’ systems would pose less difficulty than the integration of people's lives. “A lot of North Koreans would have their entire life history denied. They will inevitably suffer an identity crisis,” said Kwon Kyoung-young, a professor at the Institute of Political Education for Unification. A North Korean defector who has been in South Korea for the past nine years said that his identify crisis came in the form of “hypocrisy”: “I am not able to be myself any more. That change is the hardest part for me.” Ms. Kwon at the Institute of Political Education for Unification pointed out the German example of the difficulties of social integration. “The split is seen when former West Germans call their East neighbors ‘Ossies’ with the connotation of “lazy,” and former East Germans call their West neighbors ‘Wissies,’ or arrogant.” Mr. Suh at the Korea Institute of National Unification said government re-education programs and the mass media would have to play a key role in dampening those perceptions. “Have the major networks air special documentaries about the truth concerning the Korean War several times, and it will have an impact,” Mr. Suh said, but added that it won’t be easy. “As the saying goes, a habit acquired as a three-year-old will last through 80. It will be that hard to change the mindset,” he said. Unlike the general perception that North Korea is a workers’ paradise where men and women are equal, Mr. Suh said that North Koreans are highly authority-oriented. “They tend to look for jobs that bring power, and are quick to establish a hierarchy in any group,” he said. “Also, North Koreans are used to the state providing every aspect of life, so their reliance on the government will be high. Civic groups and religious groups that are helping North Korean defectors have already pampered them by doling out 500,000 won ($435) a month if a North Korean defector comes to church every Sunday.” What may be harder to erase and reset is the indoctrination of the worship of Kim Il Sung and the consequent distortion of Korea’s history. Mr. Suh said, “North Koreans believe that South Korea invaded North Korea to start the Korean War, even though I have interviewed a North Korean soldier who testified to waiting in his dugout in the northern part of Gangneung to invade the South in the early morning hours of June 25.” He said, though, that despite these foreseeable obstacles, the price of reunifying the two Koreas is far cheaper that the price of division. Mr. Lee at Kyungnam University seconded Mr. Suh's argument. “We have to change our thinking. The price of unification will be far cheaper than the price that we will pay to address these costs of division. The price we pay, both in defense spending and psychologically, for the division is far too high.” by Kim Ji-soo